


Building More Windows RPC Tooling for Security Research

James Forshaw, Google Project Zero



Who Am I?

- Researcher @ GPZ
- Specialize in Windows
- Writer of Tools!



“Never met a logical vulnerability I didn’t like.”

I've Been Here Before (in 2019)

James Forshaw, "Reimplementing Local RPC in .NET"/p>

James Forshaw is a security researcher in Google's Project Zero. He has been involved with computer hardware and software security for over 10 years looking at a range of different platforms and applications. With a great interest in logical vulnerabilities he's been listed as the #1 researcher for MSRC, as well as being a Pwn2Own and Microsoft Mitigation Bypass bounty winner. He has spoken at a number of security conferences including Black Hat USA, CanSecWest, Bluehat, HITB, and Infiltrate.

[Abstract]

=====


Finding privilege escalation in local Windows RPC servers is the new hotness. Unfortunately the standard Microsoft tooling only generates code for C/C++ which presents a problem for anyone wanting to write proof-of-concepts in a .NET language such as C# or PowerShell.

This presentation will go through the various tasks I undertook to implement a working including:


- Assessing the best approaches to implementing an RPC client in .NET.
- Reverse engineering the APIs to identify the low-level ALPC implementation.
- Implementing NDR parsing and serialization.
- PowerShell Integration.

The presentation will finish up with some details one of the bugs I discovered with the new tooling. The tooling itself will be available to all.

MSRPC "Native" Architecture



MSRPC "With .NET Tooling" Architecture



Where we got to.

- Parsed NDR "bytecode" from server executables
- Generate pseudo code to inspect parsed NDR
- Implemented transport for ALPC
- Generate C# RPC clients on the fly from bytecode
- Found various bugs

Carve out the RPC services in RPCSERVER.EXE

```
PS> $rpc_server = Get-RpcServer "rpcserver.exe"
```

Format an RPC endpoint as pseudo C#.

```
PS> $rpc_server | Format-RpcServer
```

Generate and compile a client for a parsed RPC server.

```
PS> $client = Get-RpcClient $rpc_server
```

Connect an RPC client, try and lookup ALPC port from Endpoint Mapper

```
PS> Connect-RpcClient $client
```

Connect an RPC client, try and lookup ALPC port by brute force.

```
PS> Connect-RpcClient $client -FindAlpcPort
```

Demo

"Possible" Future Work

- Implement parsing NDR64 byte code and NDR64 wire format.
- Support Pipes and some misc other types.
- Implement asynchronous support.
- Implement transports for Named Pipes and TCP.
- Add server support.

"Possible" Future Work

- Implement parsing NDR64 byte code and NDR64 wire format.
- Support Pipes and some misc other types.
- ~~● Implement asynchronous support.~~
- Implement transports for Named Pipes and TCP
 - *Hyper-V sockets*
- ~~● Add server support.~~
- *Linux and macOS support*
- *Improved RPC Server Discovery*
- *IDL file output*

NDR64



NDR Was Mostly Documented

RPC NDR Format Strings

NDR Engine: 32-bit Interpreter

This document describes the format string descriptors, sometimes referred to as MOPs, for the 32-bit NDR engine. This section describes changes associated with the evolution from the `-Oi` interpreter to the `-Oif` interpreter layer, as well as additions related to pipes and asynchronous support.

This document describes current Microsoft Interface Definition Language (MIDL) technology from the engine perspective, and the current NDR engine.

Interface Definition Language (IDL)

```
typedef struct _MYSTRUCT {  
    DWORD a;  
    [string] const wchar_t* b;  
} MYSTRUCT;
```

```
[  
    uuid(4870536E-23FA-4CD5-9637-3F1A1699D3DC),  
    version(1.0),
```


RPC Interface
GUID and Version

```
] interface RpcServer
```

```
{  
    int Func([in] handle_t hBinding, [out] MYSTRUCT* abc);  
}
```

RPC functions

MIDL Compiler



```
C:\> midl /protocol ndr64 server.idl
```

Auto-generated Server Definition Information

```
struct RPC_SERVER_INTERFACE {  
    unsigned int Length;  
    RPC_SYNTAX_IDENTIFIER InterfaceId;  
    RPC_SYNTAX_IDENTIFIER TransferSyntax;  
    // ...  
    void const* InterpreterInfo;  
}
```


