

Cyber Grand Shellphish



POC 2016



THE COMPUTER SECURITY GROUP AT UC SANTA BARBARA

An aerial photograph of a coastal town, likely Santa Barbara, California. The image shows a large body of water in the foreground, a sandy beach, and a town with various buildings. In the background, there are rolling green hills and mountains. The word "SHELLPISH" is written in large, white, stylized letters across the middle of the image. A white arrow points from the word towards the right, and another white arrow points from the bottom towards the beach area.

SHELLPISH

HEX on the beach

Shellphish?

- Founded in 2004
- Oldest? Capture the Flag team around
- Semi-successful
 - Won DEFCON CTF 2005
 - Qualified for DEFCON CTF every year but 2007 or so
- Hackademics at heart



CYBER
GRAND_CHALLENGE

DARPA Grand Challenges

Self-driving Cars




Robots



DARPA Cyber Grand Challenge

Programs!



Past: Manual Vulnerability Analysis


- "Look at the code and see what you can find"
- Requires substantial expertise
 - Analysis is as good as the person performing it
- Allows for the identification of complex vulnerabilities
- Expensive, does not scale

Current: Tool-assisted Vuln Analysis

- "Run these tools and verify/expand the results"
- Tools help in identifying areas of interest
 - Ruling out known code
 - Identifying potential vulnerabilities
 - Generate shellcode
- A human is involved, expertise and scale are still issues

Future: Automated Vuln Analysis

- "Run this tool and it will find the vulnerability"
 - ... and generate an exploit
 - ... and generate a patch
- Requires well-defined models for the vulnerabilities
- Which vulnerabilities? Must be modeled
- How to scale?
- The problem with halting...



2013

2014

2015

2016



Shellphish signs up!
1st commit to the CRS!

2nd commit to the CRS!
3 weeks of insanity

3 months of insanity
"Code freeze"
Final commit to the CRS!

Registration deadline
Scored event 1

Scored event 2
Quals!

Finals!





CRSPY

#isekt

CYBER

CYBER

CYBER

CYBER

CYBER

CYBER

CYBER

DARPA Cyber Grand Challenge



Organized as a Attack/Defense CTF

- Leverage CTF style to advance science
- Completely autonomous
- No team to team traffic
- Patches and exploits fielded through API (TI)
- Network traffic available via tap
- Big \$\$\$ on the line (3.75 million USD)
 - Lots of clarifications needed (68 pages of FAQ)
 - Roboter over air-gap to transfer data one-way (out)



CYBER
GRAND CHALLENGE

S



MIND THE
AIR GAP

DARPA

DATA OUT

POWER



analyze

pwn

patch



Analyze

- DECREE is Linux-inspired environment, only 7 syscalls
 - transmit / receive / fdwait (\approx select)
 - allocate / deallocate
 - random
 - terminate
- No need to model the POSIX API
- Otherwise real(istic) programs!

Pwn



- No filesystem → No flag?
- CGC Quals: Crash = Exploit
- CGC Finals: Two types of exploits
 - "flag overwrite": set a register to X, crash at Y
 - "flag read": leak the "secret flag" from memory

Patch



```
int main() { return 0; }
```

fails functionality checks...

```
signal(SIGINT, SIG_DFL);
```

no signal handling!

```
inline __attribute__((no_sse))
```

performance penalties...

CGC Final Event (CFE)



- Divided in 96 rounds, with short breaks between rounds
- API access to Challenge Binaries (CBs) for teams' CRSs
 - Each CB provides a service (e.g., an HTTP server)
 - Initially, all teams run the same binaries for each service
- Each round: score for each unique (team, service) tuple

CGC Final Event (CFE)



$$\sum_{i=0}^{\#CB} \textit{Availability} \times \textit{Security} \times \textit{Evaluation}$$

- Availability: how badly did you f*ck up the binary?
- Security: did you defend against *all* exploits?
- Evaluation: how many teams did you pwn?

