Revery: from POC to EXP

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About Me

2004-2008-2013 ➔ 2013-2016 ➔ 2016-present

- **Hack for fun** *software and system security*
  - Automated vul. discovery: **CSS TSec** 2nd Place (300+ vulnerabilities, 200+ CVE)
  - Automated exploit generation: **CSS TSec** Breakthrough Prize (1st place)
  - Automated exploit mitigation: **Microsoft BlueHat** Prize (Special Recognition Award)
  - Automated attack & defense: **DARPA CGC** (1st in defense 2015, 2nd in offense 2016)
  - Manual hacking: **DEFCON CTF** (2nd in 2016, 5th in 2015 and 2017)
- **Awards/Honors**
  - Tsinghua University Rising Star 2019
  - MIT TR35 China 2018
  - Qiu Shi Outstanding Young Scholar 2018
  - Thousand Youth Talents Plan 2018
  - Young Elite Scientists Sponsorship (CAST) 2017

Vulnerability: Ghost in Cyberspace

- Valuable assets, root causes of most security incidents





Exploiting Vulnerabilities

Victim Application

Trigger Vulnerabilities
(buffer overflow …)



Tamper Program States
(Code、Data)



Bypass Existing Defenses
(DEP, ASLR, sandbox …)

Attack Vector
(via spam, website …)



Break Tgt System
(malware, leak, control…)

Exploiting in Practice

DEFCON CTF
(blue-lotus, Tea-Deliverer)

Pwn2Own

Exploiting in Practice

Tianfu Cup PWN Contest

With the target of gradually creating China's own "Pwn2Own", Tianfu Cup International PWN Contest will have three independent and parallel events: the original vulnerability demonstration and recurrence contest, the product Contest, and the system Contest. All teams are required to use original vulnerabilities to hack the given subject. The total bonus of the contest will reach up to 1 million US dollars in a bid to deliver a feast of cyber security technologies.

Rules | Result

Only *patient* *experienced* hackers can do it.

Can machines exploit vulnerabilities like human, and even better than human?

Automated Exploit Generation (AEG)

Motivation

To better defend yourself,

Know your enemy first.

Sun Tzu

Why AEG?

- **Fixing vulnerabilities**
  - Automated vul discovery solutions
  - High volume of vulnerabilities
  - Long time to fix one vulnerability
  - 90 days deadline (Google Project Zero)
  - Need: automated vul assessment
    - to prioritize vulnerabilities to fix
  - Case: Facebook 50M user info leaked.





Why AEG?

- Fixing vulnerabilities
  - Need: automated vul assessment
- **Vulnerability Assessment**
  - GDB 'exploitable' plugin
    - Depends on vul type
  - WinDBG '!exploitable' plugin
    - Depends on basic block type
  - HCSIFTER (ASE' 17)
    - Recover heap metadata , vul pattern
  - Need: assess vulnerability with AEG



Why AEG?

- Fixing vulnerabilities
  - Need: automated vul assessment
- Vulnerability Assessment
  - Need: assess vulnerability with AEG
- **Intrusion Detection**
  - Malware life becomes shorter
    - FireEye: most malware dies in 2 hours
  - Exploits change frequently
    - NSS：IPS have high false negatives
  - Need: signature generation with AEG





Why AEG?

- Fixing vulnerabilities
  - Need: automated vul assessment
- Vulnerability Assessment
  - Need: assess vulnerability with AEG
- Intrusion Detection
  - Need: signature generation with AEG
- **The practice and trend**
  - Exploiting is challenging
    - Mostly depends on human
  - The machine is rising
    - AlphaGo
  - Need: AEG



Advances in AEG



DARPA Cyber Grand Challenge

Automated Attack and Defense

（1st in defense in 2015，2nd in offense in 2016）

What is AEG?