RPC Interface
GUID and Version

Transfer Syntax
NDR64:
71710533-BEBA-4937-8319-B5DBEF9CCC36

```
struct MIDL_SERVER_INFO {  
    // ...  
    const SERVER_ROUTINE* DispatchTable;  
    PFORMAT_STRING ProcString;  
    const unsigned short* FmtStringOffset;  
    // ...  
}
```

List of NDR64 Procedure Pointers

Example NDR64 Bytecode Structure



Procedure Parameters


```
struct NDR64_PARAM_FORMAT {  
    PNDR64_FORMAT      Type;  
    NDR64_PARAM_FLAGS Attributes; in/out etc.  
    NDR64_UINT16      Reserved;  
    NDR64_UINT32      StackOffset;  
};
```

```
const NDR64_FORMAT_CHAR __midl_fragY  
= 0x5 /* FC64_INT32 */;
```

Not in any headers!

```
struct __midl_fragZ_t {  
    NDR64_BOGUS_STRUCTURE_HEADER_FORMAT frag1;  
    NDR64_SIMPLE_MEMBER_FORMAT         frag2;  
    NDR64_MEMPAD_FORMAT                 In "ndr64types.h" frag3;  
    NDR64_SIMPLE_MEMBER_FORMAT         frag4;  
};
```

Private COM Symbols Saves the Day (Again!)



The screenshot shows a WinDbg window titled "Dump C:\Windows\System32\combase.dll - WinDbg:10.0.22621.755 AMD64". The Command window contains the following text:

```
0:000> dt combase!NDR64_FORMAT_CHARACTER
FC64_ZERO = 0n0
FC64_UINT8 = 0n1
FC64_INT8 = 0n2
FC64_UINT16 = 0n3
FC64_INT16 = 0n4
FC64_INT32 = 0n5
FC64_UINT32 = 0n6
FC64_INT64 = 0n7
FC64_UINT64 = 0n8
FC64_INT128 = 0n9
FC64_UINT128 = 0n10
FC64_FLOAT32 = 0n11
FC64_FLOAT64 = 0n12
FC64_FLOAT80 = 0n13
FC64_FLOAT128 = 0n14
FC64_CHAR = 0n16
FC64_WCHAR = 0n17
FC64_IGNORE = 0n18
FC64_ERROR_STATUS_T = 0n19
FC64_POINTER = 0n20
FC64_RP = 0n32
FC64_UP = 0n33
```

The status bar at the bottom of the window displays: "Ln 0, Col 0 Sys 0:C:\Wind Proc 000:f0f0f0f0 Thrd 000:1 ASM OVR CAPS NUM".

Get Parsed NDR64 Procedures

```
PS> $rpc_server = Get-RpcServer "rpcserver.exe"
PS> $rpc_server.Ndr64Procedures
Name           : Func
Params         : {_hProcHandle, ...}
ReturnValue    : FC64_INT32 ...
Handle        : FC64_BIND_PRIMITIVE ...
...
```

Implementing NDR64 Wire Protocol



THE *Open* GROUP

HOME / DCE 1.1: REMOTE PROCEDURE CALL

TM

DCE 1.1: REMOTE PROCEDURE CALL
REFERENCE: C706
AVAILABLE TO DOWNLOAD
This document specifies DCE Remote Procedure Call (RPC) services, interface, protocols.

[MS-RPCE]: Remote Procedure Call Protocol Extensions

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Demo

Implementing OSF Transports

OSF is Slightly Different from ALPC Transport

```
struct LRPC_BIND_MESSAGE {  
    LRPC_HEADER Header;  
    int RpcStatus;  
    RPC_SYNTAX_IDENTIFIER Interface;  
    TransferSyntaxSetFlags TransferSyntaxSet;  
    short DceNdrSyntaxIdentifier;  
    short Ndr64SyntaxIdentifier;  
    short FakeNdr64SyntaxIdentifier;  
    bool RegisterMultipleSyntax;  
    bool UseFlowId;  
    long FlowId;  
    int ContextId;  
}
```

ALPC

```
struct bind_pdu {  
    byte rpc_vers = 5;  
    byte rpc_vers_minor;  
    byte PTYPE = bind;  
    byte pfc_flags;  
    byte packed_drep[4];  
    ushort frag_length;  
    ushort auth_length;  
    uint call_id;  
    ushort max_xmit_frag;  
    ushort max_recv_frag;  
    uint assoc_group_id;  
    ContextList p_context_elem;  
}
```

