Exploiting Errors in Windows Error Reporting in 2022

XueFeng Li of Sangfor
Dr. Zhiniang Peng of Sangfor

C:\> whoarewe

- Xuefeng Li

Xuefeng Li (@lxf02942370) is a security researcher at Sangfor. He have forced on Windows vulnerability hunting and exploitation for almost. ranked #10, #22, #23 on the MSRC Most Valuable Security Researcher list in 2020, 2021 and 2022.

- Zhiniang Peng

Dr. Zhiniang Peng (@edwardzpeng) is the Principal Security Researcher at Sangfor. His current research areas include applied cryptography, software security and threat hunting. He has more than 10 years of experience in both offensive and defensive security and published many research in both academia and industry.

Agenda

- Basic of Windows Error Reporting
- Vulnerabilities history of Windows Error Reporting
- Incorrect Handle Duplicate lead to EOP - CVE-2022-35795
- Conclusion

Part1

Basic of Windows Error Reporting

Start WerSvc By ETW




```
__int64 SignalStartWerSvc(void)
{
  unsigned int v0; // ebx
  int v1; // edi
  int v3; // [rsp+40h] [rbp-28h] BYREF
  __int64 v4[2]; // [rsp+48h] [rbp-20h] BYREF

  v0 = 0;
  v1 = 0;
  if ( (int)ZwQueryWnfStateNameInformation(&WNF_WER_SERVICE_START, 1i64, 0i64, &v3, 4) >= 0
    && v3
    && (int)ZwUpdateWnfStateData(&WNF_WER_SERVICE_START, 0i64, 0i64, 0i64, 0i64, 0, 0) >= 0 )
  {
    v1 = 1;
  }
  v4[0] = 0i64;
  v4[1] = 0i64;
  if ( !(unsigned int)EtwEventWriteNoRegistration(&`SignalStartWerSvc'::`2'::WerSvcTriggerGuid, v4, 0i64, 0i64) )
    ++v1;
  if ( !v1 )
    return 0xC0000080;
  return v0;
}
```

Collect User Process Memory Dump



Collecting User-Mode Dumps

HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\Windows Error Reporting\LocalDumps