Mechanical Phish (CFE)

Our Cyber Reasoning System (CRS)

Completely autonomous system


- Patch
- Crash
- Exploit

Computational resources provided:

- 1,280 cores; 16TB memory



Mechanical Phish (CFE)





Challenges

- Infrastructure Availability
 - (Almost) No event can cause a catastrophic downtime
- Analysis Scalability
 - Efficiently and autonomously directing fuzzing and state exploration
- Performance/Security Trade-off
 - Many patches, many approaches: which patched binary to field?

	LUNGS	PHAGES	CRUFT1	CRUFT3	NBFMS
SPACE SHIP	3	1			
LIGHT		3			
MEDIUM			1		
HEAVY			3		
FLIBET	1			1	
BITFLIP					

board to
 13
 NBFM - 36
 NBFM - 23
 NBFM - 21
 NBFM - 11
 NBFM - 14
 Crows - 39
 Crows - 70
 Crows - 71
 NBFM - 5



woundedwarrior

Code Freeze



cao 4:01 PM

farnsworth has been frozen

all outstanding merge requests have been merged in




mike_pizza 4:01 PM

holy shit



cao 4:02 PM

set the channel topic: meister and farnsworth are in code freeze



God please forgive me for this commit

Francesco Disperati authored 22 days ago



72a44980



Fixes

Francesco Disperati authored 22 days ago



18849985



Disable IDSSubmitter

Francesco Disperati authored 23 days ago



460fc02c



Capitalize constant

Francesco Disperati authored 23 days ago



60cb8fe0



pass patchtype to PatcherexJob

Antonio Bianchi authored 23 days ago




160a89d4

15 Jul, 2016 20 commits



Tue 2 Aug, 23:54
~15 hours before access shutdown



Ambassador and Scriba

Ambassador:

Talk with Team Interface API

- Update Farnsworth

Scriba:

Submission Decision Maker

- Which exploit to launch against which team?
- Which patch to field?


Farnsworth

Object-relational model for database:

- What CS are fielded this round?
- Do we have crashes?
- Do we have a good patch?
- ...

Our ground truth and the only component reasonably well tested*

* 69% coverage



Meister

Job scheduler:

- Looks at game state
- Asks creators for jobs
- Schedules them based on priority

```
2016-08-03 12:42:26 -0700 bfec79f Merge branch 'fix/colorguard-only-trace-those-untraced' into 'master'
2016-08-03 12:41:30 -0700 f90c995 Log failed pod deletion
2016-08-03 12:41:23 -0700 6f0ac2e Delete failed pods
2016-08-03 12:35:05 -0700 1290f67 Only trace testcases which have been untraced by colorguard
2016-08-03 08:02:29 -0700 ecbe399 create the list in parallel
2016-08-03 06:32:11 -0700 fce13f8 Select only crash.id for colorguard
2016-08-03 06:27:04 -0700 58cc1f7 Fix colorguard and driller creators
2016-08-03 06:22:08 -0700 169b96d Set creator time limit to 15
2016-08-03 05:05:50 -0700 983d261 Use minimum of 2 seconds as a minimum rate for staggering
2016-08-03 04:56:37 -0700 f042428 Fix number of pods needed
2016-08-03 04:55:23 -0700 d582e92 Use runtime to determine jobs to stagger
2016-08-03 04:26:07 -0700 0a90221 Do not kill jobs unnecessarily
2016-08-03 03:34:58 -0700 eb82518 Fix job_ids_to_kill for staggered scheduling
2016-08-03 02:20:23 -0700 c1e8e3e Merge branch 'feature/staggered-priority' into 'master'
2016-08-03 02:11:15 -0700 3fba706 Use set for jobs_to_ignore
2016-08-03 02:03:45 -0700 b76594c Staggered pod creation
2016-08-03 02:01:16 -0700 5eb57fd Merge branch 'fix/pov_fuzzing_devshm' into 'master'
2016-08-03 01:57:55 -0700 a60f7ee up memory for using dev shm
```


angr

- Binary analysis framework developed at UC Santa Barbara
- Supports variety of architectures
 - x86, MIPS, ARM, PPC, etc. (all 32 and 64 bit)
- Open-source, free for commercial use (!)
 - <http://angr.io>
 - <https://github.com/angr>
 - angr@lists.cs.ucsb.edu





How Do We Find Crashes?