OSF

RPC Binding Strings

Protocol:NetworkAddress[Endpoint]

ncacn_np - Named Pipe
ncacn_ip_tcp - TCP socket

Optional DNS/IP name

\pipe\rpc - Named Pipe
1234 - TCP port

```
PS> $b = Get-RpcStringBinding "ncacn_np" "\pipe\rpc"  
PS> Connect-RpcClient $client -StringBinding $b
```

```
PS> Connect-RpcClient $client -ProtocolSequence  
"ncacn_np" "\pipe\rpc" -NetworkAddress "server.com"
```


Security Context Multiplexing

- Microsoft extension (see MS-RPCE §3.3.1.5.4)
- Allows you to negotiate multiple security context for the same connection and switch them for each call.
- Could have interesting behaviors!

```
PS> Add-RpcClientSecurityContext $client  
-AuthenticationLevel PacketPrivacy
```

Demo

Do We Support All Useful Protocols?

```
PS> Get-RpcEndpoint | Group ProtocolSequence
```

```
Count Name
```

```
-----
```

```
19 ncacn_ip_tcp
```

```
396 ncalrpc
```


```
15 ncacn_np
```

```
1 ncacn_hvsocket
```

What's this?



Hyper-V Sockets



Hyper-V Socket RPC Binding Strings

```
ncacn_hvsocket:VMID[SYSID]
```



VM ID to connect to

Empty	: Loopback
"parent"	: Parent host
"silohost"	: Parent silo
GUID	: VM by ID.

GUID of service to connect to.

Endpoint Mapper:
DA32E281-383E-49A1-900A-AF3B74B90B0E

```
PS> Get-HyperVSocketTable -Listener
```

Demo

Cross Platform Support



PowerShell is Cross Platform



PowerShell [↗](#)

Welcome to the PowerShell GitHub Community! [PowerShell](#) is a cross-platform (Windows, Linux, and macOS) automation and configuration tool/framework that works well with your existing tools and is optimized for dealing with structured data (e.g. JSON, CSV, XML, etc.), REST APIs, and object models. It includes a command-line shell, an associated scripting language, and a framework for processing cmdlets.

Changes Required

- Can't use ALPC for obvious reasons
- Linux does support Hyper-V sockets but only exposes a "VSOCK" interface
- Reimplement any code which uses Windows APIs
 - Parsing string bindings
 - Endpoint mapper
- Implement managed NTLM/Kerberos/Negotiate authentication
- TCP works out to the box
- Named Pipes needs a managed SMB client
 - Well I'll just write my own :)

Demo

Pipes and Other Types

Pipes

```
typedef pipe char EFS_EXIM_PIPE;
```

```
long EfsRpcReadFileRaw(  
    [in] PEXIMPORT_CONTEXT_HANDLE    hContext,  
    [out] EFS_EXIM_PIPE                * EfsOutPipe  
);
```

Define a pipe type using a certain base type.

```
long EfsRpcWriteFileRaw(  
    [in] PEXIMPORT_CONTEXT_HANDLE    hContext,  
    [in] EFS_EXIM_PIPE                * EfsInPipe  
);
```

Use for input or output

C Implementation

```
typedef struct pipe_EFS_EXIM_PIPE {  
    void (*pull)(char* state, char* buf,  
                unsigned long esize, unsigned long * ecount);  
    void (*push)(char* state, char* buf,  
                unsigned long ecount);  
    void (*alloc)(char* state, unsigned long bsize,  
                 long** buf, unsigned long* bcount );  
    char * state;  
} EFS_EXIM_PIPE;
```

Push and pull data on demand.

.NET Implementation

Exposed as a raw array.

```
int EfsRpcReadFileRaw(NdrContextHandle hContext,  
    out byte[] EfsOutPipe) {  
    CheckSynchronousPipeSupport();  
    _Marshal_Helper m = new();  
    m.WriteContextHandle(hContext);  
    _Unmarshal_Helper u = SendReceive();  
    EfsOutPipe = u.ReadPipeArray<byte>();  
    return u.ReadInt32();  
}
```

Only supported on OSF protocols
(ALPC needs async support)

Read synchronously
from stream.