WerFault.exe



10:36...	WerFault.exe	17052	CreateFile	C:\CrashDumps	SUCCESS	Desired Access...
10:36...	WerFault.exe	17052	QueryDirectory	C:\CrashDumps*.dmp	SUCCESS	Filter: *.dmp,...
10:36...	WerFault.exe	17052	QueryDirectory	C:\CrashDumps	SUCCESS	0: LenovoVanta...
10:36...	WerFault.exe	17052	QueryDirectory	C:\CrashDumps	SUCCESS	0: PetitPotam....
10:36...	WerFault.exe	17052	QueryDirectory	C:\CrashDumps	NO MORE FILES	
10:36...	WerFault.exe	17052	CloseFile	C:\CrashDumps	SUCCESS	
10:36...	WerFault.exe	17052	CreateFile	C:\CrashDumps\CrashMe.exe.2268.dmp	SUCCESS	Desired Access...
10:36...	WerFault.exe	17052	WriteFile	C:\CrashDumps\CrashMe.exe.2268.dmp	SUCCESS	Offset: 0, Len...
10:36...	WerFault.exe	17052	WriteFile	C:\CrashDumps\CrashMe.exe.2268.dmp	SUCCESS	Offset: 3,376,...
10:36...	WerFault.exe	17052	WriteFile	C:\CrashDumps\CrashMe.exe.2268.dmp	SUCCESS	Offset: 3,380,...
10:36...	WerFault.exe	17052	WriteFile	C:\CrashDumps\CrashMe.exe.2268.dmp	SUCCESS	Offset: 176, L...
10:36...	WerFault.exe	17052	WriteFile	C:\CrashDumps\CrashMe.exe.2268.dmp	SUCCESS	Offset: 232, L...
10:36...	WerFault.exe	17052	WriteFile	C:\CrashDumps\CrashMe.exe.2268.dmp	SUCCESS	Offset: 3,976,...
10:36...	WerFault.exe	17052	WriteFile	C:\CrashDumps\CrashMe.exe.2268.dmp	SUCCESS	Offset: 1,596,...
10:36...	WerFault.exe	17052	WriteFile	C:\CrashDumps\CrashMe.exe.2268.dmp	SUCCESS	Offset: 10,526...
10:36...	WerFault.exe	17052	ReadFile	C:\CrashDumps\CrashMe.exe.2268.dmp	END OF FILE	Offset: 8,192,...
10:36...	WerFault.exe	17052	WriteFile	C:\CrashDumps\CrashMe.exe.2268.dmp	SUCCESS	Offset: 10,530...
10:36...	WerFault.exe	17052	WriteFile	C:\CrashDumps\CrashMe.exe.2268.dmp	SUCCESS	Offset: 10,962...
10:36...	WerFault.exe	17052	WriteFile	C:\CrashDumps\CrashMe.exe.2268.dmp	SUCCESS	Offset: 10,546...
10:36...	WerFault.exe	17052	WriteFile	C:\CrashDumps\CrashMe.exe.2268.dmp	SUCCESS	Offset: 56,714...
10:36...	WerFault.exe	17052	WriteFile	C:\CrashDumps\CrashMe.exe.2268.dmp	SUCCESS	Offset: 10,562...
10:36...	WerFault.exe	17052	WriteFile	C:\CrashDumps\CrashMe.exe.2268.dmp	SUCCESS	Offset: 58,714...
10:36...	WerFault.exe	17052	WriteFile	C:\CrashDumps\CrashMe.exe.2268.dmp	SUCCESS	Offset: 10,578...
10:36...	WerFault.exe	17052	WriteFile	C:\CrashDumps\CrashMe.exe.2268.dmp	SUCCESS	Offset: 91,482...
10:36...	WerFault.exe	17052	WriteFile	C:\CrashDumps\CrashMe.exe.2268.dmp	SUCCESS	Offset: 10,594...
10:36...	WerFault.exe	17052	WriteFile	C:\CrashDumps\CrashMe.exe.2268.dmp	SUCCESS	Offset: 105,09...
10:36...	WerFault.exe	17052	WriteFile	C:\CrashDumps\CrashMe.exe.2268.dmp	SUCCESS	Offset: 10,610...
10:36...	WerFault.exe	17052	WriteFile	C:\CrashDumps\CrashMe.exe.2268.dmp	SUCCESS	Offset: 115,03...
10:36...	WerFault.exe	17052	WriteFile	C:\CrashDumps\CrashMe.exe.2268.dmp	SUCCESS	Offset: 10,626...
10:36...	WerFault.exe	17052	WriteFile	C:\CrashDumps\CrashMe.exe.2268.dmp	SUCCESS	Offset: 115,29...
10:36...	WerFault.exe	17052	WriteFile	C:\CrashDumps\CrashMe.exe.2268.dmp	SUCCESS	Offset: 10,642...
10:36...	WerFault.exe	17052	WriteFile	C:\CrashDumps\CrashMe.exe.2268.dmp	SUCCESS	Offset: 116,88...
10:36...	WerFault.exe	17052	WriteFile	C:\CrashDumps\CrashMe.exe.2268.dmp	SUCCESS	Offset: 10,658...
10:36...	WerFault.exe	17052	WriteFile	C:\CrashDumps\CrashMe.exe.2268.dmp	SUCCESS	Offset: 118,47...
10:36...	WerFault.exe	17052	WriteFile	C:\CrashDumps\CrashMe.exe.2268.dmp	SUCCESS	Offset: 10,674...
10:36...	WerFault.exe	17052	WriteFile	C:\CrashDumps\CrashMe.exe.2268.dmp	SUCCESS	Offset: 126,67...
10:36...	WerFault.exe	17052	WriteFile	C:\CrashDumps\CrashMe.exe.2268.dmp	SUCCESS	Offset: 10,690...
10:36...	WerFault.exe	17052	WriteFile	C:\CrashDumps\CrashMe.exe.2268.dmp	SUCCESS	Offset: 127,76...

Collect and upload crash information for all the process




C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\WER\ReportQueue
\ReportQueue\AppCrash_{AppName}_*_*_*_*
Report.wer
Other files
Create Report
WerFault.exe
ReportQueue
\Temp
Memory Dump
Other files

With Internet Connection



No Internet Connection?

- WerFault.exe remains the reports in \ReportQueue
- WER trigger the schedule task **QueueReporting(wermgr.exe -upload)** to handle the reports

Attack Surface for WER

CWerService::LpcServerThread

Dispatch User Request

CWerService::DispatchPortRequestWorkItem

Forward to handler

```
v4 = a3;
v5 = this;
CWerService::CheckIfValidPortMessage(this, a3);
memcpy_0(message, v4, 0x578ui64);
RequestCode = *((_DWORD *)v4 + 10);
v28 = 0xC000000100000001ui64;
if ( RequestCode > 0xC0000002 )
{
  if ( RequestCode > 0xF0010002 )
  {
    switch ( RequestCode )
    {
      case 0xF0020002:
        v16 = CWerService::SvcMergeETWLogs((CWerService *)0xF0010002i64, v4, (struct _WERSVC_MSG *)message);
        break;
      case 0xF0030002:
        v16 = CWerService::SvcCollectMemoryInfo((CWerService *)0xF0010002i64, v4, (struct _WERSVC_MSG *)message);
        break;
      case 0xF0040002:
        v16 = CWerService::SvcCollectSystemInfo((CWerService *)0xF0010002i64, v4, (struct _WERSVC_MSG *)message);
        break;
      case 0xF0050002:
        v16 = CWerService::SvcGetTerminationReason((CWerService *)0xF0010002i64, v4, (struct _WERSVC_MSG *)message);
        break;
      case 0xF0060002:
        v16 = CWerService::SvcAddTerminationReason((CWerService *)0xF0010002i64, v4, (struct _WERSVC_MSG *)message);
        break;
      default:
        goto LABEL_61;
    }
  }
  else
  {
    switch ( RequestCode )
```