Fuzzing

- Automated procedure to send inputs and record safety condition violations as crashes
 - Assumption: crashes are potentially exploitable
- Several dimensions in the fuzzing space
 - How to supply inputs to the program under test?
 - How to generate inputs?
 - How to find more “relevant” crashes?
 - How to change inputs between runs?
- Goal: Maximized effectiveness of the process

Fuzzing

```
x = int(input())
if x >= 10:
    if x < 100:
        print "You win!"
    else:
        print "You lose!"
else:
    print "You lose!"
```

Let's fuzz it!

1 ⇒ "You lose!"

593 ⇒ "You lose!"

4 ⇒ "You lose!"

498 ⇒ "You lose!"

42 ⇒ "You win!"

Fuzzing

```
x = int(input())
if x >= 10:
    if x^2 == 152399025:
        print "You win!"
    else:
        print "You lose!"
else:
    print "You lose!"
```

Let's fuzz it!

1 ⇒ "You lose!"
593 ⇒ "You lose!"
4 ⇒ "You lose!"
498 ⇒ "You lose!"
42 ⇒ "You lose!"
3 ⇒ "You lose!"
.....
57 ⇒ "You lose!"


AFL

- Very fast!
- Very effective!
- Unable to deal with certain situations:
 - Magic numbers
 - Hashes
 - Specific identifiers

angr




```
→ x = input()
→ if x >= 10:
  → if x % 1337 == 0:
    print "You win!"
  → else:
    print "You Lose!"
→ else:
  print "You Lose!"
```




angr




```
x = input()
if x >= 10:
    if x % 1337 == 0:
        print "You win!"
    else:
        print "You Lose!"
else:
    print "You Lose!"
```






Driller = angr + AFL






Driller






Driller



Driller



Driller





Automatic Exploitation (Simplified)

```
typedef struct component {
    char name[32];
    int (*do_something)(int arg);
} comp_t;

comp_t *initialize_component(char *cmp_name) {
    int i = 0;
    struct component *cmp;

    cmp = malloc(sizeof(struct component));
    cmp->do_something = sample_func;

    while (*cmp_name)
        cmp->name[i++] = *cmp_name++;

    cmp->name[i] = '\0';
    return cmp;
}

x = get_input();
cmp = initialize_component(x);
cmp->do_something(1);
```

HEAP

Symbolic Byte[0]
Symbolic Byte[1]
Symbolic Byte[2]
Symbolic Byte[3]
Symbolic Byte[4]
Symbolic Byte[5]
Symbolic Byte[6]
Symbolic Byte[7]
...

Symbolic Byte[32] ...
Symbolic Byte[36]

'\0'

call **<symbolic byte[36:32]>**

Automatic Exploitation (Simplified)

1. Turning the state into an **exploited** state

```
angr
assert state.se.symbolic(state.regs.pc)
```

2. Constrain **buffer** to contain our shellcode

```
angr
buf_addr = find_symbolic_buffer(state, len(shellcode))
mem = state.memory.load(buf_addr, len(shellcode))
state.add_constraints(mem == state.se.bvv(shellcode))
```

Automatic Exploitation (Simplified)


3. Constrain **PC** to point to the buffer

```
angr
state.se.add_constraints(state.regs.pc == buf_addr)
```

4. **Synthesize!**

```
angr
exploit = state.posix.dumps(0)
```

Automatic Exploitation (Simplified)



Exploit Techniques

- Circumstantial
- Shellcode
- ROP
- Arbitrary Read - Point to Flag
- Arbitrary Read/Write - Exploration
- Write-What-Where



Colorguard: Flag Page Leaks

- Make only the flag page symbolic
- Everything else is completely concrete
 - Significantly faster
 - Can execute most basic block with Unicorn
- When cores are idle on the CRS, trace all our test cases
- Solved DEFCON CTF LEGIT_00009 challenge



Patcherex

Patching Techniques:


- Stack randomization
- Return pointer encryption
- ...