Context Handles

```
typedef [context_handle] void* CONTEXT_HANDLE;
```

- Default
 - Can be passed to any RPC interface in the same process
- Strict
 - Can only be passed to the same RPC interface
- Type Strict
 - Can only be passed to the same RPC interface and must have the same MIDL type.

```
PS> $rs | Select-RpcServer -NonStrictContextHandle
```

Credential Guard RPC Interfaces

```
PS> Get-RpcServer C:\windows\system32\LsaIso.exe
```

Name	UUID	Ver	Procs	EPs	Service	Running
-----	-----	---	-----	---	-----	-----
LsaIso.exe	a3e5af3e-8a33-4737-af6e-bc1f8ecee4bf	1.0	5	0		False
LsaIso.exe	39730ec4-82ea-4fdf-8a45-c408e393e212	1.0	2	0		False
LsaIso.exe	eda3c9e4-0d4c-4bb7-b612-0e89d4f0607d	1.0	1	0		False
LsaIso.exe	57cce375-4430-47a6-bb96-2cad0d2fd140	1.0	26	0		False
LsaIso.exe	9cfeead6-6135-4fcf-831a-fd3b236023f8	1.0	33	0		False
LsaIso.exe	45527ae0-2a7d-4cec-b214-739f4159c392	1.0	19	0		False
LsaIso.exe	1707e621-44e3-4f54-bb7d-c537eabb55a5	1.0	3	0		False

```
PS> Get-Item 'NtObject:\RPC Control\LSA_ISO_RPC_SERVER'
```

Name	TypeName
-----	-----
LSA_ISO_RPC_SERVER	ALPC Port

BCrypt RPC Implementation CVE-2022-34705

```
NTSTATUS BCryptIumOpenAlgorithmProvider(BCRYPT_ISO_OBJECT **obj,  
    LPCWSTR pszAlgId, ULONG dwFlags) {  
    BCRYPT_ALG_HANDLE hAlgorithm;  
    BCryptOpenAlgorithmProvider(&hAlgorithm, pszAlgId,  
                                NULL, dwFlags);  
    *obj = AllocateBCryptIsoObject(hAlgorithm);  
    return STATUS_SUCCESS;  
}
```

BCrypt RPC Implementation CVE-2022-34705

```
NTSTATUS BCryptIumOpenAlgorithmProvider(BCRYPT_ISO_OBJECT **obj,  
LPCWSTR pszAlgId, ULONG dwFlags) {
```

```
BCRYPT_ISO_OBJECT *AllocateBCryptIsoObject(  
BCRYPT_ALG_HANDLE hAlgorithm) {  
    BCRYPT_ISO_OBJECT* result = LocalAlloc(0,  
                                           sizeof(BCRYPT_ISO_OBJECT));  
    result->Magic = 'BIOM';  
    result->hAlgorithm = hAlgorithm;  
    return result;  
}
```

BCrypt RPC Implementation CVE-2022-34705

```
NTS  
L  
B  
B  
*  
r  
}  
  
NTSTATUS BCryptIumCloseAlgorithmProvider(BCRYPT_ISO_OBJECT *obj,  
                                           ULONG dwFlags) {  
    if (!obj || obj->Magic == 'BIOM') {  
        return STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE;  
    }  
    BCryptCloseAlgorithmProvider(obj->hAlgorithm, dwFlags);  
    LocalFree(obj);  
    return STATUS_SUCCESS;  
}
```

BCrypt RPC Interface Definition CVE-2022-34705

```
typedef [context_handle] void* PBCRYPT_HANDLE_TYPE;
```

Context
Handles

```
[uuid("57cce375-4430-47a6-bb96-2cad0d2fd140"), version(1.0)]
```

```
interface BCryptInterface {
```

```
    HRESULT BCryptIumGetClientContext([out] PBCRYPT_HANDLE_TYPE* p0);
```

```
    HRESULT BCryptIumReleaseContext([ref] PBCRYPT_HANDLE_TYPE* p0);
```

```
    HRESULT BCryptIumOpenAlgorithmProvider([in] handle_t p1, [out] int64_t* p1,  
        [in] wchar_t* p2, [in] wchar_t* p3, [in] int p4);
```

```
    ...
```

```
    HRESULT BCryptIumCloseAlgorithmProvider(PBCRYPT_HANDLE_TYPE p0,  
        [in] int64_t p1, [in] int p2);
```

```
    ...
```

```
}
```

NOT
Context
Handles!