Attack Surface for WER

```
PS C:\> Get-ScheduledTask -TaskName QueueReporting

TaskPath                                    TaskName                    State
--------                                    --------                    -----
\Microsoft\Windows\Windows Error Reporting\    QueueReporting           Ready


PS C:\> (Get-ScheduledTask -TaskName QueueReporting).Actions


Id               :
Arguments        : -upload
Execute          : %windir%\system32\wermgr.exe
WorkingDirectory :
PSComputerName   :
```



Part 2

Vulnerabilities history of Windows Error Reporting

More than 25 vulnerabilities in Windows Error Reporting

	A	B	C
1	Release Date	Acknowledged For	Reference
2	Nov 12, 2019	Windows Error Reporting Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability	CVE-2019-1374
3	Oct 8, 2019	Windows Error Reporting Manager Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability	CVE-2019-1315
4	Oct 8, 2019	Windows Error Reporting Manager Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability	CVE-2019-1342
5	Oct 8, 2019	Windows Error Reporting Manager Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability	CVE-2019-1339
6	Oct 8, 2019	Windows Error Reporting Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability	CVE-2019-1319
7	Jul 9, 2019	Windows Error Reporting Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability	CVE-2019-1037
8	May 14, 2019	Windows Error Reporting Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability	CVE-2019-0863
9	Dec 8, 2020	Windows Error Reporting Information Disclosure Vulnerability	CVE-2020-17094
10	Dec 8, 2020	Windows Error Reporting Information Disclosure Vulnerability	CVE-2020-17138
11	Nov 10, 2020	Windows Error Reporting Denial of Service Vulnerability	CVE-2020-17046
12	Nov 10, 2020	Windows Error Reporting Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability	CVE-2020-17007
13	Oct 13, 2020	Windows Error Reporting Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability	CVE-2020-16905
14	Oct 13, 2020	Windows Error Reporting Manager Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability	CVE-2020-16895
15	Jul 14, 2020	Windows Error Reporting Information Disclosure Vulnerability	CVE-2020-1420
16	Jul 14, 2020	Windows Error Reporting Manager Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability	CVE-2020-1429
17	Jun 9, 2020	Windows Error Reporting Manager Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability	CVE-2020-1197
18	Jun 9, 2020	Windows Error Reporting Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability	CVE-2020-1234
19	Jun 9, 2020	Windows Error Reporting Information Disclosure Vulnerability	CVE-2020-1263
20	Jun 9, 2020	Windows Error Reporting Information Disclosure Vulnerability	CVE-2020-1261
21	May 12, 2020	Windows Error Reporting Manager Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability	CVE-2020-1132
22	May 12, 2020	Windows Error Reporting Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability	CVE-2020-1082
23	May 12, 2020	Windows Error Reporting Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability	CVE-2020-1088
24	May 12, 2020	Windows Error Reporting Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability	CVE-2020-1021
25	Mar 10, 2020	Windows Error Reporting Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability	CVE-2020-0806
26	Mar 10, 2020	Windows Error Reporting Information Disclosure Vulnerability	CVE-2020-0775
27	Mar 10, 2020	Windows Error Reporting Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability	CVE-2020-0772

Almost all of them are related to path redirection attacks.

Why WER is the good target for logic bug hunting?

- WER ALPC port allows everyone to communicate with it.
- Multiple message handler
- Running as SYSTEM IL and the main working directory C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\WER is writable for unprivileged user
- File system access without impersonation

Vulnerability Sample



Trouble:

- We must know the filename to perform path redirection attack

C++ Copy

```
UINT GetTempFileNameW(
  [in]  LPCWSTR lpPathName,
  [in]  LPCWSTR lpPrefixString,
  [in]  UINT    uUnique,
  [out] LPWSTR  lpTempFileName
);
```

```
GetTempFileNameW(L"C:\TestFolder", L"WER", 0, &TempFileName)
```

Must be a unique file name under "C:\TestFolder"

How to make sure the filename is unique?



Make **GetTempFileName** returns a unique filename

```
GetTempFileNameW(L"C:\TestFolder", L"WER", 0, &TempFileName)
```

