Attacking Hyper-V

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Who, from, what, why?

- Who: Jaanus Kääp
- From: Clarified Security, Estonia
- What: Vuln researcher & developer
- Why: Really like to talk @ POC Like to talk about security MSRC top list 4 last years

Why Hyper-V

- Difficult & interesting
- Currently my MSc thesis
- Not enough tools & info yet
 - MS has released more lately
 - Still no tools from them....
- Nice bounties also


Back to basics & terms

- Hyper-V is type 1 hypervisor
- Partitions
- Host OS runs as VM (Root partition) also
 - Additional security via secured kernel (VBS)
- SLAT
- IOMMU

VBS & VTL

- Virtualization Based Security
- Virtual Trust Levels
- Created via SLAT and Hypervisor
- Used for kernel exploits mitigation
- Partition still same
- Rings still same
- VTL1 > VTL0


VBS & VTL



VMs and terms

- Partition = VM
- VMWP = Host useland, per VM, emulation
- VSP = Host driver, some emulation
- VMBUS = One bus to bind them all

VMs




Attacking Hyper-V

- Attack directions
 - Host to hypervisor
 - Guest to hypervisor
 - Guest to host kernel
 - Guest to host userland

Host to host secure kernel*

Attacking Hyper-v



GUEST/HOST → HYPERVISOR

Communication with Hyper-V

- Hypercalls
- MSRs

Hypercalls

- Could think as syscalls++
- Give over 3 values (unless extended)
- Input 1 (RCX)
 - Call code: 16 bit
 - Is fast: 1 bit
 - Count of elements: 12 bit
 - Start Index: 12 bit

Hypercalls

- Could think as syscalls++
- Give over 3 values (unless extended)
- Input 1 (RCX)

```
struct
{
    UINT32 CallCode : 16;
    UINT32 IsFast : 1;
    UINT32 dontCare1 : 15;
    UINT32 CountOfElements : 12;
    UINT32 dontCare2 : 4;
    UINT32 RepStartIndex : 12;
    UINT32 dontCare3 : 4;
};
```

Hypercalls

Returned (RAX)

```
struct
{
   HV_STATUS CallStatus;
   UINT16 dontCare1;
   UINT32 ElementsProcessed : 12;
   UINT32 dontCare2 : 20;
};
```

Hypercalls - fast

- Input 2 (RDX) integer input simply
- Input 3 (R8) integer input simply

Hypercalls – slow

- Input 2 (RDX) Physical mem addr for input buffer
- Input 3 (R8) Physical mem addr for output buffer

Hypercalls – fast extended*

- Input 2 (RDX) integer input simply
- Input 3 (R8) integer input simply
- Some more registers
 - XMM0-XMM5

Hypercalls in kernel

- Op VMCALL/VMMCALL
- Nobody calls directly
- nt!HvcallCodeVa → executable memory

- NB:
 - bp poi(nt!HvcallCodeVa)
 - ba e 1 poi(nt!HvcallCodeVa)

Making Hypercalls

- Kernel exports HvllnvokeHypercall
- Can use it to make hypercalls easily
- Input/Output buffers >1 page
 - Buffers physical pages contiguous
 - MmAllocatePartitionNodePagesForMdlEx

Alex Ionescu blog is recommended

- Simple with debugger
 - DAMN slow lot of hypercalls
- My solution execution redirection
 - My driver
 - Overwrite nt!HvcallCodeVa
 - Do stuff
 - Jmp to original destination

- But where is nt!HvcallCodeVa
 - Not exported by the kernel
 - Referenced by MANY functions
 - HvllnvokeHypercall exported and useful

```
HvcallInitiateHypercall proc near ; CODE XREF: HvlpCr

sub rsp, 28h

mov rax, cs:HvcallCodeVa

call rax; HvcallpNoHypervisorPresent

nop dword ptr [rax]

add rsp, 28h

retn

HvcallInitiateHypercall endp
```

- Where to record
 - I picked filesystem
 - IRQL sometimes not PASSIVE_LEVEL
 - Can't write right away!
 - Work queue works well
 - Some timeloss from copying buffers

- Additional issues
 - Extra logic from fast, slow, fast extended
 - That's life
 - With slow no idea of input size
 - I just record 1 page
 - OVERKILL!
 - Some hypercalls happen constantly
 - Skip them early in the code

My recording logic

- Driver has hook function in asm
 - Main logic in separate function (C++)
- Locates nt!HvcallCodeVa via HvllnvokeHypercall
- Overwrites nt!HvcallCodeVa

Hypercalls fuzzing

- Fuzzing random/manual inputs
- Mutating recorded hypercalls
- Mutating on the fly
 - Will break things
 - Found CVE-2019-0695 like this

Hypercalls in Hypervisor

- Handler pointer of each hypercall
 - hv+0xC000000+code*0x18

MSRs

- Intercepted by Hypervisor
- Some results are faked/emulated & others relayed
- Handlers easy to find
 - huge switch statement
 - Values like 0x40000000, 0x40000001, 0x40000002, 0x40000003, 0x40000004, 0x400000D