BCrypt RPC Interface Definition CVE-2022-34705

```
typedef [context_handle] void* PBCRYPT_HANDLE_TYPE;
```

Context
Handles

```
[uuid("57cce375-4430-47a6-bb96-2cad0d2fd140"), version(1.0)]
```

```
interface BCryptInterface {
```

```
    HRESULT BCryptIumGetClientContext([out] PBCRYPT_HANDLE_TYPE* p0);
```

```
    HRESULT BCryptIumReleaseContext([ref] PBCRYPT_HANDLE_TYPE* p0);
```

```
H PS> $client.BCryptIumCloseAlgorithmProviders(0x12345678, 0)
```

```
...
```


```
    HRESULT BCryptIumCloseAlgorithmProvider(PBCRYPT_HANDLE_TYPE p0,  
                                             [in] int64_t p1, [in] int p2);
```

NOT
Context
Handles!


```
...
```

```
}
```

Testing Non-Strict Context Handles



Multiplexing



Association

```
PS> Connect-RpcClient $client1 -ProtocolSequence  
"ncacn_np" -NetworkAddress "localhost"
```

Must use "remote"
named pipe.

```
PS> $config = New-RpcClientTransportConfig  
-ProtocolSequence "ncacn_np"
```

Copy association
group ID

```
PS> $config.AssociationGroupId =  
$client1.Transport.AssociationGroupId
```

```
PS> Connect-RpcClient $client2 -ProtocolSequence  
"ncacn_np" -NetworkAddress "localhost"  
-Configuration $config
```

Type-strict Context Handles

```
typedef [context_handle] void* SERVICE_HANDLE;  
typedef [context_handle] void* DATA_HANDLE;  
int Test1([out] SERVICE_HANDLE* sh);  
int Test2([in] DATA_HANDLE dh);
```

Original
IDL

```
int Test1(out NdrContextHandle sh);  
int Test2(NdrContextHandle dh);
```

Old Code
Gen

```
int Test1(out TypeStrictContextHandle_1 sh);  
int Test2(TypeStrictContextHandle_2 dh);
```

New Code
Gen

Demo

Creeping up on RpcView

RpcView

The screenshot displays the RpcView application window with the following components:

- Decompilation:** Shows C++ code for an interface named `DefaultIfName`. It includes a `typedef struct Struct_30_t` and a function `error_status_t Proc0` with various parameters and return types.
- Processes:** A table listing running processes with columns for Name, Pid, and Path.
- Interfaces:** A table showing interface details for a specific process.
- Procedures:** A table listing procedure addresses and formats.
- Status Bar:** Displays summary statistics: Endpoints: 1/245, Interfaces: 1/345, Processes: 177/177.

Name	Pid	Path
svchost.exe	2928	C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
svchost.exe	3180	C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
svchost.exe	3208	C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
svchost.exe	3256	C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
vmms.exe	3292	C:\Windows\System32\vmms.exe
svchost.exe	3344	C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
svchost.exe	3420	C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
svchost.exe	3444	C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
svchost.exe	3456	C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe

Pid	Uuid	Ver	Type	Procs
2800	18f70770-8e64-... 0.0	0.0	RPC	5

Index	Name	Address	Format
0		0x00007ffe5d6db900	0x00007ffe5d7d4b92
1		0x00007ffe5d6db600	0x00007ffe5d7d4bd4
2		0x00007ffe5d6033c0	0x00007ffe5d7d4c0a
3		0x00007ffe5d6db8d0	0x00007ffe5d7d4c46
4		0x00007ffe5d5fe030	0x00007ffe5d7d4c70

Endpoints: 1/245 | Interfaces: 1/345 | Processes: 177/177

Querying Process From a Transport

```
struct ALPC_SERVER_SESSION_INFORMATION { ncalrpc
    DWORD SessionId;
    DWORD ProcessId;
};

NtAlpcQueryInformation(hPort, AlpcServerSessionInformation, ...)
```

```
BOOL GetNamedPipeServerProcessId( ncacn_np
    HANDLE Pipe, PULONG ServerProcessId
);
```

```
DWORD GetExtendedTcpTable( ncacn_ip_tcp
    PVOID pTcpTable,
    // ...
);
```

Query Endpoint Manager

```
PS> Get-RpcEndpoint | Group {$_.GetServerProcess().ProcessId}
Count Name Group
-----
94 1968 {[0b1c2170-5732-4e0e-8cd3-d9b16f3b84d7:0.0] ...}
1 39672 {[09c76598-1491-4810-bbb0-7f403a2ab7ea:5.1] ncalrpc...}
1 47684 {[09c76598-1491-4810-bbb0-7f403a2ab7ea:5.1] ncalrpc...}
2 34652 {[c9ac6db5-82b7-4e55-ae8a-e464ed7b4277:1.0] ncalrpc...}
1 33756 {[a111f1c5-5923-47c0-9a68-d0bafb577901:1.0] ncacn_np...}
1 29308 {[54f96d15-d9a7-4422-bd32-8b0cebd00400:1.0] ncalrpc...}
13 7752 {[552d076a-cb29-4e44-8b6a-d15e59e2c0af:1.0] ncalrpc...}
2 28632 {[0a46e05f-ded7-4890-9dca-8256bb7ad510:2.0] ...}
```