Fill C:\TestFolder with files **WER0000.tmp -> WERFFFE.tmp**



CreateFile	C:\TestFolder\WERFFE3.tmp	NAME COLLISION	Desired Acc
CreateFile	C:\TestFolder\WERFFE4.tmp	NAME COLLISION	Desired Acc
CreateFile	C:\TestFolder\WERFFE5.tmp	NAME COLLISION	Desired Acc
CreateFile	C:\TestFolder\WERFFE6.tmp	NAME COLLISION	Desired Acc
CreateFile	C:\TestFolder\WERFFE7.tmp	NAME COLLISION	Desired Acc
CreateFile	C:\TestFolder\WERFFE8.tmp	NAME COLLISION	Desired Acc
CreateFile	C:\TestFolder\WERFFE9.tmp	NAME COLLISION	Desired Acc
CreateFile	C:\TestFolder\WERFFEA.tmp	NAME COLLISION	Desired Acc
CreateFile	C:\TestFolder\WERFFEB.tmp	NAME COLLISION	Desired Acc
CreateFile	C:\TestFolder\WERFFEC.tmp	NAME COLLISION	Desired Acc
CreateFile	C:\TestFolder\WERFFED.tmp	NAME COLLISION	Desired Acc
CreateFile	C:\TestFolder\WERFFEE.tmp	NAME COLLISION	Desired Acc
CreateFile	C:\TestFolder\WERFFEF.tmp	NAME COLLISION	Desired Acc
CreateFile	C:\TestFolder\WERFFF0.tmp	NAME COLLISION	Desired Acc
CreateFile	C:\TestFolder\WERFFF1.tmp	NAME COLLISION	Desired Acc
CreateFile	C:\TestFolder\WERFFF2.tmp	NAME COLLISION	Desired Acc
CreateFile	C:\TestFolder\WERFFF3.tmp	NAME COLLISION	Desired Acc
CreateFile	C:\TestFolder\WERFFF4.tmp	NAME COLLISION	Desired Acc
CreateFile	C:\TestFolder\WERFFF5.tmp	NAME COLLISION	Desired Acc
CreateFile	C:\TestFolder\WERFFF6.tmp	NAME COLLISION	Desired Acc
CreateFile	C:\TestFolder\WERFFF7.tmp	NAME COLLISION	Desired Acc
CreateFile	C:\TestFolder\WERFFF8.tmp	NAME COLLISION	Desired Acc
CreateFile	C:\TestFolder\WERFFF9.tmp	NAME COLLISION	Desired Acc
CreateFile	C:\TestFolder\WERFFFA.tmp	NAME COLLISION	Desired Acc
CreateFile	C:\TestFolder\WERFFFB.tmp	NAME COLLISION	Desired Acc
CreateFile	C:\TestFolder\WERFFFC.tmp	NAME COLLISION	Desired Acc
CreateFile	C:\TestFolder\WERFFFD.tmp	NAME COLLISION	Desired Acc
CreateFile	C:\TestFolder\WERFFFE.tmp	NAME COLLISION	Desired Acc
CreateFile	C:\TestFolder\WERFFFF.tmp	SUCCESS	Desired Acc
CloseFile	C:\TestFolder\WERFFFF.tmp	SUCCESS	

We'll always get **WERFFFF.tmp**

Exploit


Stage 0
C:\TestFolder
Junction
C:\FakeTemp\
WER0000.tmp
WER0001.tmp
...
WERFFFE.tmp
Create Junction
Create
Attacker
Fill C:\FakeTemp with reqired files



Even if we used the oplock, we still need to win the race ☹. We can trigger the bug repeatedly to win the race.

From Arbitrary Deletes to SYSTEM:

Abusing Windows Installer services to get EOP

By researcher: Abdelhamid Naceri

First Patch

- Replace **DeleteFile** with **UtilDeleteFilePath**



Bypass with UNC Path

- Convert the LogDirectory into UNC format: **C:\TestFolder -> \??\UNC\localhost\C$\TestFolder**
- Symlink C:\TestFolder\WERFFFF.tmp.etl -> C:\Windows\Victim.txt



Final Patch

Add function WerpGetPathOfWERTempDirectory and restrict the LogDirectory



General Mitigation

Path Redirection Mitigations

Mitigations coming in a future release

Hardlink mitigation

- Will now require write permission to link destination before creation
- Already available in Windows Insider Preview (and bounty eligible)

Junction mitigation

- Newly created junctions gain a "mark of the Medium IL"
- Services running highly privileged will not follow "marked" junctions

SYSTEM %TEMP% change

- Today, SYSTEM's %TEMP% value is \Windows\Temp, which is world writable
- GetTempPath will return a new, properly ACL'd path for SYSTEM

Mitigation is not enabled to all the processes except the vulnerable process.

Ways to enable mitigation:

- New mitigation policy ProcessRedirectionTrustPolicy
- SetProcessMitigationPolicy(ProcessRedirectionTrustPolicy, &policy, 4)
- Enable EnforceRedirectionTrust

```
typedef struct _PROCESS_MITIGATION_REDIRECTION_TRUST_POLICY
{
    union {
        ULONG Flags;
        struct {
            ULONG EnforceRedirectionTrust : 1;
            ULONG AuditRedirectionTrust : 1;
            ULONG ReservedFlags : 30;
        };
    };
} PROCESS_MITIGATION_REDIRECTION_TRUST_POLICY, * PPROCESS_MITIGATION_REDIRECTION_TRUST_POLICY;
```