MSR read/write

- Easy to intercept with debugger
- Lot of traffic
- Tricky to inject code more legit way
- Easy to inject via debuger
- Text segment has lot of space at the end

My MSR recording

- Windbg extension
- Short asm to hv+0x330000 for filtering MSRs
- Insert jump to read/write handler
- Data relayed via debugger

Fuzzing MSRs

- Trying through reads/writes
- Going through CPU manuals
- Possible special cases

GUEST → HOST KERNEL

VMBUS

- Communication between partitions
- Used and managed via Hyper-V
- Based on ringbuffer in shared memory
- Organized to channels
- Special case: pipes

VMBUS channels

- Data between guest-host via VMBUS
- GUID based identification
- Callback based
- Data via VMBUS and GPADL
- GPADL is MDL between partitions
- GPADL → MDL (seen by most)

VMBUS channels

- vmbkmclr.sys/vmbkmcl.sys
- Can send simple buffer
- Can send MDL as external data
 - Not copied over, so guest can modify
- Handler is executed

VMBUS channels

- VMBCHANNEL channel object
- Structure not public
- First channel: vmbkmclr!KmclChannelList
- Some important offset:
 - 0x64C VM ID
 - 0x700 Process packet callback
 - 0x760 Next channel
 - 0x960 GUID

VMBUS channels request

- vmbuskernelmodeclientlibapi.h
- Existing connection found via linked list
- Sending request straightforward
 - VmbPacketAllocate
 - VmbPacketSend

VMBUS channels request

- VmbPacketSend is asynchronous
- VMBPACKET returned by VmbPacketAllocate
- VmbPacketSetCompletionRoutine to add completion routine
- Or simply pointer @ offset 0x64

VMBUS channel recording

- vmbkmclr!KmclChannelList not exported
- Referenced by vmbkmclr!DllInitialize

INIT:00000001C001A12F lea rax, KmclChannelList

- First "lea rax, ???"
- Stepping though linked list to find all channels

VMBUS channel recording

- Overwrite channel Process packet callback
- Recording logic same as in hypercalls
 - Worker threads
 - Timeloss from copying buffers
- Redirect to correct handler

VMBUS channels fuzzing

- Sending random
- Sending modified recordings
 - Sooner or later crashes guest kernel
- Modifying traffic on the fly
 - Crashes guest kernel quite fast

GUEST → HOST VMWP

VMBUS pipes

- All pipes are channels
 - All channels are not pipes :)
- Pipes have no packet process handlers
- Handled by vmbusr.sys/vmbus.sys
- NtReadFile/ntWriteFile from userspace
- No MDLs only usual buffer

VMBUS pipes reading path

- NtReadFile
 - $\rightarrow \dots$
 - → vmbusr!PipeRead
 - → vmbusr!PipeTryRead
 - $\rightarrow \dots$
 - → vmbusr!PipeTryReadSingle
- Uses vmbusr!PkGetReceiveBuffer for shared buffer

- Can use vmbusr!PipeTryRead
 - RCX == pipe object (ptr from channel)
 - RDX == IRP of the NtReadFile
- But don't know the result yet
- Most reads return 0 bytes

Ending of the vmbusr!PipeTryRead

```
loc_1C0001CC2: ; End of the PipeTryRead
mov rbx, [rsp+38h+arg_0]
mov rsi, [rsp+38h+arg_8]
add rsp, 30h
pop rdi
retn
PipeTryRead endp
```

- At the start of that block
 - RSI == irp
 - RBX == pipe object (ptr from channel)

- Hook end of the vmbusr!PipeTryRead
- Irp→loStatus.Information == read length
 - Often zero, so nothing to record
- Channel found via pipe object
 - Channel pointer @ pipe object + 0x100

- Problem: PipeTryRead not exported
 - Search based on signature
 - not good solution: updates might break

- Hook end of the vmbusr!PipeTryRead
- Filter 0 reads
- Recording logic same as in hypercalls
 - Worker threads
 - Timeloss from copying buffers
- Return as in original vmbusr!PipeTryRead

VMBUS pipes fuzzing

- Sending random
- Sending modified recordings
 - Sooner or later crashes guest/-service
- Modifying traffic on the fly
 - Crashes guest/-service quite fast

- My new tool/toolset
- First named googled later
- Of course exists in urban dictionary

Hyper Viper

drugs

An alcoholic drink when someone drinks a King Cobra half way down the label, then pours an entire can of **JOOSE** energy drink alcohol. Its a recipe for a raging good time, and originated at **Ohio University** on **Palmer** St.

- My new tool/toolset
 - Driver
 - Userland tools for driver
 - DLL for other tools
 - WinDbg extension*
 - Python library*

- Make request
- Record request
- Fuzzing from kernel
- Listing channels
- Debugger extension for reversing help
- Developed to be built on ;)
- •

https://github.com/FoxHexOne/HyperViper

number zero not letter O

Q&A



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number zero not letter O