Enumerating ALPC Port Handles

```
PS> Get-RpcAlpcServer -IgnoreComInterface
PID      ProcessName      Endpoints  Name
----      -
9712     sihost.exe       3          \RPC Control\LRPC-...
8864     PowerMgr.exe     1          \RPC Control\BaseModule...
7304     taskhostw.exe   2          \RPC Control\PlaySoundKRpc1
7304     taskhostw.exe   2          \RPC Control\webcache...
19548    dllhost.exe     6          \RPC Control\webplats...
15656    svchost.exe     6          \RPC Control\LRPC-...
```

Parsing All Modules in a Process

```
PS> Get-RpcServer -ProcessId 1234 | Select Name, InterfaceId
```

Name	InterfaceId
----	-----
RPCRT4.dll	afa8bd80-7d8a-11c9-bef4-08002b102989
combase.dll	18f70770-8e64-11cf-9af1-0020af6e72f4
combase.dll	00000131-0000-0000-c000-000000000046
combase.dll	00000143-0000-0000-c000-000000000046
combase.dll	e1ac57d7-2eeb-4553-b980-f80c69a9e0f7
combase.dll	69c09ea0-4a09-101b-ae4b-08002b349a02
WS2_32.dll	048cf666-ab42-42b4-8975-1357018decb3
SSPICLI.DLL	4f32adc8-6052-4a04-8701-293ccf2096f0

Getting Services with RPC Interface Triggers

```
PS> Get-Win32Service | ? { $_.Triggers.Count -gt 0 }
PS> $t = [...RpcInterfaceServiceTriggerInformation]
PS> foreach($s in $ss) {
    $ts = $s.Triggers | % {$_ .GetType()}
    if ($t -in $ts) {
        "< $($s.Name)>"
        $s.Triggers.InterfaceId | Out-String
    }
}

<Appinfo>
201ef99a-7fa0-444c-9399-19ba84f12a1a
5f54ce7d-5b79-4175-8584-cb65313a0e98
...
```


Formatting RPC Servers

```
[uuid("4870536e-23fa-4cd5-9637-3f1a1699d3dc"), version(1.0)]  
interface intf_4870536e_23fa_4cd5_9637_3f1a1699d3dc {  
    HRESULT Test1([In] handle_t hBinding, [In] wchar_t* str);  
    HRESULT Test2([In] handle_t hBinding, [Out] wchar_t** str);  
    // ...  
}
```

Old Style Pseudo C#

```
[uuid(4870536E-23FA-4CD5-9637-3F1A1699D3DC), version(1.0)]  
interface intf_4870536e_23fa_4cd5_9637_3f1a1699d3dc {  
    int Test1([in] handle_t hBinding, [in, string] wchar_t* str);  
    int Test2([in] handle_t _hProcHandle, [out] wchar_t** str);  
    // ...  
}
```

New Style "Real" IDL

Another Reason to Generate IDL



⚠️ 44 security vendors and no sandboxes flagged this file as malicious

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f6668fabad4055f2cc140df33b027a9cf6540bf81385642cb1725...
ntobjectmanager.1.1.33.nupkg

Size

1.78 MB

Last Analysis Date

1 month ago



zip

runtime-modules

detect-debug-environment

long-sleeps

direct-cpu-clock-access

checks-user-input

DETECTION

DETAILS

RELATIONS

BEHAVIOR

CONTENT

TELEMETRY

COMMUNITY

AhnLab-V3

⚠️ Trojan.Win.Generic.C4435545

Alibaba

⚠️ Exploit:MSIL/Inpat.8ac00b4a

ALYac

⚠️ Trojan.GenericKD.50130014

Antiy-AVL

⚠️ Trojan[Exploit]/MSIL.Inpat

Arcabit

⚠️ Trojan.Generic.D2554A4C [many]

Avast

⚠️ Win32:ExploitX-gen [Expl]

DEMO

Thanks!
Questions?