Open junction will get error when **EnforceRedirectionTrust** is enabled

Windows PowerShell

```
Windows PowerShell
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Install the latest PowerShell for new features and improvements! https://aka.ms/PSWindows

PS C:\> Get-NtFileReparsePoint -Win32Path C:\TestFolder

Tag         SubstitutionName PrintName
---         ---------------- ---------
MOUNT_POINT \??\C:\FakeTemp


PS C:\> echo "" > C:\TestFolder\1.txt
PS C:\>
PS C:\> Set-NtProcessMitigationPolicy -RedirectionTrust EnforceRedirectionTrust
PS C:\> echo "" > C:\TestFolder\1.txt
out-file : The path cannot be traversed because it contains an untrusted mount point.
At line:1 char:1
+ echo "" > C:\TestFolder\1.txt
+ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
    + CategoryInfo          : OpenError: (:) [Out-File], IOException
    + FullyQualifiedErrorId : FileOpenFailure,Microsoft.PowerShell.Commands.OutFileCommand

PS C:\>
```

Install-Module -Name NtObjectManager



How mitigation works?

SetProcessMitigationPolicy

nt!PspSetRedirectionTrustPolicy

```
__int64 __fastcall PspSetRedirectionTrustPolicy(_EPROCESS *process, int mode)
{
  __int64 PrimaryToken; // rbx

  PrimaryToken = PsReferencePrimaryTokenWithTag((__int64)process, 0x79517350u);
  SeTokenSetRedirectionTrustPolicy(PrimaryToken, mode == 2);
  return ObFastDereferenceObject(&process->Token, PrimaryToken, 2035381072i64);
}
```

nt!SeTokenSetRedirectionTrustPolicy → Set Process->Token->TokenFlags

How mitigation works?

Create Junction -> … -> ntfs.sys!NtfsSetReparsePointInternal -> nt!IoComputeRedirectionTrustLevel

```
__int64 __fastcall IoComputeRedirectionTrustLevel(
        __int64 ReparseTag,
        char PreviousMode,
        struct _SECURITY_SUBJECT_CONTEXT *context,
        _DWORD *TrustLevel)
{
  struct _SECURITY_SUBJECT_CONTEXT *p_SubjectContext; // rax
  void *ClientToken; // rcx
  struct _SECURITY_SUBJECT_CONTEXT SubjectContext; // [rsp+20h] [rbp-28h] BYREF

  memset(&SubjectContext, 0, sizeof(SubjectContext));
  if ( PreviousMode )
  {
    if ( context )
    {
      p_SubjectContext = context;
    }
    else
    {
      SeCaptureSubjectContext(&SubjectContext);
      p_SubjectContext = &SubjectContext;
    }
    ClientToken = p_SubjectContext->ClientToken;
    if ( !p_SubjectContext->ClientToken )
      ClientToken = p_SubjectContext->PrimaryToken;
    *TrustLevel = (SeTokenIsAdmin(ClientToken) != 0) + 1;
    if ( !context )
      SeReleaseSubjectContext(&SubjectContext);
  }
  else
  {
    *TrustLevel = 2;
  }
  return 0i64;
}
```

TrustLevel 1 : Created by Untrusted User (Medium User)

TrustLevel 2 : Created by Trusted User (Privileged User)

How mitigation works?



Mitigation bypass when impersonating another user

```
PS C:\> Get-NtFileReparsePoint -Win32Path C:\TestFolder

Tag         SubstitutionName PrintName
---         ---------------- ---------
MOUNT_POINT \??\C:\FakeTemp


PS C:\> echo "" > C:\TestFolder\1.txt
PS C:\>
PS C:\> Set-NtProcessMitigationPolicy -RedirectionTrust EnforceRedirectionTrust
PS C:\> echo "" > C:\TestFolder\1.txt
out-file : The path cannot be traversed because it contains an untrusted mount point.
At line:1 char:1
+ echo "" > C:\TestFolder\1.txt
+ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
    + CategoryInfo          : OpenError: (:) [Out-File], IOException
    + FullyQualifiedErrorId : FileOpenFailure,Microsoft.PowerShell.Commands.OutFileCommand

PS C:\>
PS C:\> $token = Get-NtToken -Logon -User user2 -Password user2@password
PS C:\> Invoke-NtToken -Token $token -Script { echo "" > C:\TestFolder\1.txt }
PS C:\>
```