Sample Vulnerability : CVE-2009-4270

```
int outprintf( const char *fmt, … )
{
  int count; char buf[1024]; va_list args;
  va_start( args, fmt );
  count = vsprintf( buf, fmt, args );
  outwrite( buf, count ); // print out
}

int main( int argc, char* argv[] )
{
  const char *arg;
  while( (arg = *argv++) != 0 ) {
    switch ( arg[0] ) {
    case '-': {
      switch ( arg[1] ) {
      case 0:
      …
      default:
        outprintf( "unknown switch %s\n", arg[1] );
      }
    }
    default: …
    }
  …
```



Vul trigger conditions:

- Path constraints
- Vul constraints

Discover vulnerabilities

- Symbolic execution
- Fuzzing (testing)

Exploit Vulnerability : CVE-2009-4270

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int outprintf( const char *fmt, … )
{
  int count; char buf[1024]; va_list args;
  va_start( args, fmt );
  count = vsprintf( buf, fmt, args );
  outwrite( buf, count ); // print out
}
```

Function returns

```
int main( int argc, char* argv[] )
{
  const char *arg;
  while( (arg = *argv++) != 0 ) {
    switch ( arg[0] ) {
    case '-': {
      switch ( arg[1] ) {
      case 0:
      …
      default:
        outprintf( "unknown switch %s\n", arg[1] );
      }
    }
    default: …
    }
  …
```



To exploit vul:

- **Trigger vul:**
  - Path constraints
  - Vul constraints
- **Manipulate states:**
  - Shellcode constraints
  - EIP constraints
  - Memory layout
  - Defense bypass

Solutions :

- **Symbolic execution**

General Workflow of AEG



Dynamic Analysis

PoC → Locate Vul → Crash scene analysis → EIP controllable / Shellcode placement / ROP gadgets

Symbolic Execution

Path constraints → Vul constraints → EIP constraints（shellcode/ROP） → Shellcode constraints

SMT solver

PoC: proof-of-concept inputs, able to trigger vulnerabilities.

Challenge: non-exploitable PoC



- Sometimes, the PoC is easy to exploit
  - Stack-based buffer overflow
  - Format string vulnerabilities
- Most often, the PoC is non-exploitable
  - The EIP is not controllable
  - The program states cannot be tampered

The crashing path taken by the PoC could be non-exploitable (even by human).

Existing AEG solutions will fail in this case.

Example non-exploitable PoC