Patches:

- Insert code
- Insert data
- ...

Patching Backend:


- Detour
- Reassembler
- Reassembler Optimized



Adversarial Patches 1/2

Detect QEMU

```
xor eax, eax
inc eax
push eax
push eax
push eax
fld TBYTE PTR [esp]
fsqrt
```



Adversarial Patches 2/2

Transmit the flag


- To **stderr!**

Backdoor

- Hash-based challenge-response backdoor
- Not cryptographically secure (can be pre-computed)
- Good enough to defeat automatic systems (online > exec timeout)

Generic Patches

- Return pointer encryption
- Protect indirect calls/jmps
- Extended Malloc allocations
- Randomly shift the stack (ASLR)
- Clean uninitialized stack space
- ...



CFE Strategies / Techniques

Defense:

- Do not evaluate patches locally, too unreliable
- Do not deploy IDS rules, too dangerous
- Only briefly analyze patches from other teams
- Deploy patches immediately

Offense:

- Pwn as much as possible

CFE Statistics 1/3

- 82 Challenge Sets fielded
- 2442 Exploits generated
- 1709 Exploits for 14/82 CS with 100% Reliability
- Longest exploit: 3791 lines of C code
- Shortest exploit: 226 lines of C code
- crackaddr: 517 lines of C code

CFE Statistics 2/3

100% reliable exploits generated for:

- CROMU_000{46,51,55,65,94,98}
- KPRCA_00{065,094,112}
- NRFIN_000{52,59,63}
- YAN01_000{15,16}

Rematch Challenges:

- SQLSlammer (CROMU_00094)
- crackaddr (CROMU_00098)

CFE Statistics 3/3

Vulnerabilities in CS we exploited:

- CWE-20 Improper Input Validation
- CWE-119 Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer
- CWE-121: Stack-based Buffer Overflow
- CWE-122: Heap-based Buffer Overflow
- CWE-126: Buffer Over-read
- CWE-131: Incorrect Calculation of Buffer Size
- CWE-190: Integer Overflow or Wraparound
- CWE-193 Off-by-one Error
- CWE-201: Information Exposure Through Sent Data
- CWE-202: Exposure of Sensitive Data Through Data Queries
- CWE-681: Incorrect Conversion between Numeric Types
- CWE-787: Out-of-bounds Write
- CWE-788: Access of Memory Location After End of Buffer

CFE Pwning Statistics

Team	Flags Captured (49 rounds all)		CSes Pwned (49 rounds all)	
Shellphish	206	402	6	15
CodeJitsu	59	392	3	9
DeepRed	154	265	3	6
TECHx	66	214	2	4
Disekt	101	210	5	6
ForAllSecure	185	187	10	11
CSDS	20	22	1	2


CFE Patching Statistics


Team	Defended CS-Rounds (49 rounds all)		CSes Compromised (49 rounds all)	
Shellphish	29	68	7	12
TechX	27	61	7	14
DeepRed	32	87	6	15
ForAllSecure	54	160	7	16
CodeJitsu	61	104	9	16
Disket	66	127	9	17
CSDS	108	189	9	18

CFE St*p!d Bugs

- Network traffic synchronization
- Race condition in submission logic
- Slow scheduling by Kubernetes

Open source all the code!






On the Shoulders of Giants



Z3



AFL



SSD DEMO time!



Human Augmentation

DEFCON CTF 2016:

- CRS assisted with 5 exploits
- Human exploration → CRS exploitation
 - Semantic understanding of interactions/protocols helps
- Backdoors!

Thank you! Stay in touch!

Student? Looking for an
internship? Master thesis?
Wanting to do a PhD?

twitter: @shellphish

email: team@shellphish.net or cgc@shellphish.net

irc: #shellphish on freenode

twitter team:

@anton00b - @caovc - @giovanni_vigna - @jac_arc - @ltFish_ -
@machiry_msdc - @nebirhos - @rhelmtot - @zardus