Install-Module -Name NtObjectManager

Time of...	Process Name	PID	Operation	Path	Result	Detail
4:03:13....	powershell.exe	8696	CreateFile	C:\FakeTemp\1.txt	REPARSE	Desired Access: R...
4:03:13....	powershell.exe	8696	CreateFile	C:\FakeTemp\1.txt	SUCCESS	Desired Access: R...
4:03:13....	powershell.exe	8696	QueryBasicInfor...	C:\FakeTemp\1.txt	SUCCESS	CreationTime: 10/1...
4:03:13....	powershell.exe	8696	CloseFile	C:\FakeTemp\1.txt	SUCCESS	
4:03:13....	powershell.exe	8696	CreateFile	C:\FakeTemp\1.txt	REPARSE	Desirec
4:03:13....	powershell.exe	8696	CreateFile	C:\FakeTemp\1.txt	SUCCESS	Desirec
4:03:13....	powershell.exe	8696	WriteFile	C:\FakeTemp\1.txt	SUCCESS	Offset:
4:03:13....	powershell.exe	8696	CloseFile	C:\FakeTemp\1.txt	SUCCESS	
4:03:13....	MsMpEng.exe	9156	CreateFileMap...	C:\FakeTemp\1.txt	FILE LOCKED WIT...	SyncTy
4:03:13....	MsMpEng.exe	9156	QueryStandardI...	C:\FakeTemp\1.txt	SUCCESS	Allocati

Desired Access: Read Attributes
Disposition: Open
Options: Open Reparse Point
Attributes: n/a
ShareMode: Read, Write, Delete
AllocationSize: n/a
Impersonating: DESKTOP-3VIAT4J\user2
OpenResult: Opened

Why mitigation fails?



- EnforceRedirectionTrust is enabled for PrimaryToken (Process Token)
- EnforceRedirectionTrust is disabled for ClientToken (Thread Impersonation Token)

Mitigation bypass when using UNC Path

```
PS C:\> Get-NtFileReparsePoint -Win32Path C:\TestFolder

Tag         SubstitutionName PrintName
---         ---------------- ---------
MOUNT_POINT \??\C:\FakeTemp


PS C:\> echo "" > C:\TestFolder\1.txt
PS C:\>
PS C:\> Set-NtProcessMitigationPolicy -RedirectionTrust EnforceRedirectionTrust
PS C:\> echo "" > C:\TestFolder\1.txt
out-file : The path cannot be traversed because it contains an untrusted mount point.
At line:1 char:1
+ echo "" > C:\TestFolder\1.txt
+ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
    + CategoryInfo          : OpenError: (:) [Out-File], IOException
    + FullyQualifiedErrorId : FileOpenFailure,Microsoft.PowerShell.Commands.OutFileCommand

PS C:\> echo "" > \\localhost\C$\TestFolder\1.txt
PS C:\>
```

Install-Module -Name NtObjectManager

Why mitigation fails?

Call stack when open junction with **UNC path**

```
2: kd> k
 # Child-SP          RetAddr               Call Site
00 ffffeb8a`29a908a0 fffff804`a57eeb3f     nt!SeCaptureSubjectContext+0x7a
01 ffffeb8a`29a90900 fffff804`a82cde02     nt!IoCheckRedirectionTrustLevel+0x6f
02 ffffeb8a`29a90990 fffff804`a827182b     Ntfs!NtfsGetReparsePointValue+0x74a
03 ffffeb8a`29a90ae0 fffff804`a826be9b     Ntfs!NtfsCommonCreate+0x17ab
04 ffffeb8a`29a90dc0 fffff804`a562a6b5     Ntfs!NtfsFsdCreate+0x1db
05 ffffeb8a`29a91040 fffff804`a75470cf     nt!IofCallDriver+0x55
06 ffffeb8a`29a91080 fffff804`a7579f54     FLTMGR!FltpLegacyProcessingAfterPreCallbacksCompleted+0x28
07 ffffeb8a`29a910f0 fffff804`a562a6b5     FLTMGR!FltpCreate+0x324
08 ffffeb8a`29a911a0 fffff804`a562bcb4     nt!IofCallDriver+0x55
09 ffffeb8a`29a911e0 fffff804`a5a17bdd     nt!IoCallDriverWithTracing+0x34
0a ffffeb8a`29a91230 fffff804`a5af3227     nt!IopParseDevice+0x117d
0b ffffeb8a`29a913a0 fffff804`a59ffb0e     nt!IopParseFile+0xc7
0c ffffeb8a`29a91410 fffff804`a5a2a86a     nt!ObpLookupObjectName+0x3fe
0d ffffeb8a`29a915e0 fffff804`a5a74a9f     nt!ObOpenObjectByNameEx+0x1fa
0e ffffeb8a`29a91710 fffff804`a5a7455d     nt!IopCreateFile+0x40f
0f ffffeb8a`29a917b0 fffff804`45821a5d     nt!IoCreateFileEx+0x11d
10 ffffeb8a`29a91850 fffff804`45820967     srv2!Smb2CreateFile+0x2fd
11 ffffeb8a`29a91c70 fffff804`4582077c     srv2!Smb2ExecuteCreateReal+0x1c7
12 ffffeb8a`29a91dd0 fffff804`4582d796     srv2!Smb2ExecuteCreate+0x3c
13 ffffeb8a`29a91e10 fffff804`4582328a     srv2!Smb2ExecuteProviderCallback+0x56
14 ffffeb8a`29a91e70 fffff804`458231b6     srv2!Srv2CallProviders+0x9a
15 ffffeb8a`29a91eb0 fffff804`45825b4f     srv2!Srv2ProcessPacket+0xa6
16 ffffeb8a`29a91f00 fffff804`a57fc9fe     srv2!RfspThreadPoolNodeWorkerProcessWorkItems+0x13f
17 ffffeb8a`29a91f80 fffff804`a57fc9bc     nt!KxSwitchKernelStackCallout+0x2e
18 ffffeb8a`2773a970 fffff804`a568a01d     nt!KiSwitchKernelStackContinue
19 ffffeb8a`2773a990 fffff804`a5689e12     nt!KiExpandKernelStackAndCalloutOnStackSegment+0x19d
1a ffffeb8a`2773aa30 fffff804`a5689c73     nt!KiExpandKernelStackAndCalloutSwitchStack+0xf2
1b ffffeb8a`2773aaa0 fffff804`a5689c2d     nt!KeExpandKernelStackAndCalloutInternal+0x33
1c ffffeb8a`2773ab10 fffff804`4582688f     nt!KeExpandKernelStackAndCalloutEx+0x1d
1d ffffeb8a`2773ab50 fffff804`a5b64817     srv2!RfspThreadPoolNodeWorkerRun+0x10f
1e ffffeb8a`2773abb0 fffff804`a5671d25     nt!IopThreadStart+0x37
```