```
RDI: 0x62626262626262 ('bbbbbbb')
RBP: 0x7fffffffbbd0 --> 0x7fffffffe2a0 --> 0x7fffffffe3a0 --> 0x7fffffffe3c0 --> 0x7fffffffe3e0 --> 0x4022c0 (<__libc_csu_init>:
RSP: 0x7fffffffb660 --> 0x0
RIP: 0x7ffff7a5bcc0 (<_IO_vfprintf_internal+6992>:      repnz scas al,BYTE PTR es:[rdi])
R8 : 0x0
R9 : 0x7
R10: 0x73 ('s')
R11: 0x62626262626262 ('bbbbbbb')
R12: 0x402447 ("\tName: %s\n")
R13: 0x7fffffffe2b8 --> 0x3000000010
R14: 0x0
R15: 0x40244e --> 0x442f4109000a7325 ('%s\n')
EFLAGS: 0x10286 (carry PARITY adjust zero SIGN trap INTERRUPT direction overflow)
[-------------------------------------code-------------------------------------]
   0x7ffff7a5bcb7 <_IO_vfprintf_internal+6983>: xor    eax,eax
   0x7ffff7a5bcb9 <_IO_vfprintf_internal+6985>: or     rcx,0xffffffffffffffff
   0x7ffff7a5bcbd <_IO_vfprintf_internal+6989>: mov    rdi,r11
=> 0x7ffff7a5bcc0 <_IO_vfprintf_internal+6992>: repnz scas al,BYTE PTR es:[rdi]
   0x7ffff7a5bcc2 <_IO_vfprintf_internal+6994>: mov    DWORD PTR [rbp-0x4d8],0x0
   0x7ffff7a5bccc <_IO_vfprintf_internal+7004>: mov    rax,rcx
   0x7ffff7a5bccf <_IO_vfprintf_internal+7007>: not    rax
   0x7ffff7a5bcd2 <_IO_vfprintf_internal+7010>: lea    r10,[rax-0x1]
[-------------------------------------stack-------------------------------------]
0000| 0x7fffffffb660 --> 0x0
0008| 0x7fffffffb668 --> 0x7ffff7a5a241 (<_IO_vfprintf_internal+209>:   mov    rcx,QWORD PTR [rbp-0x4b0])
0016| 0x7fffffffb670 --> 0x7fffffffb728 --> 0x0
0024| 0x7fffffffb678 --> 0x7fffffffb748 --> 0x4023df --> 0x206f47202d2e3000 ('')
0032| 0x7fffffffb680 --> 0x7fffffffb738 --> 0x40244f --> 0x2f442f4109000a73 ('s\n')
0040| 0x7fffffffb688 --> 0x3000000000 ('')
0048| 0x7fffffffb690 --> 0x7fff00000000
0056| 0x7fffffffb698 --> 0x7fffffffb750 --> 0x0
[-----------------------------------------------------------------------------]
Legend: code, data, rodata, value
Stopped reason: SIGSEGV
0x00007ffff7a5bcc0 in _IO_vfprintf_internal (s=0x7fffffffbc00, format=<optimized out>, ap=0x7fffffffe2b8) at vfprintf.c:1632
```

Read from invalid addr

The crashing path taken by PoC is non-exploitable.

Look for diverging exploitable paths.

Revery: From Proof-of-Concept to Exploitable

(One Step towards Automatic Exploit Generation)

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ACM CCS 2018

Example

```
1.  struct Type1 { char[8] data;                                    };
2.  struct Type2 { int status;    int* ptr;  void init(){…};        };
3.  int (*handler)(const int*) = …;
4.  struct{Type1* obj1; Type* obj2;} gvar = {};
5.  int foo(){
6.    gvar.obj1 = new Type1;
7.    gvar.obj2 = new Type2;
8.    gvar.obj2->init();  // resulting different statuses
9.    if(vul)
10.     scanf("%s", &gvar.obj1->data);     // vulnerability point
11.   if(gvar.obj2->status)                // stitching point
12.     res = *gvar.obj2->ptr;             // crashing point
13.   else                                 // stitching point
14.     *gvar.obj2->ptr = read_int();      // exploitable point
15.   handler(gvar.obj2->ptr);             // hijacking point
16.   return res;
17. }
```



- Problem： The crashing path (9->10->11->12->15) taken by PoC is non-exploitable
- Intuition: backtrace the PoC path, look for diverging paths with exploitable states, trigger vul and exploits
- Backtrace to which point? How to explore diverging paths? How to enter exploitable states?

Around the vul point | fuzzing (9->11->13->14) | Path stitching (9-10-11, 11-13-14)

PoC analysis: locate vulnerability

```
1.  struct Type1 { char[8] data;                                    };
2.  struct Type2 { int status;    int* ptr;  void init(){…};        };
3.  int (*handler)(const int*) = …;
4.  struct{Type1* obj1; Type* obj2;} gvar = {};
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

Each object is associated with: a birthmark taint tag, and an access state (uninitialized, busy, freed)

Analyze the PoC's execution trace, and validate the following security rules:

- **V1:** only access objects with intended birthmark, e.g., tag_ptr == tag_obj
- **V2:** only read objects with busy status
- **V3:** only write objects with non-freed status