Switch thread context

Why mitigation fails?



Is the Mitigation Enabled for the process?

```
PS C:\> $process = Get-NtProcess -Name spoolsv.exe
PS C:\> Get-NtProcessMitigationPolicy RedirectionTrust -Process $process
EnforceRedirectionTrust
PS C:\>
```

Install-Module -Name NtObjectManager

Path Redirection Attacks with Symlink in the Future

- More and more services enable mitigations
- Although the mitigation has weakness, but it can still block most of the attacks
- Path Redirection Attacks with Symlink are dying

Any different logical bugs in WER?

Part 3

Incorrect Handle Duplicate Lead to EOP

- CVE-2022-35795


wersvc
nonElevatedProcessStart
CreateProcess with client token (wermgr.exe –nonelevated)
Send message through ALPC
user (medium IL)
wermgr.exe (medium IL)


wersvc
CreateFileMapping WerSvc\WerSvcNonElevationInfoSectionName{wermgr.exe pid}
EventHandle
MapViewBuffer
Write into buffer
FileMappingHandle
Pass into WER without any check
user (medium IL)
Any Value


wersvc
FileMappingHandle
DuplicateHandle(**UserProcess**, FileMappingHandle, **WermgrProces**, &TargetHandle)
user (medium IL)
Any Value
wermgr (medium IL)
Handle



Medium to Medium : No Security Boundary

Vulnerable Code Snippet

```
NonElevatedProcessStart(HANDLE ClientProcessHandle, __int64 FileMappingHandle, void **a3){

    UserTokenUtility::GetUserToken(ClientProcessHandle, 0, &hToken);

    GetSystemDirectoryW(SystemDirectory, 0x104u)

    StringCchPrintfW(ApplicationName, 0x104ui64, L"%s\\wermgr.exe", SystemDirectory);

    StringCchPrintfW(CommandLine, 0x104ui64, L"%s -nonelevated", ApplicationName);

    CreateProcessAsUserW(
            hToken,
            ApplicationName,
            CommandLine,
            0i64,
            0i64,
            0,
            0x404u,
            lpEnvironment,
            SystemDirectory,
            &StartupInfo,
            &ProcessInformation);


    DuplicateHandle(ClientProcessHandle, (HANDLE)FileMappingHandle, ProcessInformation.hProcess,
&TargetHandle, 0, 0, 2u);


  }
```

- Create Non-Elevated process **wermgr.exe** with client token.
- Duplicate **FileMappingHandle** from client process to **wermgr.exe** process.
- No Check for **FileMappingHandle**

Weakness of DuplicateHandle

DuplicateHandle function (handleapi.h)

Article • 08/23/2022 • 7 minutes to read

Duplicates an object handle.

Syntax

C++ Copy

```
BOOL DuplicateHandle(
  [in]  HANDLE   hSourceProcessHandle,
  [in]  HANDLE   hSourceHandle,
  [in]  HANDLE   hTargetProcessHandle,
  [out] LPHANDLE lpTargetHandle,
  [in]  DWORD    dwDesiredAccess,
  [in]  BOOL     bInheritHandle,
  [in]  DWORD    dwOptions
);
```

Special Handle Value:

```
CurrentProcess :  -1
CurrentThread  :  -2

StandardInput  :  -10
StandardOutput :  -11
StandardError  :  -12
```

```
BOOL __stdcall DuplicateHandle(
        HANDLE hSourceProcessHandle,
        HANDLE hSourceHandle,
        HANDLE hTargetProcessHandle,
        LPHANDLE lpTargetHandle,
        DWORD dwDesiredAccess,
        BOOL bInheritHandle,
        DWORD dwOptions)
{
  NTSTATUS v7; // eax

  switch ( (_DWORD)hSourceHandle )
  {
    case 0xFFFFFFF4:
      hSourceHandle = NtCurrentPeb()->ProcessParameters->StandardError;
      break;
    case 0xFFFFFFF5:
      hSourceHandle = NtCurrentPeb()->ProcessParameters->StandardOutput;
      break;
    case 0xFFFFFFF6:
      hSourceHandle = NtCurrentPeb()->ProcessParameters->StandardInput;
      break;
  }
  v7 = NtDuplicateObject(
         hSourceProcessHandle,
         hSourceHandle,
         hTargetProcessHandle,
         lpTargetHandle,
         dwDesiredAccess,
         bInheritHandle ? 2 : 0,
         dwOptions);
  if ( v7 >= 0 )
    return 1;
  BaseSetLastNTError((unsigned int)v7);
  return 0;
```

How to process special handle value?

- GetCurrentProcess() --> (HANDLE)-1
- GetCurrentThread() --> (HANDLE)-2

```
NTSTATUS ObpReferenceProcessObjectByHandle(HANDLE       hSourceHandle,
                                           EPROCESS*    SourceProcess,
                                           ... ,
                                           PVOID*       Object,
                                           ACCESS_MASK* GrantedAccess)
{     if ( hSourceHandle > 0) {
        // Get required handle from SourceProcess HandleTableEntry
      }else{

        if (hSourceHandle == (HANDLE)-1 ) {
            *GrantedAccess = PROCESS_ALL_ACCESS;
            *Object = SourceProcess;
            return STATUS_SUCCESS;

        } else if (hSourceHandle == (HANDLE)-2) {

            *GrantedAccess = THREAD_ALL_ACCESS;
            *Object = KeGetCurrentThread();
            return STATUS_SUCCESS;
        }

        return STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE;
      }
}
```

- Handle > 0 : Object from source process
- Handle == -1 : Source process object
- Handle == -2 : **Caller thread object**


Caller: WER(SYSTEM IL)
DuplicateHandle(ClientProcess, (HANDLE)-2, TargetProcess, &TargetHandle, 0, 0 , DUPLICATE_SAME_ACCESS)
CurThreadHandle
ClientProcess: Attacker(Medium IL)
CurThreadHandle
WER ThreadHandle
duplicate
TargetProcess: wermgr.exe(Medium IL)
TargetHandle
steal the handle

Exploit Leaked Handle

Process Handle with ***PROCESS_ALL_ACCESS***

- VirtualAllocEx -> WriteProcessMemory -> CreateRemoteThread -> EOP

Thread Handle with ***THREAD_ALL_ACCESS***

- No directly memory read/write
- No directly memory allocate

Exploit SYSTEM Thread Handle

Read/Write Thread Register

```
BOOL SetThreadContext(
  [in] HANDLE        hThread,
  [in] const CONTEXT *lpContext
);

BOOL GetThreadContext(
  [in]      HANDLE    hThread,
  [in, out] LPCONTEXT lpContext
);
```

```
typedef struct _CONTEXT {

    [ ... ]

    DWORD64 Rax;
    DWORD64 Rcx;
    DWORD64 Rdx;
    DWORD64 Rbx;
    DWORD64 Rsp;
    DWORD64 Rbp;
    DWORD64 Rsi;
    DWORD64 Rdi;
    DWORD64 R8;
    DWORD64 R9;
    DWORD64 R10;
    DWORD64 R11;
    DWORD64 R12;
    DWORD64 R13;
    DWORD64 R14;
    DWORD64 R15;

    [ ... ]
} CONTEXT, *PCONTEXT;
```

Find the ROP Gadget to get Read-What-Where and Write-What-Where primitive

```
mov     qword ptr [rdi], rbx
[ ... ]
ret
```

Arbitrary Write

```
mov     rdi, qword ptr [rbx]
[ ... ]
ret
```

Arbitrary Read

Write the return address to the stack

```
0×7ff904a4834c:          mov     qword ptr [rdi], rbx
0×7ff904a4834f:          mov     rbx, qword ptr [rsp + 0×70]
0×7ff904a48354:          add     rsp, 0×60
0×7ff904a48358:          pop     rdi
0×7ff904a48359:          ret
```

- rdi = rsp – 0x60 – 0x8
- rbx = return address

```
0×7ff904a38B5D          Self:
0×7ff904a38B5D EB FE        jmp short Self
```

Steps to complete a WWW primitive



From WWW to code execution

- Write malicious DLL path into the stack
- Call LoadLibraryW with the path

Demo Time



Conclusion

- More and more services enable mitigations for path redirection attack
- Path Redirection Attacks with Symlink will become less and less
- It’s time to hunt for other type of logic bugs

Reference

- Exploiting Errors in Windows Error Reporting (BlueHatIL 2020) Gal De Leon
- Exploiting a Leaked Thread Handle - Project Zero James Forshaw

Thanks for listening!

Any Questions?