PoC analysis: identify exceptional object

```
1.  struct Type1 { char[8] data;                                  };
2.  struct Type2 { int status;    int* ptr;  void init(){…};      };
3.  int (*handler)(const int*) = …;
4.  struct{Type1* obj1; Type* obj2;} gvar = {};
5.  int foo(){
6.    gvar.obj1 = new Type1;
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

- Exceptional objects: tampered by the vulnerability
  - E.g., obj2 is tampered by the buffer overflow in obj1.

Exceptional objects important, since they are controlled by attackers, and further operations on them could cause programs being exploited.

PoC analysis: identify exceptional object

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1.  struct Type1 { char[8] data;                                    };
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



- Exceptional objects
- Exceptional objects' layout digraph:
  - **describes how the exceptional object is placed in memory.**
  - Nodes: memory objects
  - Edges: Point-to relationship between objects

PoC analysis: identify exceptional object

```
1.  struct Type1 { char[8] data;                                  };
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



- Exceptional objects
- Exceptional objects' layout digraph:
- Exceptional objects' layout-contributor digraph :
  - **describes how to generate objects similar to exceptional objects.**
  - Nodes: instructions which allocate the objects
  - Edges: instructions which setup the point-to relationship between objects

Explore Diverging Paths



- Backtrace the PoC path to vulnerability points
- Explore diverging paths around vulnerability points
  - Have similar layouts as exceptional objects
    - Could be controlled by attackers
  - Have sensitive operations on those objects
    - Could cause damages to programs

How to explore diverging paths?

Explore Diverging Paths



How to explore diverging path?

- **A straightforward solution: symbolic execution**
  - Explore program paths symbolically
- But it has scalability issue
  - Path explosion issue
  - Constraint solving challenge
  - Symbolic value concretization
    - Memory allocation: symbolic size
    - Memory access: symbolic index
  - The concrete value could be improper for exploiting.

Explore Diverging Paths



Diverging path: 9->11->13->14
(not necessary to trigger vulnerability)

How to explore diverging path?

- **Our solution: layout-oriented fuzzing**
  - Explore paths by fuzz testing
  - Directed fuzzing: use the memory layout contributor instructions as targets
    - Following these instructions, we can generate objects similar to exceptional objects.
  - Path filtering: find paths that have sensitive operations operating on those objects
    - Exploitable states

Exploit Synthesis



Crashing path: 9->10->11->12
Diverging path: 9->11->13->14
Exploiting path: 9->10->11->13->14->15

- Find stitching points
  - Try and error
  - Metrics: path reusing rate
- Path stitching
  - Explore candidate sub-paths between stitching points, with symbolic execution
- Exploit generation :
  - Solve the constraints in stitched path
  - Trigger vulnerabilities, and enter exploitable states.

Revery Overview



- Analyze vulnerability and exceptional objects
- Explore diverging paths with layout-oriented fuzzing, and find exploitable states
- Stitch PoC path and diverging path, solve constraints and generate exploits.

Evaluation

	Name	CTF	Vul Type	Crash Type	Violation	Final State	EXP. Gen.	Rex	GDB Exploitable
	woO2	TU CTF 2016	UAF	heap error	V1	EIP hijack	YES	NO	Exploitable
CONTROL FLOW HIJACK	woO2_fixed	TU CTF 2016	UAF	heap error	V1	EIP hijack	YES	NO	Exploitable
	shop 2	ASIS Final 2015	UAF	mem read	V1	EIP hijack	YES	NO	UNKNOWN
	main	RHme3 CTF 2017	UAF	mem read	V1	mem write	YES	NO	UNKNOWN
	babyheap	SECUINSIDE 2017	UAF	mem read	V1	mem write	YES	NO	UNKNOWN
	b00ks	ASIS Quals 2016	Off-by-one	no crash	V1	mem write	YES	NO	Failed
	marimo	Codegate 2018	Heap overflow	no crash	V1	mem write	YES	NO	Failed
	ezhp	Plaid CTF 2014	Heap overflow	no crash	V1	mem write	YES	NO	Failed
	note1	ZCTF 2016	Heap Overflow	no crash	V1	mem write	YES	NO	Failed
	note2	ZCTF 2016	Heap Overflow	no crash	V1	unlink attack	NO	NO	Failed
EXPLOIT-ABLE STATE	note3	ZCTF 2016	Heap Overflow	no crash	V1	unlink attack	NO	NO	Failed
	fb	AliCTF 2016	Heap Overflow	no crash	V1	unlink attack	NO	NO	Failed
	stkof	HITCON 2014	Heap Overflow	no crash	V1	unlink attack	NO	NO	Failed
	simple note	Tokyo Westerns 2017	Off-by-one	no crash	V1	unlink attack	NO	NO	Failed
	childheap	SECUINSIDE 2017	Double Free	heap error	V1	-	NO	NO	Exploitable
FAILED	CarMarket	ASIS Finals 2016	Off-by-one	no crash	V1	-	NO	NO	Failed
	SimpleMemoPad	CODEBLUE 2017	Heap Overflow	no crash	-	-	NO	NO	Failed
	LFA	34c3 2017	Heap Overflow	no crash	-	-	NO	NO	Failed
	Recurse	33c3 2016	UAF	no crash	-	-	NO	NO	Failed

- Target applications: **19** CTF challenges
- Revery generates exploits for **9** of them, triggers exploitable states for **5**, fails for another **5**
- Revery could do AEG for memory read corruption, heap corruption and non-crashing PoC。

Revery's limitation :

- It's based on Angr, lacking support for many syscalls, unable to support real world applications
- It cannot bypass defenses like ASLR yet. So we disable this defense in the evaluation.

DEMO

- A UAF pwn from RHme3 CTF 2017.

UAF Vulnerability

The player's name is free'd first and then the player's chunk itself. However, the **selected** variable isn't zeroed out, which we can abuse to leak the main_arena pointer of a smallbin chunk.

```
            [...]
00401b9c  mov     eax, dword [rbp-0x1c]       ; index
00401b9f  mov     rax, qword [rax*8+0x603180] ; player struct pointer
00401ba7  mov     qword [rbp-0x18], rax
00401bab  mov     eax, dword [rbp-0x1c]
00401bae  mov     qword [rax*8+0x603180], 0x0 ; mitigate double-free, good shit
00401bba  mov     rax, qword [rbp-0x18]
00401bbe  mov     rax, qword [rax+0x10]       ; player's name pointer
00401bc2  mov     rdi, rax
00401bc5  call    free
00401bca  mov     rax, qword [rbp-0x18]       ; player's chunk
00401bce  mov     rdi, rax
00401bd1  call    free
            [...]
```

- Generate an exploit for a PoC crashing at a non-exploitable memory read operation.
  Note: The ASLR defense is turned off in the experiment.

Takeaway

AEG vs. Revery

- Traditional AEG solutions:
  - Highly depend on the crashing scene
  - Use dynamic analysis and symbex
- Challenges
  - PoC crashing scene is non-exploitable
  - Symbolic execution is not scalable
  - Poor support for heap vulnerabilities

- Revery
  - Explore diverging paths rather than PoC path
  - Use fuzzing rather than symbolic execution, to explore diverging paths
  - Use layout contributor instructions as targets, to direct the fuzzing and speedup.
  - Use symbolic execution to stitch PoC path and diverging path, to generate exploits

Revery only pushes AEG one small step forward.

Roadblocks of AEG

- Exploit specification (AH)
  - Conditions of anti-specification
  - Partitioning of code privilege
- Exploit generation (BCDE)
  - Infer pre/post conditions
  - Infer loop pre condition
  - Infer paths reachable to targets
  - Exploit derivability (Revery)
- Multi-interaction (F)
  - Multiple vulnerabilities, multi-operations
- Environment manipulation (GIJK)
  - Race condition
  - Memory/heap fengshui
  - Time analysis, to infer size etc.
  - Information leakage, e.g., side channel

The Automated Exploitation Grand Challenge

Tales of Weird Machines

Julien Vanegue

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H2HC conference, Sao Paulo, Brazil

October 2013

- Infrastructure
  - Symbex, taint analysis, binary analysis…

Thanks!

